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Part One
Introduction

1857. Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Charles Baudelaire’s Les 
Fleurs du mal, inaugural works of literary modernism, are put on trial 
for offenses against public morals, and the British Parliament passes 
Lord Campbell’s Obscene Publications Act, providing statutory author-
ity for the seizure and destruction of material deemed obscene. Two 
years later, John Stuart Mill publishes his classic treatise On Liberty. We 
place these events beside each other because they conveniently illus-
trate the terms within which the category of obscenity would be legis-
lated and debated over the next century, not only in Europe and the 
United States, but also, thanks to the colonial exportation of Western 
legal systems, around the globe. On the one hand, we see the modern 
state acknowledging that artistic expression may pose a threat to tradi-
tional morality and taking upon itself the job of adjudicating the nature 
and extent of that threat. Over the course of the nineteenth century in 
both Europe and the United States, the state increasingly usurped the 
traditional authority of the church in regulating and repressing sexual 
expression and behavior. On the other hand, we see the foundational 
elaboration of a political theory that identifies that very state function 
as a threat to individual liberty. And these terms have demographic 
analogues that further illuminate the struggles to come. Flaubert and 
Baudelaire mark the inception of a dissident class fragment, an avant-
garde community of artists and intellectuals who identified them-
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selves in opposition to the “tyranny of the majority” against which Mill 
warned. Conversely, the judges who ruled on their cases, and the Parlia-
ment that passed Lord Campbell’s Act, represent the hegemonic con-
solidation of what Matthew Arnold called the philistines, the ascendant 
middle classes that took it upon themselves to regulate and repress the 
burgeoning electoral majorities represented by increasing working-class 
literacy and enfranchisement. Obscenity, then, emerges as a marker of 
division and debate within the consolidating middle-class hegemony of 
the nation-state era.
 It also emerges out of persistent anxieties regarding the status of 
women within this developing class formation. The first application 
of Lord Campbell’s Act would be Queen v. Hicklin (1868), which con-
cerned the sale of a pamphlet entitled “The Confessional Unmasked: 
shewing the depravity of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of the Con-
fessional, and the questions put to females in confession.” This land-
mark case established what would become known as the “Hicklin Test”: 
“whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave 
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences, and into 
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”1 It was widely under-
stood that the “females” in the pamphlet were among “those whose 
minds are open to such influences,” so many Madame Bovarys who 
might be corrupted by obscene materials which, given rising literacy 
rates and improved printing technologies, were increasingly available 
in the bookstalls of London, Paris, and New York. One year later, Mill 
published The Subjection of Women, arguing that “the legal subordination 
of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself.”2 The long shadow cast by 
Hicklin over the next century would reveal the degree to which obscen-
ity trials were referenda on this threatened tradition of subordination.
 Initially, women participated in these trials only as fictional char-
acters or, as in the case of Jane Heap and Margaret Anderson, who 
serialized Ulysses in The Little Review, as publishers of modern litera-
ture suspected of obscenity. With the notable exception of Radclyffe 
Hall, who wrote the lesbian classic The Well of Loneliness, the authors of 
obscene literature were men writing about women whose sexual needs 
and appetites exceeded the protocols of their class. From Emma Bovary 
to Molly Bloom to Constance Chatterley, the heroines of the modern lit-
erature of obscenity are male fantasies of female sexual autonomy. Thus 
it is far from coincidental that, alongside works of literature, informa-
tion about contraception and abortion, frequently provided by “family 
limitation” activists such as Margaret Sanger and Mary Dennett, was also 
the object of systematic prosecution as obscenity.
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 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual and inexo-
rable shift in the terrain of the battle between the philistines and the lite-
rati, with the former increasingly ceding ground to the latter. Aesthetic 
practices and sexual protocols that had previously been the domain 
of a minority class fraction were increasingly becoming acknowledged 
and adopted by the burgeoning professional managerial classes, who 
were inheriting the mantle of moral authority from the genteel middle 
classes of the Victorian era. And this shift in class hegemony provoked 
corresponding changes in the cultural marketplace. As representations 
of, and information about, sexuality became increasingly acceptable to 
middle-class consumers, the culture industries worked to make such 
materials more easily available. And, as advertisers began adopting pop-
ular psychoanalytic theories equating sexual and consumer desire, it 
would become increasingly difficult to differentiate between commer-
cial exploitation and aesthetic expression of sexuality.
 The distinction was crucial, however, in determining the very dif-
ferent history of censorship in cinema. In the 1915 case of Mutual Film 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, the Supreme Court determined 
that “the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, 
originated and conducted for profit . . . not to be regarded . . . as part 
of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion.”3 And this 
determination would hold until the 1952 case of Burstyn v. Wilson, 
which granted cinema constitutional protections in the United States. 
The silent era would be marked by scandal and controversy, until Hol-
lywood ultimately decided in 1930 to regulate itself under the provi-
sions of the notorious Production Code. The Code was amended in 
1934, and henceforth the depiction of moral issues and sexual practices 
in American film would be regulated by the stern benevolence of Pro-
duction Code Chief Joseph Breen and the idiosyncratic exigencies of 
state film boards. The resulting “long adolescence” of Hollywood film, 
in which all crimes were punished and even married couples couldn’t 
be shown sleeping in the same bed, provides a potential argument for 
the productive, as opposed to repressive, powers of censorship.4
1957. Roth v. United States, followed by the passage of the revised Obscene 
Publications Act in England in 1959, marks a widely acknowledged turn-
ing point in the modern history of obscenity. Supreme Court Associate 
Justice William Brennan updated the test for obscenity as “whether to 
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the pruri-
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ent interest,” and he defined obscenity as speech that is “utterly without 
redeeming social importance.”5 Although the case affirmed that obscen-
ity would remain an exception to First Amendment protection, this def-
inition had the effect of dramatically narrowing the range of expression 
that could be included in this exception. This rapidly became evident 
in the many obscenity trials that followed on the heels of this landmark 
decision, in which it became increasingly difficult for the courts to iden-
tify material with no redeeming value. The authors, critics, publishers, 
and academics who had successfully institutionalized modern literature 
from Flaubert to Joyce were now able to liberate the last remaining 
“underground” classics that had formed a kind of shadow canon to the 
monuments of modernism.
 The “masterpiece” in this canon was D. H. Lawrence’s widely 
banned, and widely pirated, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, the story of a cross-
class romance between an aristocratic woman and her crippled hus-
band’s gamekeeper, who liberates her sexually partly through the use 
of four-letter words. Lady Chatterley (the slippage between character 
and novel was endemic) was put on trial not only in the United States 
and England, but also in Australia, India, and Japan. The English and 
American cases were widely heralded as triumphant battles in a war 
for freedom of expression that appeared, finally, to be won when, in 
1968, Lawyer Charles Rembar published The End of Obscenity, recount-
ing his successful exoneration in the United States of Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover, Tropic of Cancer, and Fanny Hill. Rembar confidently concluded 
his book: “So far as writers are concerned, there is no longer a law of 
obscenity.”6
 A battle had been won, but the war was not over. Indeed, Lady Chat-
terley fared less well in India and Japan. Both trials were deliberated 
under constitutions based on Anglo-American law, and both courts, 
making ample use of precedents from English and American trials, 
found the text to be obscene. And the judges in both cases were aware 
of the degree to which the liberal framework of Anglo-American law 
risked obscuring the cultural particularities of the community onto 
which it had been grafted. On the one hand, Justice Tsuyoshi Mano, 
concurring with the majority in the Japanese case, nevertheless felt 
it necessary to mention an ancient Japanese custom called “utagaki,” 
where “a group of young men and women went, hand in hand, up 
into a mountain, normally regarded as sacred, and there they feasted, 
sang, and danced; and at the height of pleasure, they engaged openly 
in indiscriminate group sex acts and indulged in the state of ecstasy.” 
Justice Mano cited this ancient practice in order to “illustrate that a way 
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of thinking like that of the majority opinion which attempts to set up 
an absolute bound for obscenity irrespective of time and place cannot 
escape criticism that it is a theory which disregarded clearly established 
historical facts.” Mano buttressed his argument by citing Judge Learned 
Hand’s famous dictum in United States v. Kennerly (1913), that obscenity 
should be determined according to “the present critical point of com-
promise between candor and shame at which the community may have 
arrived here and now,” but it is nevertheless clear that he is deliberately 
referencing a tradition whose practice precedes and exceeds modern 
definitions of obscenity.7
 If the Japanese case suggests that “ancient customs” may pose a 
challenge to the liberal framework of modern obscenity law, the Indian 
case of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1964) reveals a more 
urgent and contemporary concern. Magistrate J. Hidayatullah, writing 
for the majority, after detailing the history of Anglo-American obscenity 
law from Hicklin to Roth, cited the historical specificity of his court’s 
ruling: “Today our national and regional languages are strengthening 
themselves by new literary standards after a deadening period under 
the impact of English. Emulation by our writers of an obscene book 
under the aegis of the Court’s determination is likely to pervert our 
entire literature because obscenity pays and true art finds little popular 
support.” Anticipating contemporary postcolonial theory, Hidayatullah 
argued that traditionally subordinated populations are not necessarily 
well served by judicial philosophies that presume formal equality.8
 Back in the United States, the Supreme Court was attempting to 
refine and clarify the definition of obscenity that it had established in 
Roth. In Ginsberg v. New York (1968), the Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of New York’s Smut Peddling Law, which included a clause 
specifying “harm to minors” as a legitimate justification for a variable 
definition of obscenity. Brennan’s majority decision established that 
the state has an “independent interest in the well-being of its youth” 
that justifies enforcing a lower threshold of legality for sexually explicit 
materials made available to minors.9 In the same year, the MPAA would 
introduce its new ratings system, which replaced the moribund pro-
duction code with a set of categories designed to codify the difference 
between minors and adults. The new ratings system also had the some-
what unintended consequence of legitimating the emergent hardcore 
pornography industry, which quickly appropriated the adults-only “X” 
rating for its products.
 In 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren retired and the newly elected 
President Nixon selected the more conservative Warren Burger to 
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replace him. The Burger Court got the opportunity to revisit the seem-
ingly intractable problem of obscenity in the case of Miller v. CA (1973). 
Conceding that “no majority of the Court has at any given time been 
able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, por-
nographic material,” Burger convinced a 5–4 majority to replace the 
“utterly without redeeming social value” component of its definition 
with the far lower threshold of “whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”10 Further-
more, conceding that “it is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound 
to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or 
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City,” the majority opinion established that lower 
courts may use regionally specific community standards in adjudicating 
cases of obscenity.
 Five years later, in the case of Pacifica v. FCC (1978), the Supreme 
Court upheld the FCC’s ban on George Carlin’s classic monologue 
“Seven Words You Can’t Say on Television,” ruling that radio is a 
“uniquely pervasive” medium and therefore merits a lower threshold of 
legality regarding purportedly offensive speech.11 In the Pacifica case, 
the Court affirmed the FCC’s definition of “indecency” as speech which 
does not rise to the level of obscenity but which may be regulated if it is 
determined that children may hear it. This shift from outright censor-
ship to selective regulation would determine many of the most heated 
battles of the 1980s and 1990s, as absolute definitions ceded ground 
to contextual and variable understandings of obscenity and indecency. 
Correlatively, academic work on sexuality would shift from liberal pro-
motion of sexual freedom and equality to more skeptical considerations 
of disciplinary discourses in the wake of Michel Foucault’s foundational 
critique of the “repressive hypothesis.”12 In the postmodern era, in other 
words, liberal theories of freedom increasingly get exposed as feints for 
actual practices of oppression.
 Few figures would epitomize this shift more dramatically than anti-
pornography feminist and legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon, whose 
work with Andrea Dworkin in the 1970s and 1980s would precipitate a 
number of ultimately failed attempts to ban hardcore pornography as a 
violation of the civil rights of women. According to MacKinnon,
Obscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals from the 
male point of view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance. The 
feminist critique of pornography is a politics, specifically politics from 
women’s point of view, meaning the standpoint of the subordination 
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of women to men. Morality here means good and evil; politics means 
power and powerlessness. Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a 
political practice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete.13
In essence deploying Mill against himself, and echoing Judge Hidayatul-
lah’s reasoning above, MacKinnon revealed the possibility that, in the 
absence of substantive equality, freedom of expression can enable prac-
tices of oppression. MacKinnon and Dworkin further turned the tables 
by focusing on pornography’s effects on adult males, extending the long 
shadow of Hicklin into the culture wars of the late twentieth century.
 Paralleling the feminist “sex wars,” in which MacKinnon and Dwor-
kin would figure so prominently, was the emergence of a generation 
of radical performance artists who, instead of opposing pornography, 
in essence reclaimed the bodies it purportedly exploits. Works such as 
Carolee Schneeman’s “Interior Scroll,” in which she read from a scroll 
that she extracted from her vagina, or Annie Sprinkle’s “Public Cervix 
Announcement,” in which the audience was invited to view her cervix 
through a speculum, literally put the artist’s body on the line, challeng-
ing fundamental distinctions between art and life, expression and con-
duct. Whether these challenges violated the First Amendment would 
be put to the test in 1990 when performance artists Karen Finley, Holly 
Hughes, John Fleck, and Tim Miller, whose contribution to this col-
lection recounts some of these struggles, were denied grants by NEA 
director John Frohnmeyer, even though they had already been selected 
through peer review. The so-called “NEA Four” would go on to win 
their case in court, but the victory was pyrrhic insofar as the NEA, under 
pressure from conservatives in Congress, ceased funding individual art-
ists. The growing power of neo-conservatism was putting liberals, and 
liberalism, on the defensive.
 At the same time, neoliberal theories of the free market began to 
trump liberal theories of freedom of expression as the economy increas-
ingly integrated on a global scale. This global neoliberal economy 
depends on new communications media, and these new media have 
become crucial in further challenging and confounding liberal proto-
cols for the regulation and even the definition of speech. And if the gov-
ernment has been, for the most part, highly successful in maintaining a 
powerful outpost of censorship when it comes to traditional broadcast 
media, it failed miserably when it came to the entirely new media of the 
Internet. In 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Clinton Admin-
istration’s Communications Decency Act, which was intended to regulate 
indecency on the Internet, violated the First Amendment. Since then, 
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pornography in all its myriad forms has become an integral, ubiquitous, 
and highly controversial component of the new media universe.
 Recent efforts to regulate Internet pornography have focused 
almost exclusively on children, once again affirming Hicklin’s hold on 
our sexual mores. Childhood would appear to mark an ultimate limit 
for liberalism, a stage in the life cycle when the faculties to exercise (or 
appreciate) freedom of expression are not fully developed. Mill himself 
affirmed that his “doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in 
the maturity of their faculties.”14 As Laura Kipnis’s contribution to this 
collection affirms, adjudicating the sexual and political senses of “matu-
rity” promises to be one of the principal challenges for liberalism in the 
future.
2007. When we hosted our Obscenity Symposium on the campus of 
the University of Iowa on March 1–4, we were struck by the contra-
dictory role liberalism played. On the one hand, freedom of expres-
sion was the premise and foundation of the event. Without the First 
Amendment, we probably wouldn’t have been able to organize the sym-
posium in the first place. Furthermore, many of the artists and per-
formers we had invited were veterans of the culture wars of the 1980s 
and 1990s, whose hard won victories had depended on liberalism’s fun-
damental premises. On the other hand, many of the talks interrogated 
these premises, revealing the degree to which liberalism, which, as we 
have seen, defined the parameters of the debate over obscenity in the 
twentieth century, has increasingly been under siege, on the one side 
from postmodern thinkers skeptical about its andro- and ethnocentric 
assumptions, and on the other side from religious thinkers doubtful 
of its moral integrity. Furthermore, this disintegration is occurring in 
the context of a globalization of culture that increasingly mixes and 
matches widely different assumptions about the nature of sexuality and 
the appropriate regulation of its expression. One of the principal chal-
lenges for scholars in the twenty-first century will be to formulate new 
models of research and analysis appropriate to understanding and eval-
uating obscenity in this new global public sphere. In order to do this, 
we need to examine it in both its past and its present manifestations. 
This collection, then, is intended as a casebook that will put recent 
developments into an historical and global context and chart out pos-
sible futures for a debate that clearly promises to persist well into the 
new millennium.
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We have divided our collection into three sections that are meant to 
introduce and then elaborate upon the basic terms of this debate. Our 
introduction is followed by anthropologist Michael Taussig’s rumina-
tions on the myriad meanings of obscenity in everyday life. Taussig’s 
meditations reveal both the ubiquity and the ambiguity of obscenity 
and therefore complement our introduction to the history of its legal 
regulation. Together, these two introductions present the fundamen-
tal definitional challenge that obscenity poses for legal, literary, and 
anthropological theory.
 The two essays in our next section, “The Triumph of Liberalism,” 
illustrate how classical liberalism has addressed this challenge in the 
United States over the last century. For Nadine Strossen, former Presi-
dent of the ACLU, the impossibility of defining obscenity proves why it 
should not, and should never have been, an exception to First Amend-
ment protection, and her essay provides both a history and a defense 
of the ACLU’s struggles to eliminate this exception since the landmark 
passage of Roth v. United States. Brett Gary’s contribution then provides 
a prehistory to these struggles in the career of lawyer Morris Ernst, 
whose successful campaign against censorship in the 1930s established 
the groundwork for the constitutional debate that would emerge from 
Roth.
 Our next, and largest, section, “The Limits of Liberalism,” as its title 
indicates, provides a representative selection of philosophical, method-
ological, and cultural challenges to liberalism as a framework for debat-
ing obscenity. We start off with Tim Miller’s performance piece, “Sex/
Body/Self,” in order to illustrate the ways in which artistic expression 
has continued to challenge “contemporary community standards” after 
the so-called end of obscenity. As an example of queer performance 
art, Miller’s piece also illustrates the degree to which the individualist 
assumptions of classical liberalism cannot always effectively account for 
the realities of group experience and identification. For this reason, we 
follow Miller’s piece with Jyoti Puri’s academic analysis, “Forging Hetero- 
Collectives,” which closely analyzes how forms of collective identity in 
India are negotiated through obscenity legislation. Puri offers the Fou-
cauldian concept of biopolitics as a tool for understanding and inter-
vening in contemporary struggles over collective identity, which are so 
central to the legislation of obscenity and artistic expression.
 Foucault provides one framework for understanding the limits of 
liberalism in negotiating the problem of obscenity; Freud provides 
another. Both Laura Kipnis’s discussion of Terry Zwigoff’s 1994 biopic 
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about the cartoonist R. Crumb and Mikita Brottman and David Sterritt’s 
meditations on the psychosexual relations between money and feces 
deploy Freudian theory in order to understand the psychological mech-
anisms of offense that tend to be obscured by liberal models of the 
rational individual. More specifically, both of these contributions reveal 
the degree to which childhood, frequently formulated as a stage during 
which we should be protected from obscenity, is in fact one of the pri-
mary sources of its content.
 We conclude with John Peters’s “Preludes to a Theory of Obscen-
ity,” which argues that, while we cannot trust the agencies of the state 
to regulate sexual expression, we should nevertheless affirm our oppo-
sition to certain forms of that expression in what are essentially moral 
terms. Noting liberalism’s reluctance to hazard moral judgments when 
it comes to obscenity, Peters suggests that such judgments have been 
and remain available in the work of a variety of critical thinkers, both 
ancient and modern, and that these judgments can provide the basis 
for a more discriminatory engagement with the proliferation of sexual 
imagery in our contemporary society.
 The contrast between Strossen and Peters is clear, and that is why 
they bookend our collection. However, they both agree in their fun-
damental opposition to censorship, and this agreement indicates, to 
us, that liberalism remains essential as a legal framework for negotiat-
ing, and protecting, sexual expression in the contemporary world. As 
a philosophical or psychological theory for understanding the nature 
and function of that expression, however, liberalism has clearly proven 
unsatisfactory, and the essays in this volume are intended to offer some 
alternative methods for achieving this understanding. Ultimately, none 
of them is able to resolve all the complexities presented by the debate 
over obscenity, but together they provide the essential coordinates for 
understanding its political and philosophical stakes.
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January 1, 2007. My 22-year-old son rents a video from Kim’s, titled Clerks 
2, telling me that Clerks 1 was pretty funny, and we sit down to watch it 
around 8:00 at night, the night before he returns to school. He explains 
that it is a sort of documentary, showing the lives of people who clerk in 
stores like a 7-Eleven or a McDonald’s in New Jersey, a place that to the 
enlightened people in Manhattan epitomizes obscenity anyway, full of 
SUVs, suburbs, chemical plants, and people too cheap to live in the city 
but come to Manhattan weekends to indulge in strip clubs, fancy restau-
rants, and Broadway shows. Well, after a few minutes we are pretty dis-
gusted; not a single line of dialogue comes out of the mouths of these 
quintessentially ordinary people in their mid-twenties without reference 
to genitalia or lurid sexual activity, the movie drawing to a close with 
a fleshy bald male called Kelly in black leather long johns sucking off 
a donkey on an improvised stage with a smoke machine in what looks 
like a McDonald’s but for legal reasons, I guess, has an invented name. 
“It’s disgusting,” says one of the young women in the movie, referring 
not to McDonald’s but to the size of the donkey’s penis off screen, “but 
I can’t stop looking.” Georges Bataille could not have put it better with 
his mantra of attraction and repulsion. Is this the genius of the vernac-
ular? That it can express convoluted highbrow ideas in a pithy phrase 
enlarged by the mise-en-scène? Bataille’s other term, made much of by 
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Julia Kristeva, namely, the abject, also springs to mind, a troublesome 
term that to me suggests a close kinship with the obscene—note the 
strange prefixes at work here, abject and obscene, and start to plot your 
etymologies. This movie, I say to myself, must be a particularly reveal-
ing instance of so-called popular culture, which I always feel I am miss-
ing out on and don’t really know what it is. Once you have bracketed it 
like that and given it a name, “popular culture,” I fear you have already 
lost it. Could the same apply to the obscene? Thank God I have this son 
of mine who knows popular culture inside out and when home from 
school acts as my guide, as did the pagan Virgil to Dante, lost and con-
fused, making his way ever deeper underground to the nether parts of 
the devil himself on his way to redemption. They say it’s adults who edu-
cate children, but nowadays it’s so obviously the other way around, at 
least when it comes to popular culture. When I was a kid in Australia in 
1952, I went to see a locally made movie called Bush Christmas in which 
two friends of mine from up the road, Nicky Yardley and his brother 
Michael, starred. What a thrill it was to see the credits flash on and then 
the sign, “Adults Only Permitted if Accompanied by Children.” The 
film concerned a handful of children, boys and girls, outwitting some 
bushrangers. How crazily innocent it all seems when viewed from today 
with movies like Clerks 2! What has happened in the intervening years, 
along with everyday reports of child abuse, hysteria about so-called sex 
offenders stigmatized as loathsome beasts, and pre-pubescent girls act-
ing like sex kittens, as depicted poignantly toward the end of the won-
derful movie Little Miss Sunshine? Which of these categories of behavior 
deserve to be called obscene and which do not? This question is made all 
the more complex by the fact that in Clerks 2 the obscenities—if that’s 
a fair epithet—are so terribly natural, unstressed, unexcited and unex-
citing, like someone asking for a Big Mac or a Coke, in which case, why 
bother? Why the autistic lack of emotion about the obscene? Is this the 
new sitcom, sex without sex? Could this be the ultimate sanitization of 
society, de-eroticizing the erotic?
January 2. Downtown Manhattan in a bar waiting for my other son. I 
am thinking of writing something about obscenity and am pondering 
how much the Western world has changed with respect to the mov-
ing line separating the obscene from the non-obscene. When Thomas 
Hardy got his most celebrated novel, Jude the Obscure, published in Eng-
land just over one hundred years ago, it was greeted with shock at the 
attack on marriage, class, and sexual mores, meriting a review entitled 
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Jude the Obscene. In Sister of the Road: The Autobiography of Boxcar Bertha, 
by the anarchist obstetrician-gynecologist and lover of Emma Goldman, 
Ben Reitman, Bertha tells us of her beloved mother’s father, a farmer 
in Kansas who, in the 1880s, was one of the organizers of the free-love 
convention at Worcester, Massachusetts. This man served three terms in 
jail, two of which were for sending birth control information through 
the mail, which the federal authorities called obscene. And as regards 
this moving line separating the obscene from the non-obscene, isn’t it 
a curious fact that I find it difficult, if not impossible, to define one or 
the other of these terms outside of their coupling as mutually antago-
nistic opposites, the same way as Émile Durkheim defines the sacred, 
as not the profane? I am early, so I sit by the bar after locking my bike 
outside on Sixth Avenue, where I notice a bearded muscle-bound guy 
in his forties dressed in black looking like Kelly from the movie last 
night sitting outside on this cold early evening by a lonely table smok-
ing a cigarette and talking avidly into the cell phone cradled in his ear. 
A far cry from the haunts of the bridge-and-tunnel crowd from New 
Jersey, the bar has yet to fill up with its usual crowd of yuppie bohemi-
ans and academics like myself. A man and woman are sort of making 
out, seated at a table by the window, looking pretty glum. Three or four 
guys are at the bar talking chummily with the barman. A cute young 
waitress tying on her apron takes my order and over a glass of red wine 
balanced on a tiny copper-topped table I try to read my novel, Distant 
Star by the Chilean Roberto Bolano¾“the most influential and admired 
novelist in the Spanish-speaking world,” according to Susan Sontag. I 
notice a camouflage-patterned backpack hanging over the chair next to 
me. Immersed in the mysteries of the strange poet—or is he a spy?—in 
the time when Pinochet took power in Chile, I fail to notice the entry 
of the bearded muscle man from outside, sans cigarette, who, despite 
there being plenty of empty seats, sits down right beside me speaking 
loudly in an Oh! I am so Gay! manner of speech into his cell phone, so 
loudly and with such flair that you had to wonder if actually he wasn’t 
talking primarily to the few people in the bar for whom the supposed 
person at the other end of the phone was merely an excuse. “So we 
went to the hospital,” he booms, “and she’s gonna have . . .”—and he 
opens a note book and slowly reads out, syllable by syllable, “palliative 
treatment.” “This is good,” he goes on to say in a voice at once cajoling 
and authoritative, a voice that brooks no dissent, as he describes what 
happened yesterday, what happened today with the lung tissue slides 
at Sloan Kettering, and how all of that connects with what will happen 
tomorrow with the ambulance to White Plains. I am sitting there like 
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an idiot unable to shut out this saga. It seems like the other person on 
the phone never speaks, pulverized by this monologue and perhaps by 
grief and anxiety. It is sickening to be exposed to this intimacy, the inti-
macy of death, no matter how anonymous such dying might be with 
respect to the captive audience in the bar, and I have little hesitation, 
although I do have some, in designating this activity as obscene. The 
hesitation I have has to do with the way people often refer to something 
they dislike as “obscene,” thus injecting moral condemnation where it 
doesn’t seem to quite fit. This is puzzling to me, and its delineation 
might shed light on the meaning, today, of obscenity. To offer what 
might not be the best example of what I have in mind here, let me 
recall a strange moment in a collapsing Anthropology Department full 
of rancor. A first-year graduate student was giving a talk, accompanied 
by slides, on the eating clubs at Princeton where he had been a student, 
his talk being billed as one of those rare occasions where the secrets, 
or should I say sociology, of the rich and privileged are to be revealed. 
This was according to the senior professor, whose disgust at the rich 
and powerful was equaled only by her desire to become one of them. 
Her protégé, an untenured professor of similar disposition, chimed in 
when, trying to deal with the problem of whether it was ethical to show 
the faces of the Princeton students photographed, someone proposed 
that maybe the faces could be masked in some way or blurred. “That 
would be truly obscene,” he thundered, a statement I remember viv-
idly as if it was yesterday, even though it occurred some twelve years 
ago. Turning this over in my mind, as has been my wont at unexpected 
moments over the years, I keep wondering why this would be thought of 
as obscene, indeed “truly obscene,” and frankly I have no answer. What 
I do feel sure about is that all of us in that room were with that remark 
being marshaled like sheep to pass into a scary place where one was to 
be morally strip-searched, and, worst of all, we had no idea what we had 
done wrong. In other words, it was not the suggestion about masking 
and making persons anonymous that was obscene, “truly obscene,” but 
that rejoinder itself, suggesting that those who would designate some-
thing as obscene are playing with fire and may well turn out to be far 
more obscene than what they rail against. The line dividing the obscene 
from the non-obscene is anything but clear, anything but stable, and, 
what is more, is such that even to name it, even to mark it, is to run 
the risk of adding to obscenity’s mysterious power and fall victim to its 
stigmatizing effluvium. But enough of this madness and back to the bar 
on Sixth Ave where, having finally laid his phone to rest, the bearded 
man, obviously a favored customer, perhaps a waiter himself or even the 
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manager, calls over one of the young men waiting tables the second 
he has disposed of his phone and in an even louder voice than before 
says, “Hi Mark, you’re the worst sex I’ve ever had in my life.” Not even 
Bataille with his marked interest in the confluence of sex and death 
could have predicted the perfection with which his theory would mani-
fest itself as it did that second day of the New Year, 2007. I pack my bag 
and take Roberto Bolano’s Distant Star over to a table as far away as pos-
sible in the back room aglow with Christmas lights.
January 3. Now that I’ve got this idea of an “obscenity diary” I am train-
ing myself to be more conscious of obscenity and am wondering why 
this so interests me. I am now in a more activist mode, fine-tuning my 
antennae to the obscene instead of just waiting passively for it to hap-
pen. Three years back my friend Jimmie Durham sent me a copy of his 
nature journal that he kept for many months in Berlin and I thought it 
wonderful, matter-of-fact whimsy concerning the odd bird that makes 
its appearance towards the end of winter, some new grass by the canal, 
the character of the frost. What made it charming was the basic idea 
that nature in the city is a fascinating topic, like an illegal immigrant 
hiding out between the artificial splendor of the well-ordered parks on 
one side, and car exhaust on the other. But it is the cast of mind that’s 
important here—not so much what one is looking for, but the way one 
looks—as when Jimmie writes his entry for December 24, 2000, about 
buying a wild goose, cooking it, then the first snow of the year falls 
around five in the evening, everything becomes white and quiet and he 
goes out onto the small terrace and hears a crow calling in the distance. 
This sense of nature as antithetical to the city, as a wild intruder lurking 
in the background waiting its time, is surely analogous to obscenity with 
its necessary affinities to what is deemed right and proper, reminding 
me of the story I was told by my British anthropologist friend Olivia 
Harris in the 1970s of how surprised everyone was when the British gov-
ernment built one of its first motorways, the M1, and instead of fleeing, 
the rabbits returned to the edges of the motorway and built their bur-
rows right there, apparently enjoying the vibrations. Is that rabbit analo-
gous to obscenity? Once conscious of my new mission I start seeing 
obscenity everywhere. In the swimming pool today there is this really fat 
man who looks so obscene in the shower with his tummy falling over his 
thighs and black hair over his back. Swimming he looks like a whale 
having a seizure. But now you have to be careful because fatness is not 
a laughing matter, what with juvenile diabetes, largely caused by fast 
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food joints such as the one in Clerks 2, and fatness has been dignified as 
a Civil Right. McDonald’s breathes a little easier. And anyway, aren’t we 
each and all free agents, responsible for how we look and what we eat? 
I ask myself, what would Jimmie’s diary have to say about this nature in 
the city? Leaving the pool, I get on my daughter’s vintage Schwinn bike 
and pedal through Central Park. It is a fine day. People are happy. In 
fact it is too damn fine, almost a summer day and it is the middle of win-
ter. The radio tells me that 2007 will be the hottest year ever. The planet 
is in trouble. My dentist chuckles over my gaping mouth. She has a 
sunny disposition and can be very funny, an advantage, I would think, 
for someone who has to look down into smelly, cavity-riddled mouths 
and wobbling tonsils all the time such that it becomes just another bor-
ing day at the office. Well, maybe not quite, which is where a TV pro-
gram like MASH gets its humor, mixing the sacred opening of the 
human body by scalpels and retractors with the routines of the operat-
ing theater, same as William Burroughs’s famous “routines,” he called 
them in his letters to Allen Ginsberg, concerning Doctor Benway throw-
ing scalpels and swabs around in gay abandon. Not quite so funny are 
my memories of medical school, of the year we students spent in small 
teams of four or five dissecting the human corpse, one team at the top, 
head and trunk, the other team below that when, to my horror, I was 
told by a friend that one of our fellow students, a star athlete, was cut-
ting out part of the female genitalia from several corpses and keeping 
them in a match box. We are used in anthropology to the concept of 
“licensed transgression,” those occasions societies set aside, such as ini-
tiation rites or Saturday nights, when the rules of decorum are relaxed 
or transgressed, by permission, as it were, thus making of transgression 
a complicated business indeed, partly rule breaking, partly rule conserv-
ing. In such a situation is obscenity truly obscenity, and what then of 
unlicensed transgression, as with the scalpel wielding medical student 
whom none of us informed on? “Well,” my dentist says, probing tooth 
Number Eighteen, “we ruined this one [meaning the planet Earth], 
let’s move on to the next!” “And everyone laughing and enjoying the 
lovely warm sunlit end of the world,” I say between opening and closing 
my mouth. And she laughs too. When I rode though the park, black 
nannies in droves were pushing white babies in baby carriages under 
the pines that the wealthy people on the Upper East Side have donated. 
A black man sat playing a drum with a small coat on the ground for 
coins. He was still there two and half hours later when I pedaled home, 
playing the tom-tom for the white folks. Opposite the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art a mammoth stretch limo black and shiny suddenly pulls 
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out. Could have killed me. Parks illegally and is still there when I pedal 
back hours later, motor running the full complement of carbon monox-
ide, the driver barely visible behind the dark glass of the window in his 
suit and tie peering into a small computer as his hedge fund boss does 
deals with the museum. Does anyone really know what a “hedge fund” 
is, by the way? And they say magic has been driven out of the world. 
Thinking about the history of the Louvre, in one of his more memora-
ble Surrealist pieces for his famous dictionary in his 1930 magazine, 
Documents, Georges Bataille stated that the art gallery in our time has 
taken over as the sacred site in the center of the city that was the king’s 
palace. The story goes like this: When the king was beheaded in public 
view during the French Revolution—there in the center of the city 
where the Egyptian Obelisk was a few years later placed by Napoleon—
at the same time as he lost his head, so the city’s abattoir, also in the 
heart of the city, alive with blood and offal, was moved to anonymous 
locations outside of the city and people could then enjoy their Sundays 
of purification by going to the art gallery while the obscene roots of the 
sacred such as sacrifice of the god or animals is nowhere in evidence. 
That was written almost eighty years ago, and while the general idea is 
as relevant and as riveting as ever, there are other sacred, or should one 
say negatively sacred, sites that undergo the same disappearance as 
Bataille’s abattoir. I am told for instance by a mechanic friend in upstate 
New York that none of the towns in the vicinity allow junk yards, which 
he calls salvage yards, to be exposed to the public, and they have to be 
situated outside of the towns. The county town planner and the town 
clerk both inform me that local laws demand high walls around such 
yards, which must be on the outskirts, never inside, the town, and the 
same applies to strip joints, which are not allowed to have blue lighting 
on the outside. In town planning parlance strip clubs are called “adult 
uses” and fall into the more general category of LULUS, meaning Local 
Unwanted Land Uses, which includes slaughterhouses as well. No prime 
space on Fifth Avenue like the Met for them! No wonder that a Mom in 
Texas got confused recently when her ten-year-old was taken on a pub-
lic-school outing to the art gallery in Dallas and came home talking of 
statues of naked women and as a result the art teacher was fired. What 
are naked ladies doing in the center of town? The town of Rosendale 
near where I live upstate, a town with a population of roughly 5,000, 
two hours north of New York City, had a plan drawn up by a Republican 
councilman and chief of the Fire District a few years back for an indus-
trial zone—“park,” I think they called it—which would destroy many 
beautiful acres of what remains of the forest by the river, and this, he 
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added earnestly, would be just perfect for “adult uses” as well. So is this 
the new sacred geography of America, walled off junk—I mean sal-
vage—yards with gutted motor vehicles alongside windowless sex 
clubs—I mean “adult uses”—with low ceilings and dark lighting form-
ing along with the slaughterhouses a ring of outposts around the perim-
eter of what passes for a town center of gas stations, churches, and 
convenience stores selling lottery tickets? As I cycle back through the 
park the sun is setting and it is getting nippy. The black nannies are 
wrapping up their charges and heading home. Some tourists are taking 
photos of the sun visible through the spaces left by the skyscrapers to 
the south as foregrounded by the trees of the park. The contrast is over-
whelming. This is the New York sublime, better than the Grand Canyon. 
In front of me on a beat-up dirt bike an elderly man, Hispanic and poor 
looking, is leisurely cycling, hunched over the handlebars. From some-
where invisible on his person or his bike enchanting music is pouring 
out real loud. I mean really loud. It sounds like Coltrane and in this set-
ting it is beyond all expectation and stereotype, which is why, I think, 
the gaggle of uncomforted looking Upper East side folk sitting on the 
benches admiring the sunset, find this obscene, yet sacred too, and 
don’t know what to do.
January 4, 2007. Many years ago as Europe took the first steps toward 
the Holocaust, Bataille’s colleague Michel Leiris gave a blessedly short 
talk to the College of Sociology in Paris as his contribution to what his 
Surrealist colleagues were calling “sacred sociology.” He called the talk 
“The Sacred in Everyday Life,” and after running through memories of 
his childhood, such as the mysterious yet familiar glow of the stove, La 
Radieuse, in the kitchen, his father’s silver plated revolver, secretive bath-
room antics with his brother, and children’s games with language, Leiris 
concluded that the sacred was not restricted to formal situations such 
as the rituals of the church but existed as a living force in everyday life, 
the mark of which was danger, ambiguity, mystery, and the unexpected 
surprise or shock we might associate with the Surreal. This account dif-
fers remarkably from the notion of the sacred set forth in 1912 by Émile 
Durkheim in his famous work The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 
in which the sacred was designated as a feeling of awe, reverence, and 
fear associated with something set firmly apart from the everyday, which 
he designated as the profane, a confusing word that means both mun-
dane or ordinary as well as the negative sacred. Leiris challenged—or 
seemed to challenge—this distinction between sacred and profane by 
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locating the sacred in the profane, granting the sacred a light and play-
ful character, but Bataille went further in emphasizing the obscene basis 
of the sacred, no less than the sacred basis of the obscene. Little more 
than an inversion of Leiris’s sacred in everyday life, my obscenity diary 
displays, I believe, something important to this montage-effect of purity 
coexisting side by side with impurity by having them run one after the 
other in daisy chains of uneven yet daily occurrence that tear at our 
logic no less than our language. As regards my diary approach, Witt-
genstein does this too. He talks about our talk and wonders out loud 
about our apparent confusions and contradictions but most of all about 
our senselessness—of which we are blissfully unaware— especially when 
we adopt the high road of the meta-level and ask unanswerable ques-
tions such as What is the Sacred or What is obscene? Leiris spotted this 
dilemma too—for dilemma it surely is—as these questions are as impor-
tant as they are unanswerable. In my hubris I have extended Wittgen-
stein and Leiris by writing little scenes or ethnographic sketches with 
each one serving as a comment on the one preceding, searching for a 
language that can perhaps do justice to the unsayable no less than the 
unsaid.
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The Triumph of Liberalism

Our legal system has always treated sexual expression with singular hos-
tility, relegating it to second-class status under the First Amendment. 
This discriminatory treatment reflects a broader cultural pattern, which 
was well captured by Susan Sontag when she wrote, “Since Christian-
ity . . . concentrated on sexual behavior as the root of virtue, everything 
pertaining to sex has been a ‘special case’ in our culture, evoking pecu-
liarly inconsistent attitudes.”2 Accordingly, to borrow again from Son-
tag, “expression pertaining to sex has been a special case in our law, 
evoking peculiarly inconsistent rulings.”
 The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is written in unqualified 
language, barring any “law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3 It 
makes no exception for speech about sex. However, the Supreme Court 
has consistently read such an exception into the First Amendment. It 
has allowed sexual speech to be restricted or even banned under cir-
cumstances in which it would not allow other types of speech to be 
limited.4
 Overall, American law is the most speech-protective in the world. 
The U.S. legal system protects many kinds of speech that are widely 
considered offensive or dangerous, including those that are outlawed 
in other advanced democracies, such as hate speech,5 defamatory false-
hoods about government officials,6 and the advocacy of violence and 
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lawbreaking.7 In contrast, American law singles out for suppression sex-
ual expression, a type of speech that is protected under many other 
legal systems.8
 As an activist, I am congenitally an optimist, so I want to stress that 
there have been some positive legal developments in this area in recent 
years, and there are also important ongoing law reform initiatives, led 
by the ACLU, along with many diverse allies. I will save the details of 
that upbeat assessment of future trends for later, so I can end on a posi-
tive note! Before then, I will address three other major points. First, I 
will cite some examples of our legal system’s ongoing assault on sexual 
expression. Second, I will outline the general free-speech principles that 
strongly protect expression with any other content (other than sexual) 
to highlight the discriminatory double standard for sexual expression. 
Third, I will summarize the three major speech-suppressive doctrines 
that the Supreme Court has concocted to rationalize three major types 
of restrictions on sexual expression. And then, fourth and finally, I will 
explain the positive constitutional law developments to which I referred 
above.
I.  Our legal system’s ongoing assault on sexual expression
Starting in 2004, we saw dramatic new crackdowns on “indecency” in 
broadcasts in response to the now infamous “wardrobe malfunction”9 
during the televised 2004 Super Bowl halftime show.10 These new mea-
sures are so extreme that they even have been condemned by some for-
mer officials of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) 
itself, even though these officials had supported prior FCC limits on 
broadcast indecency.11 Yet even these former policemen of the airwaves 
felt compelled to denounce the recent repression as “a radical . . . cen-
sorship crusade that will . . . chill . . . all but the blandest . . . program 
fare.”
 Since the Super Bowl brouhaha in 2004—which one journalist mem-
orably called “a tempest in a B-cup”12—the FCC has imposed record-
breaking fines on broadcasters, even for the fleeting, spontaneous use 
of a single word in a clearly non-sexual context. For example, the FCC 
condemned a documentary film about blues musicians, which was pro-
duced by Martin Scorsese and broadcast by an educational television 
station, because one or more of the artists being interviewed uttered 
what the FCC coyly calls “the F-word” or “the S-word.”13 The FCC even 
ruled that the news program The Early Show had committed “indecency” 
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through one use of the word “bullshitter”; the FCC stressed that its cen-
sorial regime contains “no . . . exemption [for news].”14
 As if all of the FCC censorship has not been bad enough, in 2005 
Congress passed a repressive new federal law that vastly increases the 
fines for broadcast indecency—by a factor of 10.15 Under this new 
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, the use of one four-letter word, 
even in a clearly non-sexual context, can trigger a fine of $325,000. 
Small, nonprofit broadcasters would be bankrupted by such huge fines. 
Therefore, to avoid them, many broadcasters have pulled many valuable 
programs.16 For example, a PBS station cancelled a historical documen-
tary about Marie Antoinette because it contained sexually suggestive 
drawings.17 Likewise, CBS affiliates pulled a documentary about the 
9/11 terrorist attacks just because it included actual footage of shocked 
onlookers watching the Twin Towers crashing down.18 Not surprisingly, 
many of them were exclaiming in horror, but the documentary never 
aired because some of the horrified exclamations included four-letter 
words. Given the government’s zero-tolerance policy toward isolated 
expletives, a Vermont public radio station even barred a United States 
Senate candidate from a political debate.19 The station manager feared 
that the candidate might do on air what he had done during a previous 
live debate; he had lost his temper and called two audience members 
“shits.”20
 The recent attacks on sexual expression have not been limited to 
broadcasting. For example, the federal law suppressing online material 
that any local community deems “harmful to minors,” which the ACLU 
had fought for more than a decade, concluded its circuitous journey 
through the federal court system in 2009 and was finally pronounced 
dead under the First Amendment. This law was the badly misnamed 
the Child Online Protection Act or COPA.21 It was “badly misnamed” 
because, far from protecting children, it potentially criminalized any 
online expression that contained any sexual content, ranging from 
Planned Parenthood’s information about contraception to artistic web-
sites that display nude paintings or sculptures. Both the lower court and 
the intermediate appellate court ruled that the law was unconstitution-
ally overbroad and vague, outlawing significant expression that the First 
Amendment clearly protects.22 Even the trial judge in that case noted 
that blocking young people’s access to such material may well do them 
more harm than good.23 I stress that even this judge took this position 
because he is a conservative Republican, who was appointed by a con-
servative Republican president,24 as was the judge who wrote the inter-
mediate appellate court opinion affirming the trial judge’s ruling.25
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 These facts illustrate an important point that contravenes common 
stereotypes. When it comes to freedom of speech, including for sexual 
expression, both support and opposition cut across all party and ideo-
logical lines.26 That is one reason the ACLU always has been staunchly 
non-partisan, never supporting or opposing any official or candidate, 
but instead praising or criticizing them on an issue-by-issue basis.27 
All politicians are positive on some civil liberties issues and negative 
on others. When it comes to sexual expression, the major division is 
not between Democrats and Republicans or between liberals and con-
servatives. Rather, the major division lies between, on the one hand, 
elected officials and, on the other hand, officials who are relatively 
sheltered from the political process and its majoritarian pressures: fed-
eral judges.
 This pattern is illustrated by the recent censorial laws and regula-
tions I noted above. In 2006, the new federal law that cracks down on 
broadcast “indecency” was passed by overwhelming margins in both 
houses of Congress.28 In fact, not a single Senator voted against it, while 
in the House, only 35 brave souls voted no. Likewise, all five members 
of the FCC strongly supported that censorial new law, as well as the 
recent record-breaking fines on broadcasters.29 In contrast, though, just 
as elected officials and their FCC appointees have supported broadcast 
censorship across the political spectrum, the opposite is true of federal 
judges. Fortunately, federal judges have opposed such censorship across 
the political spectrum.30
 The same pattern has emerged in decisions regarding censorship 
of online sexual expression. In recent years, Congress passed two such 
cybercensorship laws,31 with almost no opposing votes on either side of 
the aisle.32 Former presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both 
defended these laws in the courts against the ACLU’s constitutional 
challenges. In contrast, of the dozens of federal judges who ruled on 
these cybercensorship laws, almost every single one ruled in the ACLU’s 
favor, voting to uphold freedom of online sexual expression and strik-
ing down these repressive laws.
 Other recent assaults on sexual expression have occurred outside 
the legislature and courtroom and have slipped largely below the pub-
lic radar screen. For example, President Bush’s first Attorney General, 
John Ashcroft, was well-known for his commitment to eradicating sexu-
ally oriented expression from our lives, even going so far as to spend 
$8,000 of our tax dollars to buy drapes to cover an artistically acclaimed 
Art Deco statue in the Justice Department’s main hall just because this 
toga-clad female figure had one exposed breast!33
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 Most people are unaware that Ashcroft’s successor, Alberto Gonzales, 
outdid his predecessor in targeting sexual expression. After Gonzales 
became Attorney General in 2005, he announced in his very first major 
public address that the Justice Department would step up its enforce-
ment efforts against such expression.34 Gonzales told the National Press 
Club that he was creating a top-flight obscenity prosecution task force, 
which “will be staffed with our best and brightest.”35 Notably, this move 
drew widespread criticism from Justice Department lawyers36 and law 
enforcement officers,37 who resented the reallocation of personnel and 
other resources from other areas that they considered more urgent than 
preventing consenting adults from viewing images of other consenting 
adults. One such critic, the U.S. Attorney in Miami, was forced by Gon-
zales’ new initiative to remove agents from child endangerment cases, 
in which actual children had been physically abused, to reallocate these 
agents to cases involving sexual images produced by and for adults.38 As 
one FBI agent said, “I guess this means we’ve won the war on terror. We 
must not need any more resources for espionage.”39 In the same vein, a 
leader of the American Bar Association said, “Compared to terrorism, 
public corruption, and narcotics, [pornography] is no worse than drop-
ping gum on the sidewalk.”40
 U.S. Attorneys who aggressively pursued obscenity cases (even 
those that were quickly thrown out of court) were promoted within the 
Bush Justice Department, while at least two U.S. Attorneys were repri-
manded and even fired because they did not want to deploy their lim-
ited resources to fight obscenity cases. A U.S. Attorney from Nevada 
was pressured to pursue an obscenity case he described as “woefully 
deficient”; he did not want to reassign to it prosecutors who were work-
ing on public corruption and violent crime cases, and he was ultimately 
fired after resisting Bush Administration demands.41
 Prime targets of Gonzales’s renewed War on Obscenity were images 
of bondage and sado-masochistic sex.42 That provoked a commentator 
on Salon.com to observe, “Many Americans would likely find such por-
nography appalling. But shouldn’t they be far more appalled by the fact 
that the man now focused on eradicating staged acts of torture was the 
same one who set the stage, as Bush’s counsel, for real acts of torture at 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq?”43
 While there have been no publicized federal examples of such cen-
sorial behavior since the Obama Administration took office, state offi-
cials continue to engage in similar acts of sexual censorship. In 2010, 
when Bob McDonnell became Governor of Virginia, his Attorney Gen-
eral ordered new lapel pins of the state’s official seal for his staff because 
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he believed the woman depicted on the seal should have “more mod-
est attire.” The original state seal, which since 1776 had pictured the 
Roman Goddess Virtus with her left breast exposed, was replaced with a 
new rendition that covered the breast with an armored plate.44
II.  General free-speech principles that strongly protect  
expression with non-sexual content should be extended to 
sexual speech
The starting point for understanding freedom of speech is, of course, 
the “Free Speech Clause” of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion.45 In sweeping, unqualified terms, it declares that the government 
“shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.” It does not limit 
that guarantee to speech about certain topics. In fact, it does not recog-
nize any exceptions at all. In this sense, our constitutional right to free 
speech is strikingly different from the counterpart provisions in other 
countries’ constitutions.46 These other constitutions do expressly limit 
free speech in certain circumstances, including for the promotion of 
public morals,47 yet our First Amendment framers deliberately rejected 
such limiting language.
 Conservative judges and politicians often stress that the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted according to its plain language and origi-
nal intent.48 They accuse liberal judges of being “activists” by reading 
additional meanings into the Constitution’s own terms or by departing 
from the intent that those terms reveal.49 But in relation to the Free 
Speech Clause, the judicial activists are all the judges who have read 
into its straightforward language various unwritten limits, even though 
the framers deliberately chose not to include any. And the “activist” 
judges who have rewritten the Free Speech Clause in this way include 
many conservatives.50 It bears repeating that support for free speech 
crosses ideological and party lines. However, the same is true of opposi-
tion to free speech. Almost everyone advocates reading some limits into 
the Free Speech Clause, for the expression of whatever ideas they per-
sonally consider offensive, evil, or otherwise inconsistent with their own 
deeply held beliefs. Journalist Nat Hentoff well captured this pattern in 
the title of one of his books: Freedom of Speech for ME, but not for THEE; 
How the Left and Right Relentlessly Censor Each Other.51 A writer for the Los 
Angeles Times also summarized this idea very well when he wrote, “The 
urge to censor is the most fundamental human drive—far more basic 
than the sex drive.”
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 At the heart of the Supreme Court’s extensive free-speech rulings 
are two key principles. The first of these principles specifies what is not a 
sufficient justification for restricting speech, and the second prescribes 
what is a sufficient justification. These principles have been widely 
accepted by Justices across the ideological spectrum, and they have 
well served both individual liberty and our democratic society. There is 
no justification for not extending them to sexual expression, as many 
judges and scholars have advocated.
 The first of these basic principles requires “content neutrality” or 
“viewpoint neutrality.” In essence, the government may never limit 
speech just because the viewpoint it conveys is considered offensive or 
otherwise negative by any person or group, even if such group consists 
of the vast majority of the community.52 Consistent with this core prin-
ciple, the Court has protected speech that conveys ideas that are deeply 
offensive to most Americans, including burning an American flag53 or 
burning a cross.54 The content-neutrality principle reflects the philos-
ophy that the appropriate response to speech that you find offensive 
or negative in any way is not censorship, but rather either ignoring it 
or answering back. The Supreme Court described that first option in 
a recent case that, notably, rejected restrictions on sexual expression 
on cable TV. The Court said, “Where the [intended] benefit of a con-
tent-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, 
the . . . right of expression prevails. . . . We are expected to protect our 
own sensibilities simply by averting [our] eyes.”55
 In contrast, the second general principle of speech regulation states 
that the government may regulate speech if the regulation is necessary 
to promote some extremely important goal, such as preventing immi-
nent physical harm.56 This can be illustrated through the flag-burning 
example. If a protestor is burning a flag in a place where it causes an 
imminent danger of spreading the fire, then the government may stop 
that particular flag burning. This principle is often summarized by say-
ing that the government may limit speech that poses “a clear and present 
danger”57 of some tangible harm. But speech still may not be restricted 
because of some more remote or speculative harm. In other words, gov-
ernment may not restrict speech on the ground that it (i) might cause 
or lead to some (ii) intangible harm, such as offended feelings.58
 Let me explain each of those two key limits on the government’s 
power to regulate speech. First, if we allowed speech to be curtailed 
on the speculative basis that it might indirectly lead to some possible 
harm, free speech as we know it would cease to exist. That is because 
all speech might lead to potential danger sometime in the future. Jus-
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tice Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized this fact when he observed that 
“[e]very idea is an incitement.”59 If we banned all ideas that might lead 
individuals to actions that might have an adverse impact on important 
concerns, such as safety, then scarcely any idea would be safe, and surely 
no idea would be safe that challenged the status quo. This point was 
stressed by a respected conservative federal Judge, Frank Easterbrook, 
in an important opinion that struck down a law seeking to punish cer-
tain sexual expression that many people consider offensive and that 
many believe has the potential to cause serious harm at some future 
time.60
 Specifically, some advocates of women’s rights have sought to ban 
certain sexual expression on the ground that it degrades or demeans 
women; hence, they believe that this “pornography,” as they call it, 
endangers women’s safety and equality.61 The City of Indianapo-
lis passed a law reflecting this belief in 1984.62 The Indianapolis law 
defined illegal “pornography” as sexually oriented expression that “sub-
ordinates” women. It was immediately challenged by First Amendment 
advocates and advocates of women’s rights.63 Notably, the law’s oppo-
nents—including Yours Truly—believed not only that it would violate 
the fundamental free-speech principles that I have been discussing, 
but also that it would do more harm than good for women. The law 
even suppressed sexually oriented expression that is essential for wom-
en’s rights, such as expression about women’s sexual and reproductive 
health. Every judge who ruled on the law agreed that it did violate the 
core free-speech principles at stake.64
 In the most extended opinion, Judge Easterbrook assumed for the 
sake of argument that the law’s proponents correctly believed that 
“depictions of subordination [may] perpetuate subordination.” How-
ever, he explained that if this were enough to justify suppressing speech, 
then there would be no free speech left because so much speech has 
the same potential negative influence. As he wrote:
Efforts to suppress communist speech in the U.S. were based on the 
belief that [it] would increase the likelihood of totalitarian govern-
ment. . . . The [1798] Alien and Sedition Acts . . . rested on a sincerely 
held belief that disrespect for the government leads to social collapse 
and revolution—a belief with support in the history of many nations. 
Racial bigotry, anti-Semitism, violence on television, reporters’ biases—
these and many more influence the culture and shape our socializa-
tion. . . . Yet all is protected as speech, however insidious. Any other 
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answer leaves the government in control . . . the great . . . director of 
which thoughts are good for us.65
 Now I will briefly explain why government may not suppress speech 
based on intangible harms such as hurt feelings. First, it is important to 
note that the cardinal free-speech rule that Judge Easterbrook laid out 
does not at all reflect disrespect for the seriousness of these psychic or 
emotional harms. Contrary to the old nursery rhyme “Sticks and stones 
may break my bones but words will never hurt me,” words do wound, 
especially when they insult some core element of our identities, such 
as race, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth. The reason we do not 
let government suppress speech to prevent these very real psychic or 
emotional harms is well summed up by another old saying, “The cure 
is worse than the disease.” Hearing offensive and upsetting expression 
is the lesser of two evils for both society as a whole and individuals. 
Far worse would be empowering the government, or a majority of our 
fellow citizens, to take away our individual freedom to make our own 
choices about what we say and what we see or hear.
 To highlight the second-class status to which sexual speech has been 
relegated under the First Amendment, we can look at just one of the 
Supreme Court’s many cases that abide by the two general speech-pro-
tective principles I have just summarized. The Court consistently pro-
tects non-sexual expression no matter how offensive and upsetting it is 
to those who are exposed to it. If these same speech-protective princi-
ples were applied to sexual expression, the Supreme Court would strike 
down anti-obscenity laws, as well as restrictions on broadcast indecency, 
instead of upholding these suppressive measures as it has done in the 
past.
 Cohen v. California,66 decided in 1971, is possibly the Court’s most 
important precedent concerning constitutional protection for offen-
sive speech in general—that is, non-sexual offensive speech. The 
Cohen Court held that the F-word in the title of this essay—“Freedom”—
extends to what the FCC means by the “F-word”—the one with four let-
ters. So the FCC’s recent crackdown on that F-word, in broadcasts, is 
completely contrary to the Cohen case. The FCC crackdown, as well as 
the new federal statute censoring broadcast “indecency,” rests on the 
very debatable view that speech should receive less protection when it 
is conveyed by the broadcast media than when it is conveyed by other 
media. This view goes back to the Supreme Court’s ruling in a contro-
versial 1978 case involving Pacifica Radio.67 I will say a bit more about 
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that case in the next section of this essay. In this section, though, I 
will continue to discuss the 1971 Cohen case, which I think should gov-
ern all expression, including sexual expression, in all media, including 
broadcast.
 The Cohen case arose during the Vietnam War and upheld Paul 
Cohen’s First Amendment right to wear a jacket, inside a courthouse, on 
which he had written a message that was very offensive to many people, 
not only because it contained the four-letter F-word, but also because of 
his larger message. Specifically, Paul Cohen’s jacket proclaimed: “Fuck 
the draft.” The majority opinion that upheld Paul Cohen’s right to dis-
play this provocative message was written by the much-respected Justice 
John Marshall Harlan. Notably, Harlan was a conservative Republican, 
who had been appointed by a Republican president.68 I stress these facts 
again to underscore the key point I made earlier: strong support for 
freedom of speech cuts across party and ideological lines.
 Many conservatives want to limit government power over our private 
lives, leaving decisions about what we say, what we see and hear, and 
what our own young children see and hear, up to us, instead of letting 
the government dictate these choices for us. This free-speech approach 
is not only consistent with individual liberty; it also benefits society as a 
whole because it permits the lively exchange of ideas and free flow of 
information that improve democratic decision-making.
 Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in the Cohen case well cap-
tures both of these essential benefits of protecting offensive expression, 
the benefits to individual and society alike:
The . . . right of free expression . . . is designed to remove governmen-
tal restraints from . . . public discussion, putting the decision as to what 
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope 
that . . . such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry 
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would 
comport with the . . . individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.69
 In essence, to quote another old saying: different strokes for differ-
ent folks. In our wonderfully diverse society we all have widely divergent 
ideas, values, and tastes concerning what expression is offensive and 
what is not. Therefore, if we allowed government to regulate or punish 
any speech that any person or group considered offensive, we would 
have little speech left. As the Cohen Court put it, “One [person’s] vul-
garity is another [person’s] lyric.”70
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 I once saw a cartoon that captures this point. It shows three people 
in an art museum looking at a classic nude female torso, a fragment of 
an ancient sculpture minus limbs. Each viewer’s reaction is shown in an 
air bubble. The first one thinks, “Art!” The second thinks, “SMUT!” The 
third thinks, “An insult to amputees!”
 Sexuality is an especially personal area; our views about it are even 
more subjective than in other areas. Thus, the government is especially 
wrong to take away our individual right to choose concerning sexual 
expression. We cannot delegate to any government official—or anyone 
else for that matter—the deeply personal choices about which such 
expression we, and our own young children, will see or not see. Unfor-
tunately, when it comes to sexual expression, and only sexual expres-
sion, the Supreme Court has ignored all of the time-honored teachings 
of the Cohen case, and it has allowed government to punish one per-
son’s lyric just because it is another person’s vulgarity.
III.  Judge-created speech-suppressive doctrines to “justify” 
restrictions on sexual expression
In the area of sexual expression, the Supreme Court has unfortunately 
deviated from all of the general free-speech principles I have laid out, 
which have worked so well regarding speech with every other kind of 
content. The Court has allowed sexual expression to be singled out for 
regulation, and even outright banning, based only on its content. The 
Court has allowed sexual expression to be suppressed just because it is 
considered offensive by the majority of community members, elected 
officials, appointed FCC commissioners, or jury members.
 The Court has not demanded any evidence that such expression 
causes any adverse impact at all, let alone a clear and present danger 
of great tangible harm that cannot be averted through any measures 
besides censorship. The great weight of the pertinent scholarship docu-
ments that there is no such evidence.71 To the contrary, there is sub-
stantial evidence, which the Court has ignored, that the targeted sexual 
expression has many positive impacts, including for minors (at least 
older minors). Among other things, such expression provides valuable 
information about safer sex, contraception, and sexual orientation that 
promotes young people’s health—and indeed can even be life-saving—
given the rampant spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted dis-
eases among teenagers, as well as the tragic spate of suicides among 
LGBT youth.72
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 The Court has created three major doctrines under which it permits 
suppression of sexual expression. One of these permits government to 
completely outlaw or criminalize some sexual expression, which the 
Court labels “obscenity.” The other two doctrines permit government 
to strictly regulate other sexual expression in two contexts: the broad-
cast media73 and adult entertainment establishments.74 To distinguish 
this kind of restricted expression from the wholly banned category of 
obscenity, the Court usually calls such expression “indecency.”
obscenity
The very first time the Supreme Court considered whether sexual 
expression should be protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause, the Court actually extolled the importance of such expression. 
In 1957, in a case called Roth v. United States,75 the Court made what is 
probably its least controversial statement ever: “Sex, a great and mys-
terious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of 
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is . . . of . . . vital . . 
. human interest and public concern.”76 But no sooner had the Court said 
this than it proceeded to carve out from sexual expression a category 
that it held to be completely beyond the constitutional pale, labeling 
this pariah category “obscenity.” This judge-made obscenity exception 
has been opposed by most constitutional scholars and by many Supreme 
Court Justices, including the very Justice who initially created it but who 
subsequently recanted that ruling. This exception was even opposed by 
a distinguished commission of academic experts that President Lyndon 
Johnson appointed way back in 1968.77 Along with similar commissions 
in other countries,78 these experts recommended constitutional protec-
tion for all sexual expression for all consenting adults.
 In the 1973 case, Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, the whole Court 
acknowledged that “there are no scientific data which conclusively dem-
onstrate that exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and 
women or their society.”79 Nonetheless, five Justices—a bare majority—
asserted that such material could still be banned based on what they 
unabashedly called “unprovable assumptions” about its negative impacts 
on the moral “tone” of “a decent society.”80 Consistent with this ratio-
nale, the core of the Court-created obscenity concept states that local 
communities may ban material if they deem it to be “patently offensive.”
 Since that 1973 case, the Supreme Court has never again revisited 
the basic question of whether it should continue to enforce the obscen-
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ity exception to the First Amendment. However, in its free-speech juris-
prudence since 1973, the Court has generally moved toward stronger 
and stronger enforcement of the fundamental content-neutrality prin-
ciple, and it has even enforced that principle concerning sexual expres-
sion in many contexts other than the obscenity doctrine. Therefore, I 
believe that when the Court does finally revisit the obscenity exception, 
there is a strong chance that it will reject that exception altogether.
 For many decades, the Supreme Court has tried but failed to come 
up with clear, objective standards for defining constitutionally unpro-
tected obscenity. The most famous line in the Court’s unsuccessful 
effort to define obscenity came from former Justice Potter Stewart 
when he candidly admitted, “I cannot define it, but I know it when I 
see it.”81 The problem, though, is that every judge, along with every-
one else, sees a different “it”! Individuals even have different perspec-
tives about whether any given expression has any sexual content at all. 
This is captured by the old joke about the man who sees every inkblot 
his psychiatrist shows him as wildly erotic. When his psychiatrist says to 
him, “You’re obsessed with sex,” the man answers: “What do you mean 
I am obsessed? You are the one who keeps showing me all these dirty 
pictures!”
 Given our especially subjective views about the inherently personal 
realm of sex, this definitional problem persists no matter what sexual 
expression is targeted, under any rubric or any rationale. For exam-
ple, as I have already noted, some feminists decry sexual expression 
that they view as demeaning or degrading to women. To distinguish 
this sexual expression from the long-established concepts of “obscen-
ity” and “indecency,” they label it with the stigmatizing term “pornog-
raphy.” In contrast, these anti-porn feminists use the term “erotica” for 
sexual expression that they do not deem degrading to women. How can 
you tell the difference, you might well ask? Well, as one feminist anti-
pornography activist put it: “What turns me on is erotica; but what turns 
you on is pornography!”82
 As the Supreme Court has recognized, freedom of speech is espe-
cially endangered whenever the government bans or regulates speech 
under broad, vague, subjective concepts such as “offensive.”83 There-
fore, as I have repeatedly stressed, the Court has consistently invalidated 
censorship of non-sexual expression that targets “offensive” expression. 
Moreover, in the landmark 1997 case of Reno v. ACLU,84 the Court 
struck down a federal law that censored sexual expression online, spe-
cifically because the law targeted “patently offensive” expression—a 
concept that the Court held to be overly broad and vague. This rul-
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ing is a key basis for my optimism that the Court will also repudiate 
both the obscenity doctrine and its old holdings allowing regulation of 
broadcast “indecency,” because the definitions of both “obscenity” and 
broadcast “indecency” center on the “patently offensive” criterion.85 
Such vague concepts as “offensive” or “patently offensive” present a 
fundamental problem because they do not provide any clear, objective 
guidelines. These words allow police, prosecutors, and other enforcing 
officials to exercise their unfettered discretion according to their own 
subjective tastes or those of politically powerful community members. 
Consequently, the enforcement patterns will be arbitrary at best, dis-
criminatory at worst. The situations that lead to particular expression 
being deemed offensive or obscene will be completely unpredictable.
 This causes what courts call a “chilling effect”86 because no one 
wants to run the risk of criminal prosecution. In other words, people 
self-censor and do not engage in expression just because it could be 
deemed offensive by the powers that be. That self-censorship not only 
violates the free-speech rights of all those who were deterred from 
speaking for fear of prosecution, but it also deprives the rest of us of the 
chance to hear valued expression, including constitutionally protected 
speech. The completely arbitrary, unpredictable nature of our current 
legal approach can best be illustrated by citing some recent examples of 
the FCC’s enforcement of its broadcast indecency rules against particu-
lar words. I will simply list some of the contrasting rulings that the FCC 
issued in a single order. It held that “bullshit” was indecent, but that 
“dick” and “dickhead” were not. It held that non-explicit suggestions 
of teenagers’ sexual activity in general were indecent, but that explicit 
discussions of specific teen sexual practices were not. It held that “fuck 
’em” was indecent, but that “up yours” and “kiss my ass” were not.87 As I 
noted above, the FCC also held that musicians’ uses of “fuck” and “shit” 
in Martin Scorsese’s documentary film about blues music were indecent. 
In contrast, it held that actors’ uses of the very same words in the fic-
tional film Saving Private Ryan were not.88
 In response to these erratic rulings, no wonder we have seen so 
much self-censorship! The unfettered discretion involved in enforcing 
such vague concepts as “indecent,” “offensive” or “obscene” is likely to 
be exercised in a manner that is not only arbitrary, but even worse, dis-
criminatory, by singling out expression that is produced by or appeals 
to individuals or groups who are relatively unpopular or powerless. 
Indeed, recent obscenity prosecutions have targeted expressions of les-
bian and gay sexuality89 as well as rap music by young African-American 
men.90
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indecency
In addition to the obscenity concept, which allows the complete crimi-
nalization or banning of certain sexual expression, the Supreme Court 
also has allowed strict regulation of other sexual expression—usually 
called “indecency”—in two contexts. First, the Court has allowed such 
expression to be barred from the broadcast airwaves during the time 
when many minors are assumed to be in the audience, from 6 a.m. to 
10 p.m.91 Second, the Court has allowed businesses that purvey such 
expression to be subjected to strict zoning laws. For example, adult 
bookstores and strip clubs may be exiled to outlying areas of cities or 
clustered together in a “red light district.”92 Along with the obscenity 
exception, these indecency doctrines violate core free-speech princi-
ples and have been harshly criticized by many experts, including dis-
senting Justices.93
 I am going to discuss in more detail only the first of these two inde-
cency doctrines—indecency in broadcasting—since it is of more perva-
sive concern. Just as the Court’s last decision that examined and upheld 
the obscenity exception is more than 30 years old, the same is true of 
the Court’s last decision that examined and upheld the government’s 
power to restrict broadcast indecency. That decision, in Pacifica v. FCC,94 
which I noted above, upheld the FCC’s power to punish Pacifica Radio 
for its daytime broadcast of George Carlin’s famous “7 Dirty Words” 
monologue. The Pacifica case was decided by a razor-thin 5–4 ruling, 
and since then, it has been criticized by many other Justices.95 Again, 
this parallels the Court’s 1973 ruling upholding the obscenity excep-
tion, which also was decided 5–4 and has since been criticized by many 
other Justices. Moreover, Pacifica relied on factual premises about the 
nature of broadcasting which—even if they were correct at the time—
are certainly no longer valid today. Specifically, the majority stressed 
what it called the “uniquely pervasive nature of broadcast expression” 
and its unique accessibility to young people.
 Even if these factual conclusions were correct in 1971, they are cer-
tainly no longer true, given the subsequent explosion of so many other 
media, which are at least as accessible to young people as broadcast tele-
vision, and which the Court has held to be immune from special regula-
tion, consistent with the First Amendment.96 Yet, broadcasters can still 
be severely fined, or even lose their broadcasting licenses, even though 
the very same expression is completely insulated from regulation on the 
very next channel if the next channel happens to be cable, rather than 
broadcast. Surely it is past due time to end the second-class treatment 
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of the broadcast media along with the second-class treatment of sexual 
expression.
IV.  Recent positive developments and ongoing  
law reform initiatives
That brings me to my fourth and final point: my positive prognosis 
about ending, or at least reducing, both kinds of disparity. As Woody 
Allen once told an audience: “I’d like to end with something positive, 
but I can’t think of anything positive to say. Would you settle for two 
negatives?”97
 I actually have many positives, but I will confine myself to the three 
that I consider the most important. First, in the recent past, the Supreme 
Court has strongly enforced the principle of content-neutrality even for 
the traditionally disfavored category of sexual expression. Therefore, 
I am cautiously optimistic that when the Court finally re-examines its 
current obscenity and indecency doctrines head-on, as it has not done 
for decades, it will reject these doctrines as completely inconsistent 
with the core content-neutrality principle. Second, the Court’s land-
mark 2003 decision that strongly protects sexual conduct, Lawrence v. 
Texas,98 also provides additional constitutional rationales for protecting 
sexual expression even beyond the free-speech content-neutrality princi-
ple. Third, the federal courts right now are re-examining the old cases 
that have rationalized suppression of broadcast “indecency,” which is 
the first time they have done this in several decades, and the signs so far 
are encouraging.
 Now I will expand a bit on that first positive development: the 
Court’s recent strong enforcement of the core content-neutrality prin-
ciple,99 even concerning sexual expression. In a consistent line of cases, 
the Court has struck down restrictions on sexual expression in all new 
media, despite the government’s arguments that these media should be 
relegated to the same second-class status as broadcast. The government 
has argued that the Court should use the same rationale that it used 
to uphold such broadcast restrictions back in the 1971 Pacifica case: 
namely, to shield children from “indecent” sexual expression they can 
easily access on these media. Although the Court has not yet directly 
overturned Pacifica, in every subsequent case it has read that prece-
dent very narrowly and it has reached the opposite conclusion concern-
ing every other medium it has considered. Accordingly, the Court has 
rejected restrictions on sexual expression on telephones (in the context 
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of Dial-A-Porn);100 on cable TV;101 and on the Internet.102 These deci-
sions have been widely supported by Justices across the ideological spec-
trum and have been based on a robust concept of free speech that is 
completely at odds with the current obscenity and indecency doctrines.
 The majority opinions in these recent cases have not expressly over-
ruled any earlier cases, but I agree with the dissenters that the majority’s 
rationales are inconsistent with prior precedents that did allow regu-
lation of broadcast for the sake of shielding minors.103 For example, 
in the most recent of these cases, involving cable TV, what the dissent 
stated as a reason to condemn the majority’s ruling is to me a reason 
to praise it. Specifically, the dissent refers to what it sees as Congress’s 
legitimate power to “help . . . parents . . . keep[ ] unwanted [sexual 
expression] from their children,” and it then complains that “the Court 
reduces Congress’s protective power to the vanishing point.”104 Hear, 
hear!
 The second major positive development is the Supreme Court’s his-
toric 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Not only did the Court strike 
down the statute at issue—Texas’s discriminatory ban on same-gender 
“sodomy” (oral or anal sex), but the Court also based its holding on 
broad-ranging rationales. Accordingly, this ruling should sound the 
death-knell for other laws that restrict other personal, private conduct 
by consenting adults, including their production or consumption of 
sexual expression. Most importantly, the Court reversed its infamous 
1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,105 which had held that government 
may criminalize private, consensual adult conduct merely because the 
majority of the community disapproves of the conduct. That outdated 
concept reminds me of H.L. Mencken’s famous definition of Puritan-
ism: “the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy!”106
 I cannot think of any supposed justification for criminal laws that 
is more antithetical to individual liberty. John Stuart Mill, in his clas-
sic 1859 essay, “On Liberty,” said it best when he wrote, “Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign . . . [T]he only 
purpose for which government may rightfully exercise power . . . over 
anyone is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”107
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas contains lan-
guage that celebrates a similarly broad concept of individual freedom 
of choice, and I find this especially exciting, given that it was written by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, a conservative, Republican Catholic, who was 
appointed by a conservative, Republican president, Ronald Reagan,108 
and who is the key swing vote on the current Court.109
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 One aspect of the Lawrence decision is of special significance in the 
ongoing effort to un-censor sexual expression. In overturning Bowers, 
the Court expressly held that laws cannot constitutionally be based 
only on majoritarian views about morality. This holding provoked a 
fierce tirade in Justice Scalia’s strident dissent. He rightly recognized 
that this holding should doom a whole host of laws, far beyond the dis-
criminatory anti-sodomy laws that were at issue in Lawrence itself. While 
this sweeping potential was the cause of Justice Scalia’s consternation, 
for civil libertarians, it is cause for celebration! He wrote (emphasis 
mine):
State laws [that are only based on moral choices include laws] 
against . . . nude dancing, same-sex marriage, prostitution, masturba-
tion . . . fornication, and obscenity . . . Every single one of these laws is 
called into question by today’s decision . . . This [decision] effectively 
decrees the end of all morals legislation.110
 As I previously detailed, the 1973 Supreme Court decision uphold-
ing the obscenity exception reasoned that this exception was justified to 
preserve the “moral tone” of the community. Therefore, Justice Scalia 
was absolutely right in his Lawrence dissent when he said that the major-
ity’s rationale would warrant overturning the obscenity exception. In 
fact, one lower court ruling has held precisely that Lawrence does spell 
the death-knell for anti-obscenity laws. In that important ruling, fed-
eral judge Gary Lancaster, citing Lawrence, wrote, “Obscenity statutes 
[unconstitutionally] burden . . . individuals’ fundamental right to pos-
sess, read, observe, and think about what [they] choose[] in the privacy 
of [their] own home.”111
 While an appellate court overturned that ruling,112 it did not do 
so because it disagreed with Judge Lancaster’s reading of Lawrence. 
Rather, the appellate court said that only the Supreme Court itself 
should directly apply its Lawrence holding to the obscenity context.113 I 
am cautiously optimistic that, before long, the Supreme Court will do 
just that.
 The third and final major positive development I will address is cur-
rent litigation challenging the longstanding restrictions on broadcast 
“indecency.” The silver lining to the cloud of the recent crackdowns 
on such expression is that they have spurred all the major broadcasters 
to unite in a frontal challenge to them. Moreover, many “friend of the 
court” briefs have been filed by many diverse opponents of the current 
repressive regime, including the one I mentioned earlier—none other 
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than former FCC officials, one of whom had actually worked on the 
Pacifica case. That brief went so far as to call for a complete end to the 
regulation of broadcast indecency, as violating the First Amendment. 
The brief’s ringing conclusion read:
It is time to put an end to this experiment with indecency regula-
tion . . . [I]t has [led to] a revival of Nineteenth Century Comstockery. 
As former regulators we appreciate that the FCC is in an uncomfortable 
position, buffeted by the turbulent passions of moral zealots and threats 
from over-excited Congressmen. But that is precisely why the matter 
must be taken out of the agency’s hands entirely.114
 In 2009, in Fox v. FCC,115 the Supreme Court postponed addressing 
any of the fundamental constitutional questions about the increasingly 
anomalous second-class status that broadcast expression receives under 
the First Amendment. Instead, the Court narrowly ruled that the FCC 
did not violate administrative law principles when it recently reversed its 
own longstanding policy and began to sanction even “fleeting” or “iso-
lated” expletives, including just a single four-letter word spontaneously 
uttered during a live performance. The Supreme Court reversed the 
Second Circuit’s holding that the FCC had not adequately explained 
this policy change, and the high Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.116 Just as this chapter was going to press, on July 13, 2010, 
a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
issued an opinion on remand that unanimously struck down the FCC’s 
policy as violating the First Amendment. The court stressed a theme 
that this chapter also has highlighted: that the policy’s vagueness cre-
ates a chilling effect that stifles much valuable expression.117
 In the Supreme Court’s 2009 Fox ruling, several of the Justices’ opin-
ions noted the unresolved First Amendment issues that would have to 
await future rulings by the Court. Indeed, as Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion observed, the Supreme Court would “perhaps” address these 
First Amendment issues at a later stage “in this very case.”118 In light 
of the Second Circuit’s recent ruling, Justice Scalia’s prediction seems 
likely to be fulfilled. Given the suppressive impact of the FCC’s sweep-
ing new concept of broadcast “indecency,” it was disappointing that the 
Supreme Court in its 2009 Fox decision deferred ruling on the weighty 
First Amendment challenges to that concept. However, it was heartening 
that five Justices used their opinions to signal their sympathy to these 
challenges. Justice Thomas was the most critical, reiterating a point that 
he has made before, and calling into question the Court’s prior rulings 
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that permit more content regulation of broadcast than other media.119 
In addition, four other Justices indicated their receptivity toward First 
Amendment challenges: Justices Stevens,120 Kennedy,121 Ginsburg,122 and 
Breyer.123 Accordingly, I remain optimistic that the high Court will ulti-
mately agree with the Second Circuit’s recent forceful condemnation of 
the policy’s sweeping censorial impact:
[T]he absence of reliable guidance in the FCC’s standards chills a vast 
amount of protected speech dealing with some of the most important 
and universal themes in art and literature. Sex and the magnetic power 
of sexual attraction are surely among the most predominant themes in 
the study of humanity since the Trojan War. The digestive system and 
excretion are also important areas of human attention. By prohibiting 
all “patently offensive” references to sex, sexual organs, and excretion 
without giving adequate guidance as to what “patently offensive” means, 
the FCC effectively chills speech, because broadcasters have no way of 
knowing what the FCC will find offensive. To place any discussion of 
these vast topics at the broadcaster’s peril has the effect of promoting 
wide self-censorship of valuable material which should be completely 
protected under the First Amendment.124
 In closing, I would like to share a passage from an opinion by for-
mer Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who sat on the Court 
from 1939 to 1975 and who always dissented from all of the Court’s 
cases denying full First Amendment protection to sexual expression.125 
This passage reflects Douglas’s travels to Communist countries during 
the then-ongoing Cold War and it perfectly captures the First Amend-
ment philosophy that should spell the end of sexual expression’s 
second-class treatment. Justice Douglas wrote:
‘Obscenity’ . . . is the expression of offensive ideas. There are regimes 
in the world where ideas “offensive” to the majority . . . are suppressed. 
There life proceeds at a monotonous pace. Most of us would find that 
world offensive. One of the most offensive experiences in my life was a 
visit to a nation where bookstalls were filled only with books on math-
ematics and . . . religion. I am sure I would find offensive most of the 
[material] charged with being obscene. But in a life that has not been 
short, I have yet to be trapped into seeing or reading something that 
would offend me. . . . [O]ur society . . . presupposes that the individual, 
not government, [is] the keeper of his tastes, beliefs, and ideas. That is 
the philosophy of the First Amendment.126
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Morris Leopold Ernst’s name elicits little recognition today, except from 
those who know the histories of American literary censorship, the birth 
control movement in the Margaret Sanger era, the early decades of the 
ACLU, and, to a lesser extent, the history of liberal anticommunism 
in the United States. Yet a leading scholar in the field of book history 
declared Ernst the most important unstudied figure in twentieth-cen-
tury American cultural history.1 So who is this forgotten but vital figure?
 Ernst was arguably the nation’s most prominent civil liberties lawyer 
in the late 1920s and 30s, known especially for his challenges to obscen-
ity law at the local, state, and federal levels. By the eve of World War II, 
no one in the United States had done more to thwart censors’ attacks 
on a variety of cultural forms, from literature to nudism, burlesque the-
atre, and radio—and no one had done more to rationalize birth-control 
laws, either. A prolific, self-promoting author of middlebrow works 
about the excesses of “Comstockery” in all its forms, Ernst wrote or co-
wrote twenty-one books, a handful championing the emerging liberal 
anti-censorship tradition he did much to develop and articulate.2
 Ernst gained his greatest fame for his defense of literary modern-
ist texts, including Radclyffe Hall’s Well of Loneliness (1929) and, most 
famously, James Joyce’s Ulysses (1933), and was a towering figure in the 
history of American battles over obscenity law and censorship until the 
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Cold War.3 He began earning his reputation as the nation’s foremost 
obscenity law expert when he co-authored an influential history of 
obscenity law titled To the Pure (1928), and in the next half-dozen years 
he compiled a truly impressive series of legal victories in federal, state, 
and New York city courts on obscenity matters.4
 Although he was not the first civil libertarian to take on local and 
federal obscenity laws and their agents, he was the most systematic and 
successful by far until a new generation of lawyers took on these issues 
in the late 1950s.5 Neutralizing the legal arguments and cultural ratio-
nale behind the enforcement of Victorian-era obscenity laws, and ridi-
culing the symbolically potent censors who enforced cultural and legal 
“Comstockery,” Ernst deserves recognition as the legal midwife to liter-
ary and sexual modernism in the U.S. for his work against obscenity 
laws.6
 As a central part of his strategic assault on obscenity laws, Ernst also 
orchestrated important test cases to advance knowledge of human sexu-
ality and to give women greater control over their reproductive lives. 
Between 1929 and 1937, he and his associates in the New York law 
firm Greenbaum, Wolff, and Ernst won five federal court cases chal-
lenging Customs Bureau and Post Office censorship practices over sex 
hygiene and education materials and birth-control information barred 
under the authority of the 1873 Comstock laws. Defending the impor-
tation of books authored by British birth-control activist Marie Stopes 
in two Customs Bureau cases, the mailing of American sexologist Mary 
Ware Dennett’s sex hygiene pamphlet, and the receipt of birth-control 
devices and information by the Birth Control Federation of America 
(BCFA) associates of Margaret Sanger, Ernst devoted his strategic vision 
and legal expertise to reproductive rights law. He maintained a long 
relationship with Sanger as her counsel and as general counsel to the 
BCFA, later named Planned Parenthood.7
 By the eve of World War II, when his energy and political focus 
shifted to war-related matters and the cause of anti-communism, Ernst 
had, for over a decade, battled the cultural practices, legal logic, and 
administrative apparatus of the anti-obscenity forces in New York City, 
New York State, and the federal government. In the courts, and in the 
court of public opinion, Ernst and his associates, especially Harriet Pil-
pel and Alexander Lindey, dismantled the assumptions undergirding 
obscenity laws in the United States as they had evolved in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, persuading the courts that the 
nineteenth-century obscenity laws and standards were outdated to meet 
the needs of a diverse, modern public and were altogether too vague 
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to meet the standards of legal precision necessary to modern jurispru-
dence. Although this essay will detail a host of arguments that Ernst and 
his associates wielded to diminish the strength and breadth of obscen-
ity laws, I’ll suggest here that seven main arguments were central to his 
successful assault:
•	 First, sexual morality had evolved considerably from the mid-nine-
teenth century, when the Comstock laws were conceived, to the 
1930s, and the legal standards for obscenity needed to evolve to 
reflect an increasingly diverse, urbane society and citizenry with com-
peting and not uniform interests or moral codes.
•	 Second, the courts needed to reconsider who the general reader was 
and what that reader needed to be protected from; that rather than 
defending the typically female and vulnerable reader, or the patho-
logical or imbecilic reader, the courts needed to think of the general 
reader as a rational, mature, adult stable in his or her beliefs and 
behavior.
•	 Third, the Courts needed to recognize the necessity of drawing 
upon literary experts on questions of literary quality and matters of 
experimentation in the field of literature in general, and not leave 
these matters up to the tastes or common sense of judges and juries 
untrained to assess modern literature.
•	 Fourth, books should be read as a whole, rather than as mere parts, 
and that doing so would show that individual incidents of sexual 
morality or immorality were incidental to larger developments of 
character, fate, and plot, rather than merely titillating parts.
•	 Fifth, the courts needed to have demonstrated some actual evidence 
of danger and harm, rather than accept the state’s claims of audi-
ence vulnerability to harm because of potential encounters with 
“obscene” materials.8
•	 Sixth, by accepting as “scientific” and necessary to a modern public 
the reputable sexology literature dealing with masturbation and mar-
ried sexual pleasure, and protecting the right of certain classes of 
recipients—namely, married women and their licensed physicians—
to have access to birth-control information and technologies, the 
courts would satisfy core needs of the modern public, especially the 
modern family.
•	 And seventh, even though the First Amendment does not protect 
obscenity per se, the still operative nineteenth-century obscenity stat-
utes were in derogation of the Bill of Rights, in spirit.
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Together with these central arguments, Ernst and others bundled 
together a cluster of additional arguments that over time produced a 
persuasive legal and cultural counter-attack to the increasingly defen-
sive censorship agents, both local and national.9
 His obvious promotional and legal talents made him a valuable, 
much-utilized resource for progressive political and cultural causes, and 
his law firm became a vital resource as well. Through earlier association 
with the ACLU’s founder, Roger Baldwin, Ernst became an officer on 
the Executive Board of the ACLU, serving from 1927–54. He became 
General Counsel to the Union’s national office by 1929 and held that 
position through the tumult of the 1930s, 40s, and early 50s. As exec-
utive board member and counsel, Ernst helped deploy the ACLU’s 
resources for anti-censorship causes and was instrumental in bringing 
sexuality and obscenity matters into the ACLU’s sphere of concerns. 
The Union actively promoted and publicized Ernst’s efforts and occa-
sionally helped subvent his firm’s legal costs.10
 Ernst had a wide range of legal and political interests beyond the 
literary and the sexual, and he developed a consistent set of principles 
about the right to speak and the importance of the public’s access to 
a rich and diverse “marketplace of thought.” He engaged in a range 
of causes promoting freedom of expression, including becoming coun-
sel to the American Newspaper Guild, defending the right of journal-
ists for collective bargaining; being counsel to actors in the Dramatists 
Guild and counsel to the burlesque theatre industry, where he fought 
many battles with the Commissioner of Licenses in New York City over 
closings of both “legitimate” and burlesque theaters; co-founding the 
National Lawyers Guild; and being appointed a member of President 
Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights. And throughout his career he 
was one of the most insistent critics of oligopoly conditions in the mass 
communications industries, paying special attention to consolidation of 
the radio and film industries, the decimation of locally owned newspa-
pers by the newspaper chains, and postal rates that hindered market 
access to small newspaper and magazines and created bottlenecks in the 
flow of creativity and ideas necessary to a healthy democracy.11
 In all, Ernst came to understand obscenity-law restrictions in light 
of a larger political, cultural, and intellectual commitment to a well-
informed, rational public, the necessity of a vigorous marketplace of 
ideas, and a legal system not cluttered by vague moralistic language 
and unproven assertions of harm to an undifferentiated, susceptible 
public.
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At battle with obscenity laws
The first federal obscenity law in the United States, passed in 1842, 
authorized the Customs Service to confiscate “obscene or immoral” 
pictures, and by the time of the American Civil War (1861–65), wide-
spread obscenity statutes were on the books in the individual states. 
Most of these statutes shared an English Common Law language and set 
of assumptions, especially that common law prohibited “whatever out-
rages decency and is injurious to public morals.” In 1868, in the British 
case of Regina v. Hicklin, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn articulated a defi-
nition of obscenity that shaped obscenity law in English and American 
courts—in the U.S. until the 1930s.12 The Hicklin standard, which Amer-
ican courts almost immediately adopted from the British, turned on 
whether “the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave 
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, 
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.” This broad, 
conditional language was a prosecutor’s dream: It required proof only 
that a work could be interpreted as obscene and required neither dem-
onstration of ill intent nor actual harm to readers or viewers. This loose 
standard of causality accepted strong moralistic assertions of probable 
or possible effects as sufficient evidence of potentially damaging effects, 
especially to the young and vulnerable.13
 In the United States, the cultural and legal assault on obscene 
materials accelerated dramatically after 1873, when the now infamous 
Anthony Comstock, Secretary of the New York Society for the Suppres-
sion of Vice and the leading advocate of efforts to stamp out offensive 
materials, persuaded Congress to expand the federal obscenity law. The 
1873 federal “Comstock Law” barred sending through the mails not 
only “any obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, print, or 
other publication of vulgar and indecent character,” but also “any arti-
cle or thing designed or intended for the prevention of conception or 
procuring of abortion.” By specifically adding birth-control information 
and devices to the list of banned materials, the law effectively extended 
federal jurisdiction into all matters relating to reproduction and put the 
authority of Postal and Customs officials behind efforts to surveil the 
mails.14
 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Comstock 
Act in a series of late-nineteenth-century cases, and local and federal 
courts routinely employed the language of the Hicklin standard of 
“proof.” Books and other materials were prosecuted or banned not for 
their actual effects, but rather for their possible effects on anyone who 
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might conceivably read or encounter them—especially children, young 
men and women (particularly the latter), or the mentally weak. This 
meant, for instance, that even medical materials about contraception or 
abortion, aimed at doctors and medical students, could be, and were, 
found obscene because they might fall into the hands of the suscep-
tible classes. As long as the prosecutors could prove the “obscenity” of 
an artifact, there were no First Amendment concerns, because the First 
Amendment gave no protection to obscene materials.15
 In short, from the Civil War era until the 1930s, accurate scientific 
information about married sex, adolescent sexuality, masturbation, 
homosexuality, reproduction, abortion, and birth control was consis-
tently deemed obscene and kept out of the mails and bookstores to pre-
vent it from falling into the hands of susceptible audiences.16
At battle with the Vice Society
Ernst’s autobiographic statements indicate that his interests in obscenity 
matters began to crystallize in 1927 after losing a U.S. Customs obscen-
ity case in defense of a small bookseller arrested by agents of the New 
York Society for the Prevention of Vice for selling an obscene book, 
John Hermann’s What Happens.17 Ernst subsequently became obsessed 
with fighting local and federal obscenity laws, and with doing battle 
against John M. Sumner, the New York Vice Society heir to the noto-
rious Anthony Comstock. Sumner stood for a particularly repressive 
Victorianism, and his underhanded tactics against booksellers and pub-
lishing houses galled and motivated Ernst. Ernst proved a quick study, 
co-writing an influential history of obscenity law in 1928 titled To the 
Pure, a thoroughgoing attack on Comstockery as an intellectual and cul-
tural offense, and a useful legal primer for others interested in such 
battles.18 Through his successes defending local booksellers in the New 
York City Magistrates Courts, and his strategic victories in the federal 
courts, by the early 1930s he quickly achieved national recognition as 
the most effective anti-censorship strategist.
 Ernst, Pilpel, Lindey, and others in the Greenbaum, Wolff, and 
Ernst firm, developed a broad anti-censorship agenda and undertook a 
decade-long assault on obscenity laws. That agenda became increasingly 
strategic and focused on orchestrating winnable test cases on matters 
dealing with human sexuality, literary and cultural modernism, and the 
right of access to birth-control information and technology. They won 
by convincing judges and juries that the vague overreaching language 
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of the obscenity laws and the cultural arguments leveled against sexual, 
literary, and artistic modernism were outmoded and anathema to evolv-
ing standards of legal evidence and to the needs of a diverse, urbane 
public. Although he was not the first American lawyer to make these 
arguments, Ernst had the greatest success making them in local and 
federal courts.19
 Given his growing interest in obscenity law, Ernst functioned as 
counsel to leading publishing houses (including Random House and 
Putnam) and to more adventurous smaller firms committed to publish-
ing provocative works (including Vanguard and Viking). He became 
defense counsel to many of New York City’s booksellers routinely has-
sled by John M. Sumner and his smut hounds,20 and from the late 1920s 
through the mid-1930s he and his anti-censorship allies were in con-
stant local skirmishes with Sumner’s Vice Society, winning decision after 
decision in the local Magistrates Courts in defense of booksellers for 
selling, among other works, Arthur Schnitzler’s Casanova’s Homecoming, 
George Moore’s A Storyteller’s Holiday, and Gustave Flaubert’s November, 
to name just a few.21 Ernst and his allies in the growing anti-censorship 
movement—including the ACLU’s affiliate organization, the National 
Commission on Freedom From Censorship—actively publicized each 
and every battle with and victory over Sumner. Along the way, they 
actively sought out battles to publicize their cause and Sumner’s tactics.
 They had the perfect foil in John M. Sumner, who led the Vice 
Society crusades against what he perceived as the cultural degradation 
wrought by sexual license and modern culture. Sumner tried to hold 
the line against the obscene in the world of literature and art, and in so 
doing he frequently resorted to underhanded means to achieve arrests 
and seize stockpiles of booksellers’ books; these tactics infuriated Ernst, 
especially because even after booksellers were exonerated in the courts, 
Sumner frequently failed to return, or considerably delayed returning, 
the seized stockpiles. The result deepened the antipathy between Ernst 
and Sumner, and the growing animus is an important part of the atmo-
sphere and official record of this period of censorship history. Ernst 
made Sumner his whipping boy in the press and routinely ridiculed 
him both publicly and in his trial briefs. He and his anti-censorship 
allies orchestrated specific censorship events to create book-seizure 
spectacles that were sure to dramatize Sumner’s methods and his anti-
modernism, facilitating Ernst’s purposes of bringing down censorship 
barriers and promoting the anti-censorship cause in the name of intel-
lectual freedom and the marketplace of thought.
 Ernst was strategic in cultivating his battles with federal authorities 
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as well, and his lasting claim to fame—his victory over Customs officials 
in the 1933 Ulysses case—was a long planned and hoped-for outcome 
of a series of cases he set in motion with the 1929 Well of Loneliness 
case. His anti-censorship ally, Lewis Gannett, book critic and columnist 
for the New York Herald, chronicled Ernst’s local and federal victories 
from 1927–33, locating the Ulysses decision within Ernst’s larger assault 
on obscenity law. While touting Ernst’s body of work and celebrating 
the prize of the Ulysses case, Gannett also illustrates the strategic, pro-
motional relationship Ernst developed with book critics and journalists 
who were lined up with him on the anti-censorship, anti-Sumner front. 
Celebrating the victories over Sumner, without ever mentioning Sum-
ner directly, Gannett writes:
The tide really turned about the time that Morris Ernst, attorney, 
who has fought most of the historic censorship cases of the last five 
years . . . lost a censorship case the previous year (1927). . . . The defeat 
aroused a crusading zeal in Mr. Ernst. He dug into the history of cen-
sorship, published his books exposing its absurdities and contradic-
tions, and emerged as the logical and fearless defender of frank, honest 
literature.
 In 1929, with Mr. Ernst as defending counsel in both cases, Radclyffe 
Hall’s The Well of Loneliness was cleared of the charge of obscenity in 
General Sessions, and Magistrate Gottlieb gave [Schnitzler’s] Casano-
va’s Homecoming a clean-cut endorsement. In 1930 the Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed an adverse verdict of a lower court on Mary Ware Den-
nett’s The Sex Side of Life, and Judge Woolsey, in the first of three deci-
sions which have become historic, ruled in favor of Dr. Marie Stopes’s 
Married Love. . . . An amazing series of amazing victories for Morris 
Ernst.
 The Ulysses decision is the culmination of a long struggle for sanity. 
Judge Woolsey’s decision is not necessarily binding on the state courts 
of this and still less of other states, nor are the little censors of the Post 
Office Department officially bound by it. But the large scope, the care-
ful wording and thinking of Judge Woolsey’s previous decisions have 
had their effect on other courts, and the Ulysses decision is sure to prove 
a monument.22
As Gannett indicated, Ernst’s work on literary materials was not sep-
arable from his defense of materials about human sexuality or from 
his commitment to rationalizing federal law concerning both cultural 
expression and reproductive matters.
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 While Sumner was not the only censor with whom Ernst cultivated 
tactical skirmishes, their ongoing battles perfectly embody the clash of 
the modern with the passing mores of late Victorian culture. Ernst was 
astutely aware of the importance of public opinion, and by choosing 
cases that could be used to good public-relations advantage (Sumner’s 
seizure of books by Schnitzler, Moore, and Flaubert are cases in point), 
he cultivated and drew upon an audience and supporting chorus of lit-
erary reviewers and noted authors and was able to routinely use Sum-
ner to excellent effect as his foil. But the antagonism was real, and 
Ernst developed a kind of missionary zeal in defeating Sumner and in 
changing the censorship laws and practices of New York City and the 
nation.
 Although by the early 1930s he was consistently losing his obscenity 
prosecutions in the New York City Magistrates Courts, Sumner nonethe-
less argued that he exerted considerable marketplace force by threaten-
ing booksellers with prosecutions and thereby driving them to stop the 
sale of books, even forcing some out of business. Sumner contended 
that he was more successful than Ernst and others gave him credit for, 
and that they exaggerated his failures and his excesses in their public-
ity campaigns against him. But Ernst invoked marketplace arguments 
as well, combining his marketplace of thought argument with claims 
of literary reputation and the sexual information needs, or interests, 
of the modern adult audience. He also evaded the cultural degrada-
tion argument voiced by Sumner by not defending (for the most part) 
the truly smutty and disreputable materials, choosing instead to fight 
on behalf of reputable, defensible works, to achieve a winning record 
whose cumulative force was itself an argument about changing legal 
and public tastes.
 Ernst’s marketplace arguments pointed both to consumers’ interest 
and public taste, on the consumption end, and to production, repre-
sented by the entire book industry, including publishers, booksellers, 
and book reviewers. For Ernst the sales and distribution of works were 
evidence that the commercial marketplace reflected the evolution of 
public interests, tastes, and needs; and the fact that a disputed book was 
advertised, reviewed in important newspapers, stocked and circulated in 
leading bookstores everywhere meant that it had been accepted, even 
approved, by the contemporary community. Sumner countered that this 
appeal to the publishing industry and its marketplace was morally eva-
sive and obtuse, and that commercial culture and public taste should 
not be the arbiters of where public morals should be. Sumner expressly 
linked literary people with abnormality and argued that the judgments 
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of abnormal people should not determine and guide the public’s moral 
standards.
 Sumner attacked the frankness of modern literature, especially its 
so-called realism, by arguing that it was leading the reading public 
toward a fetid sewer of taste and dissipation. When defending more 
problematic works—sexually frank and marked by social realism—Ernst 
explained them to judges and juries as cautionary tales. Literary works 
replete with sordid details and sexual frankness could be, he argued, 
instructive morality tales, and not just tawdry fare. Nothing in the sor-
did environments and the generally downward trajectories of the cen-
tral characters’ lives should be construed as being attractive to the 
average reader, he argued. The fact that the protagonists’ lifestyles were 
unattractive was not a hindrance to their defense; rather, they were real-
istic depictions of modern life as lived by some people. Additionally, 
Ernst successfully argued that those particular passages depicting sex-
ual desire and fulfillment should be read as part of a larger whole, with 
sexual frankness as utterly true to life, and the specific episodes as inci-
dental to the larger narrative. The Magistrates Court judges were quite 
persuaded by this interpretive framework and frequently reproduced 
this logic in their decisions.
 The Ernst–Sumner clashes were carried out in the city’s newspapers 
and its courts, and Ernst usually won. He did so by directly challeng-
ing the moralistic, but not necessarily demonstrable, assertions used 
in obscenity prosecutions about youth and their vulnerabilities, about 
unleashing public pathologies, and about rotting moral foundations. To 
counter these, Ernst argued about the need for frank, instructive mate-
rials, about the rational capacities of the reading public, and about the 
potentially salubrious effects of sociological realism for a modern audi-
ence. But most crucially, he argued about the unacceptable vagueness 
of obscenity law and its standards of evidence. Ernst took these argu-
ments into other arenas of obscenity law, where he also met with con-
siderable success.
 In all of these cases—literary, sex hygiene and education, and birth 
control—Ernst’s core legal arguments and publicity campaigns recurred 
to a series of questions about harm: How harmful are the suppos-
edly obscene materials? Whom they will harm? How can that harm be 
assessed? Do nineteenth-century moral assumptions about harm meet 
twentieth-century definitions of morality? Do the so-called obscene 
materials meet public interests and needs? And, if so, what materials 
should the adult majority be denied because a potentially vulnerable 
minority might be harmed? His adroitness at forcing legal authorities to 
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answer these questions with the precision required of modern jurispru-
dence produced a series of legal victories, creating important openings 
for cultural and sexual modernism.
 So, too, he addressed the problem of audience vulnerability, which 
was inseparable from the question of harm. Because harm and vulnera-
bility were both legal criteria and moral claims, they were at the very cen-
ter of the obscenity discourse. For Ernst and others fighting obscenity 
laws, the core question was this: Who gets constructed as the vulnerable 
audience/consumer? The young, generally female, and sexually vulner-
able? The young, impressionistic, and potentially predatory male? Or 
the average adult? Under Ernst’s and others’ persuasion, the New York 
City Magistrates Court judges, and eventually the federal court judges, 
came to understand that the average adult reader was the operative 
consumer in the literary and sexual modernist marketplace. This shift 
in the vulnerable-audience argument became a critical turning point in 
the successful legal defense of “obscene” literature, birth control, and 
sex hygiene materials, as the moral claim of potential harm became less 
persuasive when adult men—and not youth in general, especially teen-
aged girls—were constructed as the presumed audience. The assump-
tion that the average audience was not vulnerable, and was capable of 
refraining from the kinds of behaviors depicted in even the most ques-
tionable texts was central to undermining obscenity prosecutions. Once 
stable adults replaced vulnerable youth as the assumed audience, pros-
ecutors found it very difficult to win obscenity prosecutions unless the 
works on trial were well beyond the pale of contemporary sensibility.
 Ernst’s trial and appellate briefs, where most of these arguments 
were articulated in case after case, weren’t just legal arguments; rather, 
they were essays that spoke to the social and cultural ruptures of the 
moment. His briefs, and his published works, were persuasive essays 
about contemporary laws fitting the needs of a modernizing public, 
under the guarantees of a legal system that could and should offer 
more protection for freedom of inquiry, for the dissemination of useful 
information, and for greater semantic and administrative precision on 
the part of the state if it was going to interfere with the flow of ideas.
 Ernst was particularly forceful about the imprecise language of the 
obscenity statutes, given shifting cultural tastes and mores. He high-
lighted how statutory vagueness became a weapon wielded by prosecu-
tors, and made the imprecision of obscenity laws indefensibly evident. 
The problem with obscenity laws, especially the “deprave and corrupt” 
language, was that they were based on prosecutors’, juries’, and judges’ 
subjectivity, subjectivities that were rooted in variables such as educa-
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tional background, religion, or attitudes about sex. These were pro-
foundly imprecise terms. Ernst essentially argued that in strict legal 
terms, there must be a standard of conduct that is possible to know 
and to be tested against. As he wrote to a colleague in preparation for 
trial, “Obscenity still remains the only crime the determination of which 
depends essentially on speculation, not on facts or known standards.” 
But because of the utter vagueness of the obscenity statutes, knowing 
the line that distinguished the obscene from the not obscene was nearly 
impossible and utterly necessary in a just legal system. “It is obvious that 
any element of vagueness and uncertainty is hostile to the fundamen-
tal principles of justice and places an individual at the mercy of mere 
chance. If definiteness is essential to law in general, it is doubly so to 
criminal law; it should be made impossible for a man to guess himself 
into jail.”23
Sexual modernism
Ernst should be just as well remembered for his defenses of sex-infor-
mation materials and birth control as for his defenses of literature. 
Between the Radclyffe Hall Customs Bureau case over The Well of Lone-
liness in 1929 and the Ulysses decision in 1933, Ernst won three federal 
court trials on questions of disseminating “obscene” materials about 
human sexuality through Customs and the Postal system. Then in the 
mid-1930s he won two more federal trials on Customs and Postal con-
trol over birth-control materials.
 As he gained focus on the defense of literary and cultural expres-
sion, he also turned to the defense of information about human sexu-
ality. In the most famous and highly publicized of his sex-information 
cases (due in part to the ACLU’s fundraising and promotional work), 
Ernst eventually regained for Mary Ware Dennett the right to use the 
mails to distribute her widely used, well-respected pamphlet “The 
Sex Side of Life.” The trial over Dennett’s pamphlet, which was used 
primarily for the sexual education of youth, put modern youth and 
access to information about sexuality on trial. Because she dared to 
write frankly about masturbation as normal, and not morally fraught, 
and about sex as pleasurable and sexual feelings as natural, she was 
accused, and initially found guilty, of trafficking in obscene materials. 
The core cultural anxieties about youth, masturbation, and the break-
down of self-discipline and chastity as the bulwark of moral order suf-
fused the discussions surrounding the case, and Dennett’s repudiation 
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of the literature and folklore against masturbation (with its warnings 
of madness, infirmity, and licentiousness leading to self-destruction) 
was the central issue for both those defending and those opposing her. 
Ernst, the ACLU, and others actively publicized the case, and in March 
1930 Ernst succeeded in convincing the federal appellate court to over-
turn a lower federal court conviction for distributing obscene materials 
through the mail.24
 Fresh from this victory, he approached British birth-control activist 
(and eugenicist) Marie Stopes about taking on the Customs Bureau ban 
on the importation of two of her books, one her advice manual Married 
Love, and the other her birth-control book, titled Contraception.25 Like 
the Dennett case, the Stopes trials marked important legal challenges 
to an older moral order, and the growing legal recognition of the right 
of the modern adult public to have access to frank, scientific informa-
tion about sexuality and its pleasures, and reproduction and its control, 
especially for married couples. Ernst won these two federal court cases 
against the Customs Bureau in 1931.
 Not coincidentally, at the time Ernst was defending Mary Ware Den-
nett, he also began working as counsel for Margaret Sanger (Dennett’s 
erstwhile leadership rival in the inchoate American birth-control move-
ment), defending the 16th Street Birth Control Clinic against a raid and 
seizure of all records by the New York City police. Thus began Ernst’s 
and his law firm’s long association with Sanger and birth-control activ-
ists, including Ernst’s efforts at mediating relations between Sanger and 
Dennett, who had very different ideas about the goals, strategies, and 
leadership of the birth-control movement. For the progressive sexual 
modernists such as Dennett, Sanger, and Stopes, and for Ernst and his 
colleagues, especially Harriet Pilpel—a longtime counsel for the birth-
control movement—the issues of sexual pleasure and knowledge could 
not be separated from the issue of the right of reproductive control.26
 He and his colleagues targeted the broad authority that the Com-
stock Act’s “obscenity” language gave to Customs officials, Postal offi-
cers, and local prosecutors to interfere with the adult public’s right of 
access to information about sexuality and reproduction. Ernst, Pilpel, 
and Lindey made their firm the most important law firm in the coun-
try on birth-control matters in the 1930s and 40s, when the birth-con-
trol movement was dramatically expanding. Following their defense of 
Sanger’s clinic against police raids in 1929, they won two mid-1930s fed-
eral birth-control cases about the right of licensed physicians and scien-
tific researchers to have access to birth-control technology (United States 
v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries, 1936), and contraceptive information 
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(U.S. v. Norman E. Himes, 1937).27 As with the literature cases, Ernst and 
his firm orchestrated these as test cases, hoping to ensure that the fed-
eral government could not deny birth-control information and devices 
to licensed physicians, clinics, druggists, and scientific researchers inter-
ested in these matters.
 In all, Ernst and associates won five federal cases between 1931 and 
1937 (including the two Stopes cases and Dennett), dramatically dimin-
ishing the broad reach of obscenity restrictions on reputable, modern, 
scientific information about human sexuality and reproduction. For 
birth-control advocates this meant that doctors could prescribe contra-
ceptives to preserve the lives and protect the health of their married 
patients (unless proscribed by state laws), and that federal postal and 
customs officials could not interfere with distribution or dissemination 
of materials addressed to the “privileged class” of recipients—namely, 
licensed professionals.28 For the birth-control movement, there was 
plenty more work to be done, but Ernst’s legal work in the 1930s went 
a long way toward rationalizing and regularizing federal law on birth-
control matters. By the eve of World War II, no one in the United States 
had done more than Morris Ernst to expand legal protection to a vari-
ety of cultural forms, from literature and art to nudism, theatre, film, 
and radio—and no one had done more to rationalize birth-control laws, 
either.
Conclusion
To conclude, I want to do two things. First, I want to provide a summa-
tion of the cumulative defense strategy Ernst developed in his prime 
years defending literary and sexual modernism in the New York and 
federal courts. Second, I want to put some clay on Ernst’s feet, lest this 
essay have the effect of leaving this problematic figure with the glow of 
unabashed hagiography.
 Ernst’s many trial briefs during this period made a series of legal 
and cultural arguments that were repeated and elaborated in sub-
sequent cases as his defenses grew more numerous. Individually and 
collectively, the briefs embraced a narrative trajectory about cultural 
progress and sexual liberation from the nineteenth century to the late 
1920s–30s and the growing tolerance of an increasingly cosmopolitan 
and sophisticated judiciary whose understanding of the modern condi-
tion outpaced the Victorian sensibilities of the censors. In short, Ernst 
argued the following:
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•	 Sexual morality had evolved considerably from the mid-nineteenth 
century.
•	 John Sumner’s obsessions were pathological, old-fashioned, and dis-
turbed, and his tactics were underhanded, relying on such subter-
fuge as the use of undercover agents.
•	 The Vice Society’s failure to achieve any pattern of success in pros-
ecuting books in the late 1920s and 30s was due in part to the New 
York City Magistrates Courts’ cosmopolitan rationality and willing-
ness to entertain more complex and evolving understandings of 
morality and taste.
•	 The legal standards for obscenity need to evolve to reflect an increas-
ingly diverse, urbane society and citizenry with competing and not 
uniform interests or moral codes.
•	 The idea of who the general reader is needs to account for the 
mature, adult reader stable in his or her beliefs and behavior.
•	 The marketplace functions as an adequate gatekeeper and protector 
of public tastes, with the publication, publicity, sales, and distribution 
apparatus ensuring that the legitimate publishing business will main-
tain decent standards, while under-the-counter smut and pornogra-
phy will be kept marginal.
•	 The literary reputations of the author, the publisher, the reviewers, 
and the systems of literary review are legitimate, and can and should 
be invoked as evidence of quality and importance.
•	 Compared to pornography, the producers of which are anonymous, 
the books under consideration operate in a very different market. 
Pornography is for profit only with no other redeeming value, is sold 
under the counter, and without any kind of open exposure or review 
system in place.
•	 The courts should compare the book under examination with other 
books deemed acceptable by the courts.
•	 And, in modern life, books are just one among many influences of 
the modern media and entertainment industry (the press, the stage, 
movies), and to measure the harm of any given book is impossible.
 These core elements of the Ernstian defense achieved considerable 
success in local and federal courts and became part of the standard rep-
ertoire for defending literary works against charges of obscenity, with 
Ernst a leading force in the progressive legal community on the eve of 
World War II. But other issues, and fissures in the progressive commu-
nity, led Ernst away from a sustained focus on obscenity law. After the 
Nazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939, he turned his considerable energies 
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to an ardent anti-communism, making his culturally progressive affili-
ations fraught, and his legacy within the ACLU controversial. Indeed, 
his obsession with communism and growing fealty to J. Edgar Hoover 
dominated Ernst’s career by the early 1940s through the early 1950s, 
more than straining his relations with cultural and political progressives 
in general, and dimming his bright reputation over time, making him 
today a rather neglected figure.29
 Friends and foes knew that Ernst was a dependable protector of 
Hoover and the FBI’s reputation, although they did not know he had 
become a covert informant as well. Hoover assessed that he could rely 
on Ernst to do his bidding among the “responsible” and “serious lib-
eral crowd,”30 and Ernst became the pre-eminent liberal defender of 
the FBI, writing glowing tributes to Hoover and “his boys” in journals 
such as The Nation, and also in mainstream publications such as Life, 
Saturday Evening Post, and Reader’s Digest.31 The result for the civil liber-
ties community was that a talented, well-respected leader spent his time 
promoting Hoover rather than challenging him. The result for Ernst 
was a diminution of his prestige and reputation within the community 
of civil libertarians among whom he had been a leader. He was never 
as influential after he became an active anti-communist as he had been 
before, and the irony is that by aligning himself with Hoover he wanted 
to be exceptionally influential. In the end, Morris Leopold Ernst made 
his mark in American literary and legal culture in the 1930s, while he 
was still a relatively young man, and he spent much of the rest of his 
career functioning not really as a champion of civil liberties, but rather 
as someone who once had been.
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Part three
the Limits of Liberalism

The lights go out and Tim appears in a bright, whore-red follow spot completely 
naked perched on a ledge.
My body is a map. My body is a TEXT. My body is a STORY!
My body is a container for feeling and memory! My body is a HONEY-
BAKED HAM!
NOOO! My skin is a map.
I am perched here naked on a precipice.
My skin is a map.
A map of my world. My secret world.
It tells you where I’ve been. And how to get to where I come from.
It charts my seas . . .
my caves . . .
my mountains. Such as they are!
my peninsulas . . .
PEN-INSULA! which from my semester of college Latin with a de-
frocked priest I know means “almost-island.”
I travel with this map over my skin.
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I go on journeys. Find new coastlines. Hidden borders.
I follow my nose along the touch that has pulled me through life.
I lead with my tongue.
I go by foot . . . by dick . . . by brain sometimes.
I know the path by heart.
The pleasures I sailed across.
The pain I pointed towards.
The knowing my bends and hollows.
The bodies . . . many bodies . . . I have touched and been taught by.
The secret places soothed and stroked.
My skin is a map.
Tim begins to walk nude among the obscenity conference attendees, thus earn-
ing his honorarium.
Well that is not really true. My skin is not a map. My skin is what tends 
to get me in trouble and then we can map that trouble all over the 
world. Like when I was performing in Tokyo and I walked naked among 
the audience of 400: a big foreign fag gaijin naked man. I had never 
felt more naked as I gamboled without clothes through the aisles in 
Japan and came near a Dokkyo University student whose gaze crept 
further and further inside her armpit. Now admittedly, I have made 
young ladies—as well as young men—all over the English-speaking 
world shrink into their seats with eyes gazing heavenward when they 
encounter my queer narratives on stage and even queerer naked body 
in the orchestra seats.
 Or the time in Durham, NC, a few years back. I was on the cover of 
a North Carolina newspaper The Independent. In the photograph I am 
almost naked with Senator Jesse Helms leering like a vampire behind 
me. This festive image brought out hundreds of right-wing protest-
ers to my performances to try to stop my show in Durham. There was 
one small girl carrying a sign in the protest outside the theater that 
says, “YECHH! TIM MILLER KEEP YOUR CLOTHES ON!” I am so 
stressed by the protests that I am forced to pick up an audience mem-
ber, a gorgeous black PhD student from UNC Chapel Hill. After the 
show, he and I shoved our way thru the protesters, went to my hotel and 
fucked one another in a marathon session to try to make us feel better 
about Amerika. It worked!
o
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All those dry cleaning bills audience members all over the world sent to 
me when I sat my naked sweaty butt on their Sunday best and left a butt 
imprint, a kind of living booty shroud of Turin!
So you see my skin is not a map. My skin—especially my naked skin—
is a trouble spot. It’s a place where I always get messed up. It’s a place 
where the police get called. It’s a place where I will never get tenure.
Tim steps onstage.
My skin is all of those things. That why I want to start.
Tim puts his clothes on. Follow spot blazingly bright white.
Let’s start at the beginning. The very beginning. My Dad is fucking my 
Mom. In a bed. Where else would they be? This is suburban Whittier, 
California. They’re young and hot for each other. I’m trying to visual-
ize this. Half of me is inside my Father’s dick. The other half is inside 
my Mom. My biology gets a little vague here. They’re breathing fast. 
My Dad is going to cum any minute. He’s thrusting madly. AH AH AH! 
Suddenly I am thrown out of my Father’s dick into my Mom’s body. I 
am surrounded by thousands of squirming creatures.
I am swimming upstream.
Oh humble dog paddle!
Oh efficient crawl!
Oh stylish backstroke!
 I am swimming upstream. As I would swim upstream throughout 
this life. One queer little spermlet . . . Fighting the odds. A hideous 
sperm that looks like Senator Jesse Helms tries to catch me in a net. I 
elude him! There’s a bunch of generals from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
who want to kick me and all the other gay sperm out of this fallopian 
tube. I elude them, as well. Then a bunch of hulking macho slimebag 
straight-pig sperm shove and try to elbow me out of the way. Call me 
“Sissy! Pansy! Fag!
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 You’ll never find an egg! HA HA HA!”
 Clearly this is homophobia. My very first experience. But! I use my 
superior agility, fleetness, and sense of style and calmly leap from plod-
ding straight sperm forehead to straight sperm forehead. I quickly find 
a willing dyke ovum, we agree to power share. We reach consensus 
immediately (this is a fantasy sequence, all right!) and we . . .
 FERTILIZE!
 There is an explosion of creative electricity. A shifting of queer tec-
tonic plates.
 Skittering across the well of loneliness to Walt Whitman’s two boys 
together clinging on the sea beach dancing! I see Gertrude Stein is in 
a tutu. She dances with Vaslav Nijinsky in a butt plug. They do a Pas de 
Deux on the wings of a fabulous flying machine created by Leonardo 
and piloted by James Baldwin and Amelia Earhart. They fly over the 
island of Lesbos where Sappho is starting to put the moves on the cute 
woman carpenter who had arrived to build her a breakfast nook.
 There is a puff of feathers . . . an angry fist . . . a surface to air wit-
ticism. . . . the off the shoulder amazon look! Embodying the bridge 
between woman and man and back again. The sperm is a fish. The egg 
is a rocket. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1!
 And . . . ECCE HOMO! Behold the fag.
 And now the big cry to the universe. It’s time to be born. WAAAAHH!
 The doctor spanks my butt. WAAAHH! He spanks it again. 
WAAAHH! I look back and I say
 “Doctor, I won’t really be into spanking till I’m a Freshman in 
College!”
 With that first pre-erotic and non-consensual spank a wave of shame 
and body fear washes over me. I fight back. I kick the doctor in the 
balls. Rejecting his authority. I slip on my “Action = Life” Huggies. 
Slither into my attractive “We’re Here We’re Queer Get Used To It” 
powder-blue baby jumper. I see all the other queer babies in the nursery 
start to shimmer and grow and explode from their diapers. We all grow 
to adulthood. So many of them find their way to the University of Iowa 
Obscenity Conference tonight.
 Until I stand before you now.
Tim bows. Applause! Grabs the microphone.
o
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I’m going to perform several pieces for my presentation, but I want to 
also use my time to blur the boundaries between the performer-self 
and the holding-forth-in-another-way self. I’d like to talk a little more in 
terms of this obscenity conference and my performances and the enor-
mous role that this particular subject has played in my work. So I’ll talk 
a little bit between each of the pieces. And one thing for me that is very 
important is to really acknowledge what makes each of us tick, what 
influences and emboldens us to create work. And for me especially in 
terms of my own difficulties with the U.S. government, not just around 
the first amendment or the National Endowment for the Arts, but all 
of the many ways I feel my government assaults my personhood, my 
home, my family. Certainly my first amendment battles are one of the 
big pieces of that, but I don’t think any of this space claiming, or any 
of my naked wandering through the audience imagining new and more 
efficient strategies of overthrowing the Bush administration, would have 
ever occurred to me without a few crucial influences. My work is totally 
informed and encouraged by all of the feminist performance work I saw 
growing up in the late 1970s in Los Angeles at the “Women’s Building” 
in downtown L.A. where I was seeing as a teen this explosion of femi-
nist performance practice of people really claiming the narratives of 
our bodies, the particulars of our daily lives, what counts, what matters 
to us, our dreamscapes, certainly also our queer selves. It encouraged 
my agency as a little queer boy and also made me want to be a lesbian 
when I grew up. And I’ve done my best—I think I’m going to write a 
little fantasy piece where I was raised by lesbian wolves in the Hollywood 
Hills—I’ve been watching HBO’s mini-series Rome too much . . .
 Anyway, there was just this sense at that time in Southern California 
that “Okay, this is my life, the personal is political.” This was a crucial 
inscription on my body and the texts that live within as I launched into 
the world. Of course, sticking my metal fork in the electrical socket 
of the “personal is political” circuitry has contributed endlessly to my 
getting in trouble—getting strange confederate flags waved outside my 
shows and homophobic death threats from time to time. It was a huge 
gift to me from feminism: to imagine that my queer boy’s life, desires, 
and narratives mattered.
 Second, I was also for a short time in a terrible punk rock band with 
my boyfriend in High School—the worst imaginable punk rock band—
we had only two of the three chords we needed to do our specialty 
songs built around the texts of the Marquis de Sade. The great thing 
was that we had never even read the Marquis de Sade. Terrible punk 
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posturing aside, this gave me an incredible set of tools to add into all 
the Marxist-feminist-lesbian new ways to understand the world. I knew 
I had to jump on the table, annoy the neighbors, get the cops called, 
raise your voice loud with punk chord progressions.
 Finally for me was coming of age in high school during an explosion 
of lesbian and gay civil rights in California—which certainly in the late 
1970s was where “the action” was in almost every way. With the election 
of Harvey Milk as the first openly gay male elected official in the United 
States, I knew I needed to connect my personal identity as a gay man 
with political praxis. Harvey Milk took office and was there for a short 
time before a right-wing cop blew his brains out in one of the more suc-
cessful political coups in American history—though we’ve had many 
more successful ones of late. So somehow that swirl of influences of the 
Feminism, Punk Rock, and Gay Civil Rights is always with me whenever 
my work is problematized or tarred with the obscenity brush and I get 
some nutty Congressman Bob Dornan on the floor of the United States 
House of Representatives in open debate calling me a “porno-slime 
jerk”—which my mom happened to see on C-Span while she was on her 
treadmill watching TV: “Honey, you were just called a ‘porno-slime jerk’ 
in the U.S. House of Representatives.” I like acknowledging those influ-
ences because I think they’re core to what I do. And certainly my own 
formula here is mirrored by many other artists who started making work 
in the juicy ferment of the eighties in response to the craziness of that 
Reagan-Bush era where all kinds of voices were being claimed—new 
strategies: sexuality, politics, community identification. Suddenly all of 
this work coming out of queer communities, communities of color, dis-
abled folks’ performance work. One of my proudest accomplishments 
is founding the two main centers for on-the-edge performance work: 
PS 122 in New York and Highways Performance Space in Los Angeles. 
At Highways we were doing a festival of performance coming from the 
Asian Pacific Islander communities and we were presenting a storyteller 
from the leper colony in Hawaii (he has a book out, it’s quite amazing). 
Anyway, the most untouchable, the most cast out in the Western cul-
tural matrix, is of course the leper. “I’ve got to have a leper at Highways 
in Santa Monica!” And that his shows delighted and troubled the sold-
out audiences gave me a real sign of hope that the franchise is widen-
ing, that more and more voices were adding their stories, politics, and 
erotics.
 So out of that space it’s not so surprising that this work, and hope-
fully mine included, got fiercer, got funnier, was gathering larger 
audiences, was getting more press, was showing up in major media 
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in Chattanooga of all things, or—like this piece I just performed now 
about the queer sperm—on an episode of the HBO show “The Larry 
Sanders Show” which was built around me coming on and doing that 
piece—mentioning a “butt-plug” was “the problem” on the HBO seg-
ment called “The Performance Artist”—so out of all that as this work 
got stronger and more connected to who we are and how we relate to 
the world as artists, it’s not surprising that the Reagan-Bush junta started 
to bash back. And certainly in 1990 when myself, Karen Finley, Holly 
Hughes, and John Fleck became the so-called “National Endowment 
for the Arts Four,” the “NEA Four.” This was not the first example of 
being embattled because I had been going through eight years already 
of the homophobic inaction of the Reagan–Bush administration allow-
ing eighty thousand Americans to die before Reagan deigned to say the 
word AIDS and I was regularly being arrested with the AIDS Coalition 
to Unleash Power (ACT UP) as we protested with fierce creative flair. 
The culture war did open up a new front, a new space, where my work 
in a way really got twisted and tortured in a way that really surprised me. 
I’m such a Pollyanna and embarrassingly so full of white privilege that I 
actually believed way too much in what I learned with my “A” in Civics 
class. I actually imagined that the “separation of powers” would never 
let President Bush mess with the NEA, that gay people would someday 
be treated like citizens and that the First Amendment protected creative 
expression—all those things that I’ve mostly disabused myself of since—
I actually couldn’t imagine that I could live in a country where opposi-
tional, queer artists like me would not be encouraged, nurtured with a 
tiny little bit of our tax money.
 So out of this juicy period in which I was as likely to be performing 
at “Actors Theater of Louisville” or the “Brooklyn Academy of Music” as 
I was to be collaborating with an Episcopalian priest doing performance 
art sermons or collaborating with Guillermo Gomez-Pena at the Cen-
tral American Cultural Center in Los Angeles around the huge wound 
in my state, well in our whole country, around immigration and the 
bicultural reality of a North American country that speaks two primary 
languages, English and Spanish. The “personal is political” formation 
means that our lives as artists and citizens are constantly being engaged 
and challenged.
So that’s a little bit of setting-up-the-scene, but I think it’s time for 
another performance. I think one of the huge sustaining things to 
come out of all of those teenage, queer-boy, wish-I-was-a-lesbian eve-
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nings at the “Women’s Building” in downtown L.A. was this real inter-
est in exploring the narratives that live in our bodies and the myths, the 
memories, and the meanings that live in our assholes, and our elbows, 
and our pancreases—pancrei or whatever you call them!—and that’s a 
real ongoing teaching exploration for me. I was just here a few months 
ago at the U of I working with some MFA actors and playwrights and we 
did some explorations of narratives that live in our bodies and people 
produced some really powerful and charged stuff. So I want to do a lit-
tle piece jumping out of that.
Tim is caught in a followspot as the stage goes dark and walks slowly into 
audience.
My hands . . . my hands . . .
My hands have been slapped a lot in my life.
Tim takes an audience member’s hand in his and regards their palm.
Most people think you learn about someone by reading the palm of the 
hand, but I think we can learn just as much from the back of our hands. 
You just need to be able to see the echo, the imprint of the times that 
that person’s hand has been slapped.
 My hand got slapped when I reached my hand in the cookie jar for 
just one more.
 My hand got slapped when my first boyfriend was queer-bashed 
when I was eighteen. He had gone to a different High School than I 
did. They yelled at him “Die Faggot Die” as they stabbed him nine times 
in the neck with an ice pick outside of a gay bar in Garden Grove, CA.
 My hand got slapped when certain right-wing Congressmen said that 
no lesbian or gay artists should be able to raise their voice in America.
 My hand got slapped very hard in Fifth Grade when I cut holes in 
the pocket of my pants. Neat Virgo holes here in my faggy maroon 
cords. I did this for a good reason so I could put my Fifth Grade fingers 
through those holes and touch my Fifth Grade Dick and balls during 
English lessons, subject-verb agreement. Now, this didn’t hurt my com-
mand of the English language. I speak English very well. I have writ-
ten a book. I’m a professor. My mom discovered my shame when she 
was hanging the washing up in the backyard to dry on the clothesline. 
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She discovered the holes when she pulled the pockets inside out to dry 
better in the sun. She slapped my hands and said to me “Don’t fiddle! 
Don’t fiddle! Don’t fiddle!”
 FIDDLE? I am always getting caught, caught red-handed.
Tim heads back onto the stage which floods with bright as noon Montana 
sunlight.
We’re here in Montana. Bozeman, Montana. It’s 1997 Lesbian and Gay 
Pride in the State of Montana. BIG SKY PRIDE! I am here to perform 
for Montana Pride. Montana is a big state, about the size of Western 
Europe, so people have to drive for twelve hours to get to Pride in Boz-
eman. There are about eight or nine hundred Lesbians and Gay men 
from around the state here. There are also about eight or nine hundred 
other people here to celebrate Gay Pride. Montana Militia had sent a 
bunch of folks. This was their fifteen minutes of fame what with the FBI 
standoff that summer. The KKK has representatives from twelve coun-
ties in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho. The White Aryan Nation has 
sent two busloads from Coeur D’Alene. We’re all one big happy family 
here in America and we’re all together to enjoy Montana Lesbian and 
Gay Pride. There are more pick-up trucks with gun racks in the back 
than I have ever seen in my entire life. Unfortunately not one of them 
belongs to a butch dyke. I personally believe that lesbians are the only 
people who should be allowed to possess firearms in America. This is 
my version of gun control. It’s been tense here, bomb threats, Montana 
State Police with telescopic rifles on the roofs of buildings on Main 
Street as we marched. This is one of those gigs I do in America, like in 
Chattanooga, where the police warn me for my safety to never stand in 
front of windows while the protesters wave their confederate flags as the 
audience arrives for the show.
 I am walking to a Lesbian and Gay Wedding in Bozeman, Montana. I 
have done my performance the night before and now I’m going to take 
part in the last event of Pride weekend.
 I am walking across a street in Bozeman on the way to the wedding 
and I can feel Alistair’s hand in mine, his long cool fingers woven with 
mine. We’ve been through a lot in the last years. We’re doing pretty 
good in 1997. We’ve gotten so much closer. Dealt with shit, I say “I 
love you” now without any rehearsal required. Everything is pretty good 
except for one thing. Alistair is not here with me. No Yellowstone vaca-
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tion for us. Alistair is on the other side of the world being told by my 
government that he is not welcome here. He does not get to be in Mon-
tana holding the hand of his lover, boyfriend, husband, partner, I don’t 
care what you call us. The U.S. Consulate won’t let him in to the States, 
has rejected his student visa, his return ticket is no good now, and he 
has had to drop out of University because he’s missed the beginning of 
the term and our lives are falling apart thanks to the U.S. government 
and I am walking across a street in Bozeman, Montana.
 Two men in a pick-up with a gun rack in the back window pull up 
and stop next to me. I know what’s coming. I don’t have to call the psy-
chic friends network. What’s coming is so predictable. What’s coming 
are “F’s.”
Fucking.
Faggot.
Fruit.
Fairy.
Freak.
 They’re predictable, but they’re scary too, like an angry dog strain-
ing at its leash. I know that those F’s were usually followed by something 
more concrete, a rock, a bottle, maybe even a piece of concrete. Sure 
enough, a half-empty or, depending on your worldview, half-full bottle 
of Colt 45 Malt Liquor leaves the passenger side window as it’s flung 
at me. This was not an individual serving, this was a Sunday morning 
family-size bottle of Colt 45. It flew through the air, its geometry per-
fect, I could admire it for a moment even under these circumstances 
as it made a graceful arc and hit me direct on my right hand. My red, 
red hand—redder now from the hot blood dripping down my fingers. 
The bottle bounced and shattered at my feet. It’s not too bad, five or six 
stitches tops, I just hope the guns stay in the gun rack.
 I would like to say that at this moment I became homo superhero. 
I would tear off my clothes and instead of my vulnerable naked flesh, 
there would be an ugly superhero unitard costume. I would jump on 
the cab of their truck, kick the windshield in, and drag these two ass-
holes across the broken glass. But I didn’t do any of those things. I’m 
not strong enough, or dumb enough, to do that. I wish I could be like 
my friend Mark in Iowa City. When someone yells “FAGGOT!” at him 
on the street, he has a commitment to immediately drop his pants and 
underwear, turning his back to them, spreading his butt cheeks and 
shouting, “Yeah, I am a big faggot. Why don’t you come here and lick 
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my pussy!” I just can’t do that. I guess I just don’t have that spirit of 
Iowa in me. I just bowed my head and walked quicker, a deer frozen in 
the oncoming headlights. Well, the light changed and the men in the 
truck lost interest in me. They threw one or two more F’s and then went 
on their way. I rubbed the blood, and the growing green and purple 
and red on my hand, my hand which just a moment before had been 
holding Alistair’s. His hand slips into mine and the world goes mad. 
It’s almost like they could see Alistair’s hand in mine. It’s not enough 
that our country has tried to destroy our relationship, these men in the 
truck still want to stick our hands in the frying pan, hold our hands to 
the flame as I cross a beautiful street in Montana made ugly by these 
men’s hate.
 Well, I wasn’t much in the mood for going to a wedding now, but 
what else could I do. So off I went.
 My hand aching for the absence of Alistair’s hand in mine.
 My head aching from the harsh ricochet of those F’s.
 My heart aching for these dozen lesbian and gay couples getting 
ready to bind their lives in an old school gymnasium in Bozeman, 
Montana.
I’m really interested in all of the ways these terrains, these borders of 
our identity and selfhood in a way get thrown into the kind of crazy toxic 
soup—not just in this country but this is where we are so it’s our prob-
lem—this crazy American homophobic alphabet soup. The eight years 
I spent around the NEA material, taking a case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, got added into the mix of past letters like HIV and AIDS which 
transformed my sense of what it is to be an artist, an activist, part of 
a community in this country. New letters have been added these last 
years thanks to the INS (now known as ICE, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement). The struggles I’ve been going through for the last thir-
teen years now with my Australian-Scottish partner to try to keep him in 
this country as his final visa winds down is now part of that soup that I 
keep having to dive into every morning I wake up in this America that 
limits artists’ agency in a way around those letters N.E.A., I.N.S., H.I.V., 
A.I.D.S. And that soup, as it simmers away as I travel all over the coun-
try—thirty states every year—and perform, I really like engaging these 
issues. And certainly in the last few years I’ve been focused much more 
around this larger limiting of agency and freedom of expression of 
thirty million gay people around the culture-war battle about civil mar-
riage equality, which is certainly a huge surprising space that many years 
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ago I might not have thought I’d be spending so much of my rhetorical 
flourishes and activism and performance-opining to be addressing. But, 
like it or not, it’s probably the front line of the culture war right now 
and what cynically gets used to try to bash gay people in Ohio to sleaze 
out another shoddy victory in that state that decided the last election.
 So as I travel and talk about stuff just like I am now or perform a 
full piece or go perform at a state university in Tennessee and talk in 
some ways and perform just like I am now for a class visit at some intro 
contemporary society general requirement class. There’s a couple of 
hundred people in a lecture hall—and I know suddenly maybe some of 
those people, and not just in Tennessee or in Montana or in the subur-
ban conservative parts of my own state—I know frequently they’ve just 
never had someone that naughty, naked, political, queer, in a position 
of authority in a classroom or in a theater. And again and again, after 
I do a presentation to a class or a performance someone who I would 
clearly profile as a straight, white, Republican, Baptist, home-schooled, 
lacrosse-playing, frat boy will come and present himself to me: “Ya 
know, Tim, I’m a straight, white, Republican, Baptist, home-schooled, 
lacrosse-playing, frat boy”—“Really?!”—we all play our parts—“And I 
don’t know if you and Alistair should be able to get married, but I think 
you should have all the rights of a straight couple.” And you know so for 
me that’s the space and that’s where the work is I’m really interested in 
doing within the culture wars, where we hit the jackpot like that in what 
that young man said to me. It was like the three red cherries lined up, 
you know ching-ching-ching, bells-and-whistles, the jack-pot happens, 
the light-bulb going on. The treasure of what this country might some-
day become pours at our feet.
These battles around content, obscenity, have hounded me for a num-
ber of years. Regularly there would be protests outside my shows or peo-
ple would be losing their jobs or funding because they presented me, 
which made me feel very guilty. I want to focus on one incident not that 
long ago in 1999, when I was performing in Chattanooga for the first 
time. I probably perform in the southeast more than any other part of 
the country. I don’t know, maybe the text of my work and the complex-
ity of that Senator Helms from North Carolina has woven me in, in a 
strong way, to the fabric of the southeast. The south interests me a lot 
but it was the first time I’d performed in Chattanooga and there’d been 
an enormous amount of fuss on the front page of the Sunday paper. In 
my newest book from the University of Wisconsin there’s an essay I’m 
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very happy about called “The Battle of Chattanooga” (typical grandi-
ose me) equating my little wars around culture with that big nasty Civil 
War and all the battle around Chattanooga in 1864. That civil war is 
ongoing of course. I’d been on the cover of the Sunday Chattanooga 
Times-Free Press, had already been on “Good Morning Chattanooga,” 
and the headline was basically “OBSCENE FAG COMES TO CHATTA-
NOOGA (Lock up the children).” A huge important thing happened 
there. It’s not about me and my work being aggrandized, or inflated or 
puffed up, because actually what these moments where the sparks fly 
or where the shit hits the fan, as they’ve happened at this University 
as they happen everywhere from time to time, actually scare the shit 
out of me. What really matters is this amazing opportunity for change, 
for people to claim space. It actually has nothing to do with me. And 
every night there at “Barking Legs Theatre” on Dodds Avenue in Chat-
tanooga as the audience made their way through the protest of these 
white supremacist north Georgia churches who had all made me the 
subject of their Sunday sermons after seeing the Sunday paper, waving 
their confederate flags and having their children scream at the audi-
ence, the real performance was not me performing, it was actually the 
audience arriving, choosing to park their car, walk through two blocks 
of shouting protesters. We were sold out for the run, the benefit of con-
troversy, I’ll admit it—and every single ticket got picked up. No one took 
a look at the right wing protesters and decided to head home. Chatta-
nooga is an interesting and complex community—but also had been a 
very closeted city, and there hadn’t really been a big highly visible queer 
thing like this with the amount of media I was getting—it actually gave 
people in that community a chance to see, not their neighbors, see 
these outside people who had come in, and Chattanooga is a city of jazz 
clubs and barbeque and you know, in the good old days, whore-houses, 
it was the New York for the Tennessee River area, a really charged and 
interesting space.
 And it’s a majority black city. So all of a sudden all these white peo-
ple from north Georgia churches were coming and waving confeder-
ate flags, which is very provocative of course—yet another symbol we 
fight about in our discussions around the first amendment. The Afri-
can American cops were very annoyed by these confederate flags on 
the streets. These were the police who were protecting the theater, the 
audience and me personally since there had been lots of very specific 
threats—to the point where I was advised to keep my head down in 
the car as I went home. One African American police officer in Chat-
tanooga who I became quite friendly with over the four nights—on the 
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last night of the show he told me sort of conspiratorially: “Ya know 
those cracker protesters, they’re not parked illegally but I’m gonna 
go ticket ’em anyway for you.” So it’s the only time I’ve been all for 
the abuse of police powers. The heat on the street actually just gave a 
chance, and heat is generated around a naked body or a word or an 
image starts going and people can kind of freak out and start going all 
Mr. Smith on “Lost in Space” about it—but that heat creates a space 
where it’s actually this tremendous opportunity for people to change, to 
recognize energies that are around us. Generally the last thing I want to 
do on the day I arrive at a college in North Carolina is to go spend five 
hours with the theater students and the “Campus Crusade for Christ” 
students to dialog about the conflicts that come from me performing 
on campus. On the other hand if you order a pizza there’s the pos-
sibility that we’ll all stay in the room together and talk to each other. 
And that’s happened again and again in my journeys, which is some-
thing I’m extremely interested in—how do we create those little change 
moments, light bulb moments, walking through the protesters, looking 
them in the eye, shouting back, as those people did on Dodds Avenue 
in Tennessee.
 Anything that keeps claiming our private identity, sure, but also how 
that heads out into the social sphere and makes tangible change hap-
pen. And oddly in some ways, that opportunity is created because I have 
been sometimes hassled as “porno-slime jerk,” a critique which is so 
ridiculous since my work is so within an American, Chautauqua, solo-
performance, avuncular public address, speech contest in high school 
form. (I admit it: I did Forensics Speech Contests! There’s currently 
all these queer boys in Texas on YouTube who do my work in speech 
contests, which I’m writing an essay about because I find it so inter-
esting that they’re there in their bedrooms, doing my shows from my 
books, and winning their state competitions in Texas and Illinois with 
my queer material!)
 On that note, I think it is a time for a homosexual orgy, don’t you? 
I want to do one last piece and that’ll be it for tonight. And I don’t 
think I need to preface anything—no I guess I’ll just dive into this. But 
I wanted to do this piece tonight, partly I’m really interested in this 
space of imagining from that heat of these battles that sometimes hap-
pen around our bodies, our cocks, our cunts, our hearts, our politics, 
that there actually is this huge possibility for change. And I was recently 
performing in Winston-Salem at Wake Forest, which is you know a big 
great University but also an affiliated Baptist college. And I was premier-
ing my new show, “A Thousand and One Beds,” and there is just this 
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one part where I’m eighteen and I’ve just been fucked in the butt on 
Hollywood Boulevard and I’ve got cum dripping out of my butt onto 
the “Walk of Fame” on the John Travolta star, and before the show as 
I kneel down in prayer before I do the Lord’s Work I thought “I really 
can’t say this in Winston-Salem at Wake Forest University.” But then of 
course I went ahead and with the students I was working with it was 
that moment afterwards—“Oh my god, that piece was so amazing, that 
part of it, it gives me courage in the piece we’re working on in our 
project. I’m going to and talk about that.”—so that’s like, even in those 
moments where we doubt ourselves—the truth is every time I do that 
little particular section I get extremely embarrassed, although John Tra-
volta always gets a laugh—so anyway I’ll just dive into this piece.
Civil disobedience weekend performance
Tim picks up an electronic bullhorn and begins to harangue the audience.
“You’re all about to be placed under arrest for OBSCENITY. You are 
here in violation of the Patriot Act. In violation of the Federal Law, 
National Endowment for Censorship Penal Code, yes Penal Code S-Q-
143-Q. And the Lord Bush said ‘Thou shalt not protest the U.S. gov-
ernment, make or view oppositional queer performance art with erotic 
transformative images of the future!’ If you do not disperse immediately 
you will be placed under arrest. You are now under arrest! The charge 
is blocking a Federal Orifice! I mean Office!
 “You are now under arrest! You are now under arrest! You are now 
under arrest!”
We linked arms and chanted furiously . . . STOP BUSH! FIGHT BACK! 
SAVE ART! END WAR! And for our bi-lingual number ALTO A LA 
CENSURA! Art is not a crime! Which the next day the newspapers 
would report as “Hola a la Censura.” Ooops! We doffed our art crimi-
nal chain gang outfits and blockaded the Federal Building. Shutting 
that building down in protest of our Government’s attacks on civil liber-
ties, the 1st Amendment and Freedom of Expression. This was the big 
moment . . . the time where all our careful training . . . our split second 
organization . . . our carefully honed message . . . no more rehearsing 
or nursing a part . . . we were about to enter. . . .
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 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WEEKEND!
 We stood there . . . Bicep to bicep . . . ego to ego . . . one by one 
the cops took us away . . . Les and Adrian and Tom and Guillermo and 
Jordan and Kathy. . . . Finally it was my turn . . . and I felt the cold 
steel of those federal handcuffs so tight . . . so very tight around my 
wrists . . . so deliciously tight . . . and they lined us up underneath a pic-
ture of George Bush. Our hands handcuffed behind us . . . in the per-
fect position to grab the crotch of the person behind . . . and then they 
marched us off and put the guys in one holding tank and the women in 
another.
We sat there. One of the federal cops said to us . . .”You can communi-
cate with each other all you want . . . but NO TALKING!”
 They processed our paperwork. It was like we were checking into a 
hotel. There were bunk beds as far as I could see in this holding cell. 
There must have been 1001 BEDS. Why does the US have so much 
space to lock people up? The Federal Cop came in and said, Well, I 
see we got 24 real ARTFAGS in here. Well boys, since you got arrested 
so late on this Friday, the Federal Judge has already gone home. We’re 
gonna keep you here all weekend! We protested . . . but our dogs, our 
jobs, our boyfriends! The Federal Cop just gave us a cold stare and 
said . . .
 TOUGH LUCK BOYS, WELCOME TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
WEEKEND!
We resigned ourselves to our fate and we began to talk together in 
groups of two and three. Then the highly sexy Jose went to the toilet, 
unzipped his pants, pulled out his dick, and took a piss. A strange and 
horrible realization dawned that this was a very cute bunch of Civil Dis-
obedience Dudes locked in a holding tank for the weekend with noth-
ing to do . . . no copy of “Remembrances of Things Past” to sooth those 
long hours. No Pictionary Set! No laptops! What could we possibly do?
 I was sitting next to the cute semiotics instructor from Cal-Arts who 
started rubbing something in his pants. It was not a book by Michel 
Foucault. It was not chopped liver. It was the beginning of
 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WEEKEND!
 He said, “Boy, these anti-Bush civil disobedience anti-censorship 
actions sure get me all hot.”
 I said, “Yeah. Me too.”
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 He said “Hey, I’m really stiff. Getting tenure was a bitch. How about 
a back rub?”
 I said, “Sure, Dude.” All eyes were on us. Hands begin to move 
underneath “MOVEON.ORG” T-Shirts and that message took on whole 
new meaning. Now, Tom, who was a lighting designer at several perfor-
mance spaces around town, found that this holding cell came conve-
niently equipped with several household dimmers and he quickly made 
the mood a little more ambient.
A trembly, pregnant, and luscious apprehension suffused the 
room . . . that dank and drear holding tank. The Olympic Anthem 
theme song snuck in through the ventilation shaft . . . One of the boys 
from Highways reached into the pants of one of the boys from the LA 
County Museum of Art and they began to kiss big wet sloppy larger than 
life tongue kissing. Like the kind you see on late night TV Mexican 
Telenovellas. Like the kind you read about in repressed Edwardian gay 
private Diaries. Like the kind I practiced on a towel the night before I 
took my girlfriend to Disneyland in 8th Grade and we made out on the 
“Journey to Inner Space Ride.” Those kinds of kisses.
 The semiotics instructor from Cal Arts has now pulled his dick out 
and is demonstrating the Theory of Signification to the Graduate Stu-
dent from the Inland Empire . . . the pants are dropping . . . shirts are 
pulled over heads in a practical arabesque . . . generally stroking and 
soothing and generally fulfilling our foray.
Though the state may chain us . . . our crazed and juicy bodies and 
imaginations will not be imprisoned . . .
“With love’s light wings did I o’erperch these walls,
For stony limits cannot hold love out:
And what love can do, that dares love attempt.”
 And this is our revolt . . . our disobedience most uncivil here in the 
bowels of George Bush’s Federal Building we will whip ’em out and 
come on his hideous Bushy smirk and fake cowboy hat . . . wipe it on 
his WMD dossier of lies that lead us into this war that will kill a mil-
lion people before it’s done . . . naked together on a burning flag in 
North Carolina . . . raising high the roofbeam, the standard and any-
thing else that’s handy including the sleeveless T-shirt stretched so taste-
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fully behind the neck of the blond boy with the lovely butt who comes 
from the Simi Valley Anti-Censorship and Homo-phile Auxiliary who 
is being tended to by the People for the American Way Outreach co-
coordinator who is in fact reaching out, from behind, pinching his nip-
ples . . . while the Events Coordinator from the National Campaign 
for Freedom of Expression is licking his balls while, with an excruci-
atingly slow up and down motion, is jacking on his activist member. I 
remain distant . . . observant . . . my job is to stay aware of what is going 
on . . . so it can be written down . . . it must be written . . . it must be 
saved . . . this part of ourselves . . . the jump off point . . . ready to speak 
truth to Caesar and jerk off on his best toga . . . or, if not on his best 
toga, at least in his sandal in the middle of the night so that the next 
day as he divides Gaul his foot goes squish squish and he slips and falls 
and hits his head before he invades another country.
 Everyone is in on the act now. THERE ON THE 1001 BEDS IN 
THE HOLDING CELL! It is a flurry of safer activist sex! I am writing 
furiously . . . there is more than I can describe . . . the hand does not 
move fast enough. Skin is slapping . . . thighs are clenching. . . . breath 
is racing. One after another we come on the face of George Bush. On a 
banner with the words GUILTY burned across his forehead. He is now 
awash in the semen of 24 pissed off artist fags . . . defiant even in the 
slammer . . . the joint . . . the big house . . . saying NO to anti-gay, anti-
peace, anti-free speech fascists!
 We all cum and fall on each other spent. But, then, we hear foot-
steps . . . voices . . . then hundreds of people rush into the basement of 
the Federal Building with a confused shout. We are being released!
 We meet the women as they are let out of their holding cell. They 
have used their time in custody to form a Lesbian Video Collective! 
How do they do these things? We shot a load. They founded an arts 
organization! They have already shot their first feature! Amazing. It’s 
a remake of the classic Maedchen in Uniform, which they have sensibly 
retitled for English distribution Pussy Come Home!
 WHAT HAS HAPPENED? WE MAKE OUR WAY OUT TO THE 
STREET.
We hear the haunting strains of the ending of Beethoven’s 9th Symphony.
Now, out on the streets, there is strange music in the air.
 There are thousands of people dancing in the streets. Carrying 
garlands of flowers and speaking dozens of languages. Alistair runs 
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to greet me and takes my hand. People of every cultural and commu-
nity background have taken the street in front of the Federal Building. 
The LA Philharmonic has come down from the Hollywood Bowl for an 
impromptu celebratory playing of Beethoven’s 9th there on the nearly 
liberated Civic Center Mall.
Seid umschlungen . . . Millionen . . . Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt!
Be embraced . . . ye millions . . . this kiss for all the world!
 We begin to hear snippets of what has happened. George Bush has 
been IMPEACHED and is FACING A WAR CRIMES TRIAL IN BAG-
DHAD? HMMM.
 The new president has appointed Holly Hughes head of the NEA?
 The Federal Police have given up and joined our cause? HMMM.
 Dick Cheney has given up hunting and has come out as a gay per-
son? YEEECHHH! Oh please God, anything but that.
 And most mysterious of all . . . there are confirmed reports that 
numerous historical monuments all over this country have transubstan-
tiated! No longer are they monuments to war but now honor those who 
fought for social justice and against Neo-Fascist censorship during these 
long dark years.
 There is dancing and music . . . fireworks in the air. We hear more. 
A fax from Washington tells us that the new Congress has elevated the 
AIDS Crisis and homophobia to the highest National Priority. The 
Supreme Court has upheld that marriage equality for gay folks is a Con-
stitutional right. A telegram arrives from UN Security Council. They 
want to meet with us immediately to form a world artists’ government 
to address nuclear disarmament . . . economic restructuring . . . global 
warming. The nation has been moved by our deeds! We have tri-
umphed! The day is ours!
 I think of the work left to be done and I glance up at the top of the 
Federal Building. The cold concrete façade is finally cracking open and 
sprouting strange and beautiful vines, tendrilling into the night . . . tes-
tament to the seeds planted on this Civil Disobedience Weekend.
 Those vines are growing up and they are rooting deep . . . growing 
towards something new.
Towards something that if we all put in a lot of vision . . .
a little imagination . . . and tons of work.
They’re growing towards what just might . . .
What just might be . . .
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. . . our future.
Tim and Beethoven’s 9th climax. Simultaneously. It’s a fantasy, okay?
I just want to say just before we end the conference for tonight that it 
is an interesting and charged moment we are in. This piece that I just 
performed—I’ve been performing it for the last year—and for the first 
few months I was doing it I thought “Man, Tim you are such a fucking 
Pollyanna.” And of late, these last months, it’s starting to feel like that 
vision, that possibility of change is feeling much more alive. I was here 
in Iowa City on election night, November 8th, 2006, and I remember we 
were at the Vitro Hotel with the Democratic Party of Johnson County 
and it was one of the most joyous experiences of my life. I don’t know 
if it was quite as good as a gay sex orgy in federal detention that over-
throws the Bush Administration, but it was close! In these interesting 
times, I just want to encourage everybody to dive in and take a big bite 
out of this moment we’re living through. Stuff in America is shifting 
and changing and we just need to, as our dear departed Allen Ginsberg 
would say, “Keep our queer shoulders to the wheel.”
On matters of obscenity in India, the law stages more than the now-
familiar tussle between censorship and freedom of expression. Sections 
292–294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) codify obscenity within the 
law. Introduced by British colonial order in the 1860s, these laws have 
been revised and expanded since, and have been supplemented with 
the landmark Indecent Representation of Women Act (Prohibition) of 
1986–87. Sections 292–294 deem representations to be obscene if they 
are lascivious, prurient, indecent, and corrupt or if they cause deprav-
ity. Obscenity is understood not only as lust and lewdness but also as a 
contagion of sexual depravity. Indeed, the law codifies obscenity as a 
metonym for the excesses of sexuality. The leading cultural metaphor 
for obscenity in India, as elsewhere, is the sexualized female body in the 
visual field, especially the media. Portrayals of women in advertising, 
sexual displays of female bodies, and cultural depictions of inappropri-
ate clothing in film, TV, and magazines typify (hetero)sexualized excess. 
Such excess is also represented by suggestive forms of dancing, explicit 
displays of heterosexual affection in film, TV, videos, cable channels, 
magazines, public performances involving film celebrities, and so on. 
Courts constantly adjudicate between popular morality and freedom of 
expression, sometimes upholding one and sometimes defending the 
other. Distinctions between obscenity, vulgarity, and indecency are also 
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cited, since freedom of expression is not unmitigated and protecting 
public morality remains an imperative of governance.
even as the dialectics of public morality and private liberty appear to 
drive the juridical and cultural discourses on obscenity in India, they 
are at best partially relevant. The Introduction to this collection and 
other essays included herein speak to the limitations of this discursive 
framework of obscenity. What is curious about the Indian context is 
the frequent recourse to law in stances taken against obscenity. Charges 
of obscenity are regularly levied against women performers as well as 
actors, directors, and artists who depict sexualized female bodies. Rep-
resentations of non-normative sexualities—for example, Deepa Mehta’s 
film Fire, portraying sexual love between two women—are also charged 
with being obscene. The authority of law is constantly called into effect 
against film, music videos, public performances, and paintings. Self-
defined concerned citizens or political and religious groups register 
complaints at local police stations and/or file writs in court. Report-
edly, thousands of public-interest litigations and criminal complaints 
on related matters clog up the courts even though few prosecutions 
actually occur. In most cases, enduring the crisis appears to be worst 
of it. What is additionally relevant is that charges under obscenity law 
are typically coupled with other laws, often those militating against reli-
gious offenses specified in Chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code. The 
ire of the Hindu Right against the film Fire was fueled by the fact that 
the two leading women characters’ names, Radha and Sita, are among 
the most revered under canonical Hinduism. Violations of heterosex-
ist respectability and Hinduism are inseparable in this case, and legal 
charges were filed by the Hindu right under obscenity as well as under 
religious offenses law.
 This chapter takes the recurrent recourse to obscenity law as its 
starting point in order to reconsider the framework of morality and lib-
erty. The argument develops from three cases. The first case has to do 
with public wrath and legal charges of obscenity against a beloved icon 
of Tamil-language film based in Southern India, the second with the 
Hindu Right’s hounding of India’s best-known painter, M. F. Husain, 
and the third pertains to the persecution of non-normative sexualities 
in the northern city of Lucknow. Each case brings together the cul-
tural and legal discourses of obscenity and the coupling of obscenity 
law with a variety of other laws on defamation, public mischief, promot-
ing enmity between religious communities, and “sodomy law.” Together, 
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these cases not only foreground the fraught female body that is most 
often at the heart of popular and feminist debates on censorship.1 They 
also underscore the relevance of non-normative sexuality and the ways 
in which religion and ethnicity deeply mark the terrain of obscenity. 
While their particulars differ, the three cases help redirect attention to 
the underpinnings of cultural-legal practices that stage more than the 
contestations of morality and liberty. I suggest that these contestations 
are feints for calculated incitements aimed at redefining the bound-
aries of the social body. These cases call attention less to the limits of 
censorship and liberalism and more to the need to revise theoretical 
frameworks through which we read juridical and cultural discourses of 
obscenity.
the FIrst argument driving this chapter is that routine recourse to 
obscenity law is a means of policing sexuality and the social body. While 
building on feminist contributions that draw together sexuality and the 
social body,2 I urge reconsideration of our operational understandings 
of the latter. All too often, the social body that obscenity yokes to sexu-
ality is implied as the nation. Indeed, we have been quick to impugn 
nationalist discourses for sifting the obscene from the properly sexual, 
and rightly so. The second argument developed in this chapter suggests 
the need to multiply our notions of the social body as varyingly predi-
cated upon imagined boundaries of region, ethnicity, and religion, as 
well as nation. This contingency of the social body suggests that the 
mechanism through which discourses of obscenity stage the policing of 
sexuality and the social needs to be theorized carefully. In other words, 
this chapter comes to grips with the means through which legal and 
cultural registers of obscenity fuse normative sexuality and the normal-
ized social body. Drawing upon theories of the biopolitical, this chap-
ter makes the case that social bodies, howsoever defined, are forged 
through normative sexuality. Therefore, the third argument presented 
below is that the routine recourse to obscenity law is a node of biopo-
litical regulation, by which I mean power’s infiltration of life, especially 
through the forging of the collective.
 To engage obscenity law in India is to engage English-language 
juridical and cultural discourses on obscenity. It is a matter of colonial 
and postcolonial institutions that the rule of law at the national level is 
in English. However, this hardly exhausts the many and regionally var-
ied understandings of obscenity; for example, ashlil, though generally 
translated as obscene, is used in more complicated ways in the Hindi 
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language press. Furthermore, obscene materials are hardly limited to 
English-language based representations; Lawrence Cohen writes about 
the secretive Hindi-language publications produced around the baccha-
nalian festival of Holi.3 These points cannot be understated even as we 
need to be careful not to assume that discourses in Hindi or Tamil lan-
guages are aimed at the regional, while English is about the national. 
The advantage of focusing on English-language national-level legal dis-
courses of obscenity is that they paradoxically highlight the fact that 
their object is not necessarily the body of the nation.
Nightmare one: The actor
In September 2005, the renowned Tamil film actor Khusboo is bom-
barded by charges of obscenity and defamation throughout the state 
of Tamil Nadu, India. The Tamil edition of a leading English-language 
newsmagazine, India Today, had invited Khusboo’s commentary on a 
national survey about changing sexual attitudes. Although more may 
have been made of the limitations of the sex survey, the rage is aimed 
unexpectedly at Khusboo, curiously out of proportion to her remarks, 
especially given her popularity. Khusboo is not ethnically Tamil, but she 
has been embraced as an icon of Tamil women. The part that ignites 
the flames reads: “Our society should liberate itself from such ideas that 
brides should all be virgins at the time of marriage. No educated man 
will expect his bride to be virgin at the time of marriage. But when 
indulging in pre-marital sex, the girl should guard herself against preg-
nancy and sexually transmitted diseases.”4 That Khusboo has no right 
to speak on behalf of Tamil women and that she has made “derogatory 
remarks about the chastity of Tamil women” are allegations first made 
in a publication of the southern Indian media machine, Sun TV. The 
crisis ensues. The self-appointed Tamil Protection Movement (TPM), 
with links to Sun TV, fans the protests against Khusboo. The TPM is 
forged through a political alliance between two groups with divergent 
caste-orientations and interests, the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI) and 
the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK). The women’s wing of the PMK is at 
the forefront of the attacks against Khushboo. Thol Thirumavalavan, 
chief of the TPM, summarizes the main point of the protest: “Khush-
boo made the remarks on pre-marital sex to justify her own life’s expe-
rience. She had no right to talk of the chastity of Tamil women.”5 She 
did not; her commentary was general, not directed specifically at Tamil 
women or men. A 1990s heartthrob, a deified figure with one temple 
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devoted to her, a cinematic icon of Tamil women, is swiftly pilloried as 
a “North Indian,” Hindi-speaking Gujarati Muslim.6
 Effigies of Khusboo are burned, volunteers of the DPI storm the 
office of the South India Film Artistes’ Association, demanding an apol-
ogy from the actress.7 The apology is issued: “Even in films, I never 
undertook roles that lowered the image of women,” she says. “I have 
the greatest regard for Tamils, especially Tamil women. If my remarks 
have hurt anybody’s feelings, I tender an apology. I am one among you 
and will always remain with you.”8 But the protests continue. A compet-
ing media source, Jaya TV, with which Khusboo is affiliated, reports that 
many of those who are gathered for the agitations do not know what 
has been published;9 Khusboo is pelted with eggs, tomatoes, and slip-
pers while arriving for an appearance before a magistrate.
 Complaints of defamation and obscenity are lodged throughout 
the state. In Tiruchi, Tamil Nadu, for example, four women lawyers 
charge Khusboo with committing offenses under Section 292, related 
to obscenity, and under Sections 504 and 505.10 Section 504 briefly 
addresses intentional insult with intent to breach peace, while Section 
505 is a lengthy discussion of what constitutes public mischief—circulat-
ing rumors and reports that are meant to incite mutiny in the military, 
to incite fear or alarm, to incite harm against another group, or to pro-
mote ill will among groups, especially at a place of worship or religious 
event. In other cases, defamation charges are invoked against Khusboo 
through Section 499 (representations intended to cause harm to the 
reputation of a person) and Section 500 (threat of injury to a person, 
reputation, or property).
 If charges of obscenity under Section 292 seem to relate to the sub-
stance of what is said, then the charges of public mischief and defama-
tion appear to be about intentionality. Obscenity is predictably derived 
from women’s heterosexuality; mere mention of the possibility that 
(Tamil) women may be sexually active prior to marriage is enough 
provocation for self-appointed protectionists of Tamil cultural nation-
alism. That Khusboo recommends change in social attitudes, particu-
larly men’s expectations of women’s sexuality, is seen as incitement to 
depravity, intended to cause public mischief and defame Tamil women. 
Her position as an insider/outsider throws suspicion on her intentions 
and makes what she says obscene. Her popularity as a representation 
of Tamil women accounts for why she is seen as “speaking for”11 them 
and maligning Tamil culture, which leads to her being repositioned as 
a “Hindi-speaking Gujarati Muslim.” She is caught between Tamil cul-
tural nationalism’s resistance to northern cultural and political hege-
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mony and its anti-Muslim taint. Her position as a Tamil-speaking icon of 
Tamil women accounts for why her remarks can be easily appropriated 
as pertaining to Tamil culture, and her non-Tamil status accounts for 
why the remarks can be presented as an attack; how dare she serve as a 
“proxy and portrait” of Tamil women and culture.12 The obscenities are 
seemingly manifold.
 The involvement of the key players—the TPM, various contingents 
of the DPI and the PMK, Sun TV and its competitor, Jaya TV—indi-
cates that charges of obscenity are fraught with more than women’s 
sexualities, and, in this case, are the effects of political expediency and 
Tamil cultural nationalism. Informed commentaries speak to how these 
vituperations are the result of several factors:13 Khusboo led an ear-
lier charge against a film director and member of TPM, who equated 
actresses with prostitution, and this was considered payback time; Khus-
boo hosts a popular quiz show on Sun TV’s competitor channel, Jaya 
TV; the Dalit party, composed of those who have been historically 
refused a place in the Brahmanical caste hierarchy, and the PMK, which 
represents lower caste interests, have dipped into the well of Tamil 
nationalism for electoral purposes, a nationalism first whipped up by 
the upper-caste Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party in the inter-
ests of electoral politics by the early 1970s.14 These complicated politi-
cal, caste-based, and media-staged battles nonetheless are waged over 
women’s sexual respectability, and Tamil nationalism draws the lines of 
belonging and battle as necessary.
Nightmare two: The artist
A furor erupts in February 2006 against India’s best-known painter 
and living legend, Maqbool Fida Husain. This is the most recent in a 
series of Hindu fundamentalist–led uproars, triggered by an abstrac-
tion of the Indian map onto a painting of a female figure and a charkha 
(wheel). The body-map is a vibrant, stunning red, offset by a black out-
line, the blue of the ocean and the darkened silhouette of a male yogi. 
Reminiscent of the body-map in Mahasweta Devi’s stories, made famous 
in the United States by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, that illustrates the 
violence rendered on the body of tribal women by Indian nationalism 
and the state, this depiction is also anguished. It invokes the Hindu 
Right–led and state-supported pogrom against Muslim women and 
communities in Gujarat in 2002. The names of cities—Benares, Delhi, 
Gujarat, among others—literalize the female body as map; Chennai-
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based Apparao Galleries entitles it “Bharatmata” (Mother-India). The 
painting is sold to a private collector in 2004 and has never been pub-
licly displayed,15 but that does not prevent as many as sixty-six criminal 
cases being filed in a number of states and in New Delhi on grounds of 
obscenity and outraging religious sentiments.16 An apology by Husain 
for hurting people’s sentiments does not prevent the vandalism of an 
exhibition later in 2006 in London or the threats of violence—The 
Hindu Personal Law Board President, Ashok Pandey, announces Rs. 51 
crore (Indian Rs. 10 million) to “eliminate” the artist, and, in a show of 
sympathy, Congress Minority Cell leader Akhtar Baig offers Rs. 11 lakh 
(Indian Rs. 100,000) to any “patriot” for the painter’s hands.17
 Husain is a complex figure. Over 90 years old, he has been feted with 
some of the most prestigious honors by Indian governments, including 
the post of honorary member of the upper house of parliament. He is 
a prolific painter, self-described as Muslim and secular, born in a place 
of Hindu pilgrimage in the state of Maharashtra, first employed as a 
billboard painter, a founding member of the Progressive Artists’ Group, 
public figure, and, as is frequently mentioned, a consummate show-
man. He is flamboyant, accused of crass commercialism for pandering 
to the market in which his works are the most expensively valued. He 
responds, “Even marketing is an art form. I’ve created a whole new phe-
nomenon of how to market. And I am not defensive about that.”18
 The conditions under which Husain is the most maligned painter 
of the Hindu right wing are also complex. Husain was first deliberately 
targeted in 1996 when members of the Bajrang Dal, the youth wing 
of the organization Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), destroyed Husain’s 
paintings and damaged the gallery in Ahmedabad. The trigger? A 1976 
sketch of the Hindu goddess of knowledge and the arts, Saraswati, which 
was dredged up by Om Nagpal in the right-wing Hindu journal Vichar 
Mimansa as a “nude” desecration.19 With its greeting-card–like outline 
of the goddess and her sitar, a lotus in one hand, this simple and bold 
sketch was part of the preparation for a fully clothed painting of Saras-
wati made for the O. P. Jindal industrial family.20 Nagpal’s article was the 
basis upon which the Maharashtra Minister for Culture and leader of 
the sectarian right-wing Shiv Sena party, Pramod Navalkar, filed crimi-
nal charges with Mumbai Police against Husain for promoting enmity 
between different groups of people on the grounds of religion and act-
ing to insult religious feelings and beliefs.
 Then in 1998, Bajrang Dal members stormed into and vandalized 
Husain’s residence in Mumbai, this time on the pretext of a lithograph 
displayed at an exhibition at the Academy of Art and Literature, New 
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Delhi, based on the mythic tale of the rescue of Sita by Hanuman.21 
Produced in 1984, this depiction stays true to the epic story in which 
Sita rides on Hanuman’s tail; the point of contention for the Bajrang 
Dal, however, was Sita’s gray, seemingly unclothed figure. Seen in the 
context of Husain’s other work from the time period related to the two 
Indian/Hindu epics, female and male nude figures are everywhere. The 
canvases belie a pre-occupation with the epics, archetypes of human 
quandaries and fallibilities, and the mythic figures that embody them. 
Female and male figures do not appear to be provocative or eroticized 
so much as they are illustrations of the battle between good and evil 
that rages within each person.
 Over the last decade, hundreds of complaints have been filed with 
the police in various parts of the country, there have been dozens of 
marches and burnings of Husain effigies, and dozens of criminal writs 
have been submitted in courts in cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, and Bho-
pal.22 Indeed, subsequent to the Bharatmata controversy, the Supreme 
Court responded to Husain’s request that the writs from the states of 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh be combined and that he 
should not have to appear in numerous courts and cities.23 The writs 
against Husain are based on Sections 292 and 294 of the Indian Penal 
Code, relating to obscenity, Section 153-A (promoting enmity between 
different communities based on religion, race, place of birth and lan-
guage, etc.), Section 295-A (deliberate and malicious act to outrage reli-
gious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs), 
and Section 298 (uttering words with deliberate intent to wound reli-
gious feelings of any person).
 Since 1996, Husain has been ensnared in a maelstrom of obscen-
ity charges elaborated on the grounds of female sexual representation 
and religious difference. Who he is and what he paints are collapsed 
to orchestrate a crisis around the female nude. As art historian Tapati 
Guha-Thakurta notes, the female nude is a source of deep ambiva-
lence within Indian art history and is precariously situated in the grow-
ing rift between representations of high art and popular disapproval, 
between the aesthetic and the moral, between modern art and the reli-
gious, between the erotic and the obscene.24 The decade-long targeting 
of Husain, Guha-Thakurta argues, is due to his status as a prominent, 
venerated artist, embodying the modern, the secular, and the national, 
coupled with the accident of his religion. Implicit in Guha-Thakurta’s 
analysis, but necessary to underscore, is that the battle is framed by the 
Hindu right wing as the struggle to protect the sanctity of Hindu god-
desses and Hinduism. Nagpal asks maliciously, why could Husain not 
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“paint his mother and sister in this modern art style?” “Why does he 
paint a Hindu goddess in such a disrespectful manner? Why doesn’t 
he paint Allah?”25 The strategy is simple and insidious—to show that 
Hinduism is under attack. The brunt of this irony—that the predomi-
nant hegemonic Brahmanical form of Hinduism can be under assault—
is borne by religious minorities, especially Indian Muslims, who are 
framed as the “enemy within.” Hindu goddesses, not gods, become 
the specific sites upon which the dirty politics of religion, ethnic cul-
tural nationalism, heterosexuality, and masculinity is violently enacted. 
Obscenity is cited as sexual and religious violence, and used in turn to 
inflict violence on others.
Nightmare three: The foot soldiers
On July 7, 2001, police in Lucknow, a city in the state of Uttar Pradesh, 
raid and seal the offices of Bharosa Trust and Naz Foundation Inter-
national (NFI), two affiliated non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
working on HIV/AIDS-related issues. The program manager of Bharosa 
Trust, Parmeshwar Nair, is arrested with another of its workers, Moham-
mad Shahid, after which the police take into custody the Director of 
NFI, Arif Jafar, and a worker, Sudhees Kumar. The police appropriate 
educational material and items used for the demonstration of safe sex 
practices. Within a day, stories reportedly fueled by Lucknow police 
make headlines in English-language newspapers, about “gay clubs” 
being run from the two offices, and of pornographic materials and “sex 
tools” used for nefarious purposes. Senior Superintendent of Police Brij 
Bhushan Bakshi is quoted in a Hindi language newspaper as saying that 
all the accused would be sent to jail for polluting Indian culture.26
 The events leading up to these scurrilous reports are as follows. 
A man files a First Information Report (FIR) with the police that on 
July 6, 2001, he was lured by another man, who stopped him along a 
deserted road and sodomized him. Activists close to the case believe 
that this report was the result of the complainant not being paid for 
sex. Based on this report, the police raid the cruising park where the 
complainant says he was picked up, and arrest more people, including 
an outreach worker from Bharosa Trust. This worker leads police to the 
office of Bharosa Trust, and the raids and additional arrests ensue.
 Nine people are arrested, four of whom are members of the two 
NGOs. The police charge them under Sections 377 (unnatural offenses), 
292 (obscenity), 120b (criminal conspiracy), and 109 (abetment). Oddly 
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enough, the men are also charged under Section 60 of the Copyright 
Act and Sections 3 and 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women Act 
in regard to the educational materials seized from the offices. Applica-
tions for bail are rejected twice until they are granted on August 17, and 
the four men are finally released on August 21, 2001. In their 45 days in 
prison, the men are beaten, denied food, forced to drink sewer water, 
and refused treatment when they are ill. The Sessions Judge initially 
denies bail on the grounds that “they were a group of persons indulging 
in these activities and are polluting the entire society by encouraging 
young persons and abetting them for committing the offense of sod-
omy; that the investigation is still under progress; that the offenses are 
being committed in an organized manner.”27
 If the extra-legal police activities invoke heterosexist nationalism, 
then these two scenarios remind us that matters are always more com-
plicated. The curious and troubling aspects of this case in Lucknow are 
the particular mix of charges—“unnatural sex,” obscenity, and criminal 
conspiracy—not to say anything about charges of copyright violations 
and indecent representation of women. Section 377, or the “sodomy 
law,” is another legacy of the British colonial state, and though the lan-
guage is imprecise, it is widely interpreted to criminalize same-sex sex-
ual practices. Section 377 is a cognizable law (arrest without warrant) 
and non-bailable (bail can be applied for only after arrest), but also 
one that requires medical proof of unnatural sex. No such substantia-
tion could be established for the four HIV/AIDS workers under arrest. 
The imprisonment of and violence against the four men in Lucknow 
was never about allegations of sexual acts or sex practices; as the initial 
false newspaper reports and the Sessions Judge indicate, they are about 
the precariousness of heterosexuality. Enforcement or prosecution of 
Section 377 requires that a complaint be filed, which did not occur 
in the case of the four men. Rather, they were rounded up in police 
raids on the NGO offices, where they were seized alongside educational 
materials and implements. Their violation was seen to lie in circulat-
ing representations of sex, in speaking for the unmentionable subject 
of non-normative sexual practices. But, perhaps, their most egregious 
transgression was that these men were seen to stand in place of obscen-
ity itself.
 On July 10, 2001, within days of the arrests and amidst the media 
frenzy, the Times of India, a leading English-language newspaper, broke 
the story that the Central Intelligence Bureau had tipped off the Gov-
ernment of India about the spreading of “gay culture” in seven cities, 
including Lucknow.28 Reportedly, the intelligence bureau was pressed 
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into service to monitor the flow of funds to NGOs in India, since they 
were coming from Europe and Canada, with the so-called involvement 
of Pakistani nationals. The news article suggests that although the intel-
ligence bureau report could not be corroborated, NGOs such as Bha-
rosa Trust and NFI were operating as “gay clubs” and “sex rackets”; thus, 
the report implies that the NGOs were subtly propagating gay culture 
through foreign aid.
eaCh OF these three cases speaks to the nightmarish links between 
obscenity and cultural politics within which famous figures and ordi-
nary people are caught. Juridical and cultural discourses on obscen-
ity cohere around representations of sexual excess—wrought through 
women’s (hetero)sexualities, as goddesses are anthropomorphized, and 
non-normative sexualities, particularly males who have sex with males.29 
What makes these cases stand out from the everyday interplay of obscen-
ity and cultural politics is their intensity, as happenings are manipulated 
into events, events into crises.
Juridical, cultural, sexual
Obscenity laws were first introduced into late-nineteenth-century colo-
nial India and later incorporated into the post-independence Indian 
Penal Code. The imperial underpinnings of a juridical system designed 
to contain the threats of obscenity in Britain and its colonies are 
addressed by Deanna Heath. Bringing together the analytics of race, 
nation, and empire, Heath argues that attempts to regulate obscenity 
were aimed at protecting the superiority of the British “race” and nation 
from the corrupting influences of the publications and objects originat-
ing in the colonies as much as at protecting the colonies from the volu-
minous exports emanating from Britain.30 “Purity” crusades were waged 
in Britain in ways that reverberated in the colonies, especially through 
the signing of international conventions against the transnational trade 
in obscene publications and objects. Although the colonial government 
in India was a reluctant participant in the 1910 International Agree-
ment for the Suppression of Obscene Publications, it was more enthu-
siastic about the 1923 International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene Publications.31 According to 
Heath, Indian colonial officials’ earlier reluctance stemming from the 
belief that India was more “sinned against than sinning” was offset by 
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the need to defend India’s civilization from Western vice by regulating 
obscenity.32
 If juridical attempts at curtailing obscenity in colonial India 
emerged from circulations between metropole and colonies, then, as 
Charu Gupta argues, they were never simply about Victorian percep-
tions of decency and propriety.33 In the only book-length treatment of 
obscenity in colonial India, Gupta notes that emergent concerns with 
obscenity at the time were equally motivated by the moral concerns of 
an emergent middle-class and elite Indian nationalism goading British 
intervention. British and Indian moralists shared anxieties about the 
transmission of sexually explicit materials, “dirty” literature, and sexual 
literature couched as scientific or modern.34 Indeed, for British officials 
in India the task was doubly challenging—to protect against Western 
importations of obscenity but also its indigenous versions. It is within 
the context of British Orientalism and the “woman question” at the 
center of colonial and anti-colonial encounters that obscenity came to 
hinge on the control of female sexuality and the restriction of sex to 
procreation, not pleasure.35
 Identifying a second strand as “politically obscene,” Gupta notes 
that these materials blended sexuality, politics, and emergent religious 
divides.36 Since the mid-nineteenth century, Hindu writers in Uttar 
Pradesh, a state in northern India, had slandered Islam and its prophet 
and had deliberately linked the alleged debauchery of past Muslim rul-
ers to the breakdown of the state and public order. Few Muslim rul-
ers were spared charges of lechery or dissolution, and, by the 1920s, 
these claims had expanded to allegations of rape and forcible mar-
riage of Hindu women by Muslim men, claims that echo even today. 
Indeed, Cohen’s description of secretive literature, mentioned earlier, 
produced during Holi in the city of Benares, also in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, points to similar fantasies. Cohen describes these publications, 
locally marked as obscenity, as not only including men sexually pene-
trating other men, unequal sexual exchanges among men through traf-
fic in women, and critiques of the state, but also the rape Hindu men 
must perform on Muslim women in order to justify and counter their 
own sexual fantasies about the threat posed by Muslim men to Hindu 
women!37
 Rather than “political obscenity,” Sections 292–294 of the IPC 
broadly target the intersections of sexuality and representation in ways 
that require judicial interpretation. Section 292 specifically prohib-
its the circulation, selling, printing, advertising, hiring, and profiting 
from obscene representations in the form of books, writings, paintings, 
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and the like. Section 292A extends the same prohibitions to materials 
intended for purposes of blackmail. Any person who benefits from or 
aids in making available obscene materials to persons below the age of 
20 is liable under Section 293. These juridical provisions are the result 
of legal amendments over the years that have attempted to clarify the 
meaning and scope of the provisions, with the most thoroughgoing revi-
sions dating to 1969. Intended to introduce contemporary standards 
into archaic laws, Vishnu D. Sharma and F. Wooldridge note that the 
1969 amendments were heavily influenced by the 1959 Obscene Publi-
cations Act in England.38
 In their overview of Indian obscenity law, Sharma and Wooldridge 
observe that, since the 1925 version of Section 292 lacked a definition 
of obscenity, the courts used the Hicklin test, and the only available 
exception to obscenity was provided on religious grounds.39 In contrast, 
the 1969 amendments continued to militate against the circulation and 
sale of obscene literature, while ensuring that materials justifiably for 
public good or with a bona fide religious purpose were exempt. Excep-
tions were expanded to include “public good,” interests of science, lit-
erature, religious purposes, a public servant discharging his functions, 
as well as representations that are protected under the Ancient Monu-
ments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act of 1958. Most impor-
tantly, a definition of obscenity is given which remains in effect today: 
“(that which) is lascivious or appeals to prurient interest or if its effect 
or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of one of 
its items, if taken as a whole, is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt 
persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to 
read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.” Notwith-
standing the brief mention of obscene acts in public in Section 294, the 
laws anticipate and seek to manage sexual transgressions in the realm 
of representation. The laws not only seek to draw lines between the 
obscene and the erotic, the moral and the indecent, but also come to 
be routinely pinned on sexual transgressions involving female hetero-
sexuality and deviant sexualities.40 The “politically obscene” described 
by Gupta appears to be accommodated under Sections 292–294, insofar 
as it may be lascivious, but more likely under the sections on defama-
tion (499–500), if it appears to be non-sexual in nature.
 Despite these attempts to revise and refine obscenity law in India, 
the meaning of obscenity remains vague and ill defined. Judges play a 
key role in interpreting the law and negotiating prurience and public 
good, frequently relying on the Miller test.41 The persistent imprecise-
ness of the meaning of obscenity is thought to contribute to abuse of 
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the law through routine and frivolous legal filings. Especially since it 
is years before judicial decisions are announced, filing legal charges 
promises to tie defendants in court for a protracted period of time. 
One response is to call for further clarity in order both to prevent such 
abuse and to encourage successful prosecutions. However, in a land-
mark decision in December 2006, the Indian Supreme Court ruled 
against a public-interest litigation asking to curb explicit photographs 
and ads published in newspapers, on the grounds that a blanket defini-
tion of obscenity would hurt freedom of the press.
 While the outcome of court charges may be long in arriving, 
announcements of legal charges of obscenity quickly garner media and 
public attention. The authority of law is used to leverage the media, 
and the outcome is a very public drawing and redrawing not only of 
what counts as obscenity but also of what counts as respectability. On 
the one hand, Khusboo’s remarks are crammed into the codification 
of obscenity under Section 292—that by posing the very possibility of 
women’s pre-marital sexual activity, the words can corrupt or cause 
depravity. On the other hand, and this seems to me more important, 
what is not debated is whether women’s pre-marital sexual desire is nor-
mal or natural; rather, it appears that Khusboo’s deeper offense lies in 
publicly suggesting that women are sexually active prior to marriage. 
Unlike sexual normality, which is tied to the individual, sexual respect-
ability is essentially a social criterion through which individuals and 
groups are tied to the collective. That the charges of “unnatural sex” 
(Section 377) need to be trumped up in the case of the four workers in 
Lucknow while the police release false reports of “gay clubs” and “sex 
rackets” further confirms that the sexual is seen essentially as a matter 
of the social.
 Alongside and through the incitement of cultural and legal dis-
courses on sexual respectability is also an incitement of discourses of 
the social body. Sexual excess and its correlates of depravity, lascivious-
ness, and indecency, to name a few, are reinforced as intrinsically con-
tagious, as easily corrupting the social body. In Khusboo’s case, it would 
have been possible simply to ignore the comments or refute her opin-
ions publicly without heaping scorn on her. But the hue and cry serves 
to reconstitute the Tamil community as essentially fragile and easily 
undermined. Not surprisingly, then, Khusboo’s words on the social 
acceptance of pre-marital female sexuality are seen as a direct assault 
on the Tamil community, even though her remarks are aimed at women 
in general. In the other two cases as well, protecting the collective—
whether of Hindus or Indians—requires constant vigilance and a vir-
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ile masculinity. In Husain’s case, not only are his visual representations 
deliberately provoked by the Hindu Right as the sexualization of Hindu 
goddesses, but they are actively presented as attacks on the integrity of 
the so-called community of Hindus. The conjoined use of obscenity and 
sodomy law in the Lucknow case further speaks to the threat that sexual 
excess poses to the social body, this time seen as the nation.
 By excoriating Khusboo as not-Tamil, the internal and external fron-
tiers of the collective become the same. Those at the internal frontiers 
of the body—by virtue of religion, ethnicity, same-sex sexualities, or 
gender, caste, and class—are also markers of its external frontiers. It 
is not so much that the external boundaries of the collective are being 
defined as that the external and internal boundaries are being col-
lapsed into one another purportedly in the interests of the collective. 
That in each of the cases obscenity law is coupled with a constellation 
of other legal charges attests to anxieties regarding the expansive inju-
ries caused by sexual excess. Defamation, breach of peace, and intent to 
hurt religious feelings, among others, are the laws that signal concerns 
about protecting the so-called integrity of the social body.
 If national-level laws and policies of law enforcement stabilize the 
appearance of a singular social body, then regional, cultural, and politi-
cal differences interact with their interpretations and enactments. In 
2004, the Delhi High Court ruled on eight cases against Husain related 
to his sketch of Saraswati, a sketch of another mythic figure, Draupadi, 
and paintings of the well-known Hindi film actress Madhuri Dixit. This 
was in the wake of the first politicization of Husain’s work in 1996. The 
offenses included obscenity, indecent representations of women, pro-
moting enmity between religious groups, and deliberately outraging the 
religious feelings of a group. The Supreme Court had ruled that the 
various cases filed in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and elsewhere 
be bundled together under the purview of the High Court of Delhi. 
Delhi High Court Justice Kapoor dismissed the cases against Husain, 
but only on a technicality. At odds with the defense arguments that 
the artwork was done without any malicious intentions, the judge none-
theless dismissed the eight charges on the grounds that the charges 
had to be filed with the cognizance of the central or state government. 
Even as the authority of a centralized legal system prevailed, the jus-
tice severely chastised Husain for hurting Hindu sentiments. He wrote, 
“Under the garb of freedom of expression no person can be allowed 
to hurt the religious feelings of any class of people. This should be 
known more to the petitioner who belongs to a different religion” (Crl. 
M(M) 420/2001). Husain’s legal victory was no vindication, as the judge 
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deployed the centralized legal structure to protect the integrity of a spe-
cific and hegemonic social body, namely, Hindus.
 A singular notion of the social body is not at work here. Rather, it 
varies across each of these cases—Tamil nationalism; Hindutva, which 
invokes Hindus as a community distinct from non-Hindus, especially 
Christians and Muslims; and (putatively secular-but-Hindu) Indian 
nationalism. Notwithstanding the provision that the Indian penal code 
does not extend to the northernmost and embattled states of Jammu 
and Kashmir, obscenity law and other citations from the penal code 
operate at the national level. Yet the notion of the collective at stake is 
neither always national nor uniform. Further, these forms of imagined 
collectives are not concentric circles expanding from the regional to 
the national. They are more accurately represented as Venn Diagrams 
of overlap and difference; for example, Tamil nationalism frequently 
goes against the grain of what is seen as north-dominated Indian nation-
alism. It is to theorizing the ways in which discourses of obscenity illumi-
nate the mechanism that ties the sexual to varying notions of the social 
body that I now turn.
Sexuality, social bodies, and biopolitics
The focus on obscenity across these three cases draws attention to the 
fact that sexuality is at the heart of how social bodies are fabricated. 
Sexuality helps forge, produce, and stabilize the collective. Sexuality is 
not merely a fault line of the collective, sifting normality and its other. 
Rather, sexuality is essential to how social collectives are imagined, 
which explains the pre-occupations with it. The three cases indicate that 
at stake are not matters of individual bodies or sexualities, even though 
the brunt of the assaults was borne by specific individuals. Rather, the 
crises proceed through the domain of sexuality to the integrity and 
continuity of the collective body. Precisely because sexuality is founda-
tional to the production of the collective, it is saturated with anxieties of 
normality, respectability, depravity, irregularities, and more. Concerns 
related to obscenity articulate these anxieties and become an available 
placeholder. Representations of sexualities, particularly female or devi-
ant, that are considered obscene may be politically motivated, but they 
also echo underlying anxieties about the fabrication and continuity of 
the community, howsoever defined.
 The broad use of obscenity speaks to how sexuality both constitutes 
and endangers social bodies. In the Lucknow witch-hunt, the putative 
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threat to the collective makes sense only if we concede that same-sex 
sexuality may undermine heteronormativity. The possibility of “gay 
clubs” and “sex rackets,” of consensual same-sex practices and sex work, 
fans anxieties about reproductive and non-reproductive heteronorma-
tivity precisely because of its brittleness, precisely because heteronor-
mativity is seen as the lifeline of the community, and precisely because 
any threat to heteronormativity constitutes a threat to the political com-
munity. At issue are not only same-sex sexualities but anything that may 
be perceived as a threat to heteronormativity and its rightful place in 
marriage and community. Interpretations of Khusboo’s words strike 
as blows to the cultural and biological survival of the collective. Any-
thing other than respectable sexuality calls into question for her critics 
not only the morality of Tamil women but also heterosexual marriage, 
inheritance, class, and caste lines, and normative masculinity.
 Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, as the fabrication and regulation 
of the human collective into a “population,” gets closest to theorizing 
the significance of sexuality in the production of the social body. Bio-
politics, for Foucault, entails defining, assessing, managing, and polic-
ing the notion of population and reveals the need to regulate it on 
behalf of collective interests. Births, reproduction, deaths, disease, 
health, life expectancy, and more make up that morass of conditions 
through which populations are forged. Biopolitics alerts us to the kind 
of violence necessary to forge such wholeness.
 Central to biopolitics is Foucault’s premise that regulation proceeds 
by infiltrating life, not through the threat of death. It is motivated 
toward regularization, not disciplining. Clarifying what he first laid out 
in the last section of the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault suggests 
succinctly in his lecture at the College de France on March 17, 1976: “it 
is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biological pro-
cesses of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, 
but regularized.”42 A few sentences later, he elaborates on the biopoliti-
cal technology that is focused on managing life, unlike the pre-occupa-
tion with death of an earlier modality of power, namely, sovereignty: “It 
is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live. Sovereignty 
took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that 
I would call the power of regularization and it, in contrast, consists in 
making live and letting die.”43
 For Foucault, this presents a new relationship between life and his-
tory because even though life is posed as biological it is, in fact, pene-
trated by history’s techniques of knowledge and power.44 It also presents 
the growing importance of the norm over the threat of law. The kinds 
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of phenomena that biopolitics is concerned with, Foucault insists, are 
aleatory—unpredictable, uncertain—and must be studied within the 
population over a period of time. Through the technologies directed 
at improving the life and quality of the population, controlling the ran-
dom and the accidental through calculation and forecast, biopolitical 
regulation is aimed at controlling mortality, not wielding the threat of 
death.
 The nexus between life and populations suggested by Foucault has 
spurred scholarship along two dimensions—the terrain of biology, med-
icine, and science within which questions of health, genetics, and dis-
ease are framed;45 and the forging of political communities by defining 
their exceptions, whether through the status of refugee, terrorist, or 
through the fault lines of race.46 The concept of the biopolitical is use-
ful in these disparate dimensions precisely because it turns attention 
to the deeper questions of life and the making of the collective. The 
concept underscores the various arenas through which “populations” 
are continually fashioned—for example, at the national level this fash-
ioning occurs through census surveys, by assessing demographics, and 
through disease and health indicators, among others.
 The preoccupations with obscenity in the context of India, espe-
cially in the three cases described here, underscore the significance of 
sexuality to the forging of the collective, to the nexus between life and 
politics. It is curious that even though Foucault first elaborates the con-
cept of the biopolitical in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, sexuality has so eas-
ily fallen out of our theorizing of it. In Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben’s 
thinking on the biopolitical lays bare the politicization of life through 
which (Western) political community is wrought. Focusing on the 
(de racialized, degendered, desexualized) stock figure of the refugee or 
the idiom of the camp, Agamben seeks to expose ways in which the 
state of exception that drives a wedge between natural rights and the 
rights of citizenship comes to be a foundational, lasting characteristic 
of political community. In so doing, Agamben significantly revises Fou-
cault’s attempts at linking disciplinary power that operates at the level 
of the body and biopolitical power at the level of the collective, and yet 
what is elided is Foucault’s necessary insight: sexuality is the mechanism 
that links individuals to the collective and connects disciplinary power 
to the biopolitical.47
 Similarly, Achille Mbembe offers a thought-provoking revision of 
Foucault’s reflections on the biopolitical through the concept of necro-
politics, to argue that contemporary life is subjugated to the power of 
death. Using historical and contemporary examples, drawn from Nazi 
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death camps, slave plantations, the occupation of Palestine, as well as 
sustained violence and genocide in Africa, Mbembe, like Agamben, 
neglects a reading of power and sovereignty deepened by attention to 
the ways in which the domain of sexuality serves as a pathway of power; 
for example, HIV/AIDS is significantly absent as a crucible of the bio-
political and the necro-political in Mbembe’s analysis.
 Rather than auxiliary, sexuality is directly instrumental to the biopo-
litical forging of collectives. This approach helps us reconsider how life, 
disease, genocide, demographics—the numerous indices of population, 
in fact—are grounded in the domain of sexuality, especially heteronor-
mativity. Despite the various complexities of political expediency, the 
three cases can assume the proportions that they do precisely because 
the significance of sexuality, articulated through obscenity, strikes at the 
heart of the collective, its continuity, its stabilization. For the same rea-
son, it is important for some publics to chisel away at representations of 
indecency or lasciviousness through public protests, the police, and the 
authority and sanctity of legal provisions. Drawn out discussions in mul-
tiple public realms are far more effective than quick, successful convic-
tions from this vantage point.
 The three cases also say something more about the functioning of 
the biopolitical. Precisely in their shape as events, as crises, they do not 
work in the same way as census surveys and population growth indices. 
In contrast to the regularization and standardization techniques of bio-
politics, these events appear to be irregularities. Yet the irregularities 
happen with enough regularity, as it were, to make us rethink the con-
junctions between regularity and irregularities, between standardization 
and crises, between making predictable the random and relying on its 
unpredictabilities. Seen this way, the nodes of biopolitical strategy are 
not just institutions of governance that shape demographic and popula-
tion discourses. Rather, the nodes of the biopolitical span structures of 
governance, institutions such as the media, as well as political groups, 
parties, and individuals.
 Furthermore, while the connotation of the social body has spe-
cific meanings within a Western liberal tradition, the social body that 
is forged through the anxieties and incitements of obscenity in the 
Indian context needs to be appreciated as not just the national, but also 
the transnational, the regional, the intra-national ethnic regional, and 
the transnational religious, among others. Biopolitics is not merely the 
regulation of social bodies as nation or the political community as the 
nation-state. Rather, it is the mechanism through which power forges 
and fuses heteronormative sexuality and the hegemonic social body.
Part three: the LImIts OF LIberaLIsm110
 The predictability of charges of obscenity, recourse to obscenity 
laws, especially with few indications of successful prosecution, needs to 
be rethought as the forging of hetero-collectives through the use of bio-
political strategies. Considering the significance of sexuality to the col-
lective draws connections between the various nodes of the biopolitical, 
including pre-occupations with obscenity, census surveys, demograph-
ics, immigration policies, the national body, sovereignty, and regional 
cultural nationalism. Cutting sharply across these various terrains, not 
in any monolithic or predictable way, is the domain of sexuality. Seen 
thus, the three cases described here make us take seriously how Khus-
boo’s utterances, Husain’s paintings, and the four NGO members’ work 
could cause such anxieties, how these crises could be tactically effec-
tive in fueling such anxieties, and how matters of obscenity are directly 
instrumental to these anxieties. These three cases are imperatives not to 
underrate the obsession with obscenity and, through it, sexuality’s foun-
dational role in the shaping of social bodies.
Concluding remarks
The perceived need to protect the integrity of social bodies explains the 
preoccupations with obscenity law in the Indian context. The discourses 
of obscenity serve to expand but also to protectively retract and retrench 
the contours of social bodies. Obscenity and its correlates—indecency, 
lasciviousness, moral turpitude—are seen to corrupt the core fabric of 
social bodies in ways that warrant attention equal to political instability, 
war, poverty, and hunger. Obscenity law in India offers a commentary 
on the foundational significance of sexuality to public order and the 
threat of unregulated sexuality to individuals and social bodies. The 
cultural and legal discourses of obscenity demand that we acknowledge 
sexuality’s foundational significance, especially reproductive and non-
reproductive heteronormativity, to the forging of collectives. Obscenity 
is as much a synecdoche of sexuality as it is of the collective, and while 
we are likely to concede easily the multiplicity of sexualities, it is nec-
essary to press the issue that there isn’t a singular notion of the collec-
tive and that notions of the collective are contingent. The point is not 
merely to insist on the plural over the singular. The point, instead, is 
to grapple with the ways in which discourses of obscenity activate social 
bodies understood not only as national but also as factors in religious, 
ethnic, and cultural identity.
 Turning to the biopolitical alerts us to the underlying mechanism 
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through which sexuality serves the regulation of social bodies. Sexual-
ity is the chain link between life and political collectives, between life 
and power. The unrelenting preoccupations with obscenity and sexual 
excess bear testimony to sexuality not as ancillary but as central to social 
bodies and to the imagination of political community. These legal/cul-
tural incitements are the means through which power fuses and rein-
forces heteronormative sexuality and hegemonic social bodies.
 On May 8, 2008, Delhi High Court Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul 
(CRL Revision Petition No. 114/2007) dismissed the cases against M.F. 
Husain.48 In a decision hailed by liberal-leaning public intellectuals, art-
ists, and supporters of Husain, Justice Kaul sorted through the famil-
iar and fraught terrain of public morality and artistic liberty. Opening 
his lengthy statement by paraphrasing Pablo Picasso—that where art is 
chaste, it is no longer art—Justice Kaul went on to juxtapose obscenity 
law in India with that in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. The outcome 
was an undoubtedly liberal legal endorsement of the need to take a 
work in its entirety, to sort through the distinctions between obscen-
ity, vulgarity, indecency, and pornography, to confirm that sexuality is 
not synonymous with obscenity, to protect artistic expression while cau-
tioning against Indian puritanical ignorance that is leading to the des-
ecration of art and the abuse of law. The Justice’s statement can be 
set up as a tussle between the right to artistic liberty and the require-
ments of public morality, between the right of expression and the effect 
of transgression. That this decision and statement uphold the right of 
expression and artistic liberty is exactly what resounds in the numerous 
endorsements by public intellectuals.
 Yet, to merely read Justice Kaul’s statement in this way omits and 
elides the imperatives of biopolitical governance and the production 
and regulation of the social body. In Justice Kaul’s statement, the tug 
between public morality and artistic liberty is mitigated by the notion of 
social stability. Unlike the United States, he noted, India has no abso-
lute right to freedom of speech, and while it is up to the state to ensure 
that it does not impose unreasonable restrictions, the state can intro-
duce restrictions in the interests of the larger social good. Indeed, as 
Justice Kaul said, there is an inseparable connection between freedom 
of speech and the stability of society, and the yardstick for determining 
whether a work is transgressive and offensive is whether it violates the 
integrity of the social body as whole. The statement upholds the liberty 
of Husain by paying close attention to the exigencies of sexuality and 
the social body. For this, Justice Kaul made two primary arguments: he 
conceded the need to protect the social body by emphasizing that the 
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painting, Bharatmata, is not about the depiction of lust; and, in a more 
spirited vein, he suggested that Hindus cannot claim to be wounded 
by the painting for the nation does not only belong to them. Toward 
the end of the statement, Justice Kaul cautioned against frivolous law-
suits and enjoined the courts not to entertain such abuse. Insofar as 
the outcome of such writs is incidental to the use of cultural-legal prac-
tices to draw and redraw the contours of the social body and its fault 
lines through the realm of sexuality, such cautions will be unheeded 
and such entreaties unenforceable.
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The question of offense and especially aesthetic offense has haunted my 
work for a long time; in fact it might be the subtext of everything I’ve 
written. What I mean is this. It’s been my experience that in writing a 
book you start out trying to answer one question and end up unable to 
answer another question, which then of course comes to seem like the 
real question, generally a far larger one than the more manageable ques-
tion you started with (which invariably seems trite by the time the book 
is finished, if it ever actually is). Research projects are impelled into 
being by both manifest and latent desires: the manifest desire fast loses 
its mystery, while the latent desire taunts your intelligence and/or self-
knowledge, which is one of the reasons it’s so difficult to reread one’s 
published work, which always seems somehow deficient by the time it 
hits print. One of the ironies of my own career is being someone with 
a book about pornography on her vitae—a book generally regarded as 
more in favor of than opposed to pornography (though personally I’d 
hesitate to classify it as “pro-porn”)—though one whose author remains 
rather offended by the subject matter whose offensiveness she meant to 
explicate and thus defang. No doubt one of the things that motivated 
me to write that book in the first place was wanting to understand why 
I found pornography offensive at a visceral level while simultaneously 
feeling vast intellectual and political antipathy toward anyone else with 
the same response. It remains an unanswered question, though let me 
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add that I’ve found little in either anti-porn or pro-porn writings that 
helps illuminate things. Anti-porn theorists tend to be offended at porn 
because they conflate fantasy with actual violence against women, which 
I don’t find convincing; pro-porn theorists tend to dismiss offense as 
simply bourgeois and retrograde—and might I add that much of the 
recent work in the pro-porn vein strikes me as actually more about fan-
dom than explication, determinedly hip in a way that always sets my 
teeth a little on edge?
 So even after hashing over these conflicts in the aforementioned 
book, big questions gnaw at me still. Not so much why pornography is 
offensive: the answer here is that it’s pornography’s job to be offensive, 
systematically locating social boundaries, and then systematically trans-
gressing them. This can be profoundly pleasurable, at least for some, or 
so I hear. The question that’s left over has more to do with the subjectiv-
ity of offendability, or the phenomenology of offensiveness: what does 
it mean to be offended, and more to the point, why is this so frequently 
experienced as unpleasant, even threatening? Why is feeling offended 
so often connected to anger, as opposed to any of the other available 
emotions in the human repertoire? Why anger, rather than, say, sadness 
or confusion?
 The lack of attention to such questions in porn studies isn’t entirely 
surprising, especially when you consider how little has been written on 
what might be termed “negative aesthetics” generally. Take the issue 
of ugliness, which is not unrelated to aesthetic offense. The history of 
aesthetics is comprised of volumes upon volumes on the meaning of 
beauty, with virtually nothing on the ugly. One reason is that aesthe-
ticians aren’t very sure what it is or what characterizes it. Do things 
classed as ugly share certain properties? Is ugliness a property of the 
object itself or does it inhere in the response of the perceiving sub-
ject? Being offended seems even more difficult to pin down, despite 
the percentage of our everyday lives spent in service of offense-avoid-
ance, when you think about it: everything from table manners, to where 
you can have sex, to disposing of bodily waste, and thousands of other 
daily rituals. Defy or forget these proprieties and you risk social punish-
ment or ostracization. In fact, it’s no exaggeration to say that avoiding 
the sensation of offense is the central cultural and aesthetic mission of 
social life as we know it, embodied yet easily offendable creatures that 
we are.
 In the civic realm, the offense-avoidance imperative yields addition-
ally murky and troublesome categories, namely, “obscenity,” the rubric 
under which potentially offended citizens find temporary solace in 
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regulatory maneuvers: pornography zoning, movie ratings, decisions 
around arts funding, and so on. When the offense-avoidance imperative 
is pitted against the founding principles of our nation such as freedom 
of expression, offense-avoidance stands a very good chance of winning, 
regarded as such an unquestionable right that other rights and free-
doms can easily be abridged in its service. The exception is when the 
offense in question can be shown to have some specifiable social pur-
pose: if the offense can double as a “good citizen” beneath its rough 
exterior, it may stand a fighting chance. Offense in the name of par-
ody has been declared a form of protected speech by no less a body 
than the Supreme Court, though other forms of aesthetic offense don’t 
always fare as well. Additionally, offense-curtailment is the goal behind 
all sorts of new regulations of daily life, namely, the wave of campus and 
workplace speech codes of the last few of decades.
 Still, offense remains a daily problem, and all the codes in the 
world can’t contain the threat. Potential hazards are everywhere, and 
increasing daily, since the more regulations are instituted, the lower the 
thresholds of offendability seem to drop. Consider a recent letter in the 
business section of the Sunday New York Times, addressed to a weekly job 
advice column called “The Career Couch.” Queries an anonymous com-
plainant: “You often see two colleagues flirting with each other in the 
office, and their behavior offends you. What can you do?”1 The answer, 
according to the Times: speak up, complain to the colleagues, and if 
that doesn’t work, go to the boss. Exactly why these flirtatious colleagues 
are offensive is never in question: offense is its own justification. It’s 
hardly news that the ability to avoid causing offense is linked to receiv-
ing a regular paycheck; this has been true from day one of wage slav-
ery, but where will it stop? Those of us laboring in the dingy halls of 
academia have long habituated ourselves to the fine points of offense-
avoidance, having been issued regular directives for years warning the 
more propriety-challenged in our ranks against creating an “offensive 
environment” by, for instance, telling jokes in class, despite the fact 
that the offense-potential of jokes is a continually shifting and capri-
cious category, further complicated by variables like class and gender, 
not to mention variations in individual toleration levels on the part of 
joke-recipients. My point is this: even though dramas of offendability 
are played out minute-by-minute throughout the social world, the etiol-
ogy and psychology of offense are barely if ever discussed. Instead, the 
response to the potential of offense is invariably new forms of prohibi-
tion and censorship, no doubt because these are easier to institute than 
it is to attempt to plumb the psychodynamics of offense.
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 There are, it must be said, different varieties of censorship, and dif-
ferent censoring agencies. As we know, Freud’s invention of psychoanal-
ysis was founded on the discovery that certain contents and ideas were 
prohibited access to consciousness: some censoring agency stood in the 
way. In Freud’s account, however, this is an unconscious process, whose 
operations aren’t immediately available to conscious description. Thus 
psychical censorship isn’t precisely contiguous with social censorship, 
which is a process undertaken consciously: a social censor knows that he 
or she intends to enact censorship and can produce a rationale, how-
ever unreliable outside observers may take these rationales to be. But 
before censorship takes a social form, it necessarily takes an interior 
form. Not psychical censorship, but the intrapsychic experience of being 
offended, by which I mean a felt response to some sort of content—gener-
ally of a sexual, violent, gross, or sacrilegious nature—that registers on 
a perceiving subject in particularly marked ways: unpleasantly, possibly 
viscerally. Being offended is a peculiarly liminal state, I’m suggesting, 
neither entirely conscious nor entirely unconscious, and additionally 
liminal in that it’s perched uncomfortably in between the psyche and 
the social. Perhaps this liminality contributes to the difficulty in specify-
ing why it is that being offended is so, well . . . offensive. It also suggests 
that a phenomenology of offense really has to be the starting point in 
any social theory of censorship.
What FOLLOWs is a roundabout stab at such an account, by way of an 
admittedly unlikely case study: the 1994 feature documentary Crumb, 
Terry Zwigoff’s biopic about the notoriously vulgar countercultural car-
toonist Robert Crumb. Why this film? Mostly because I found my own 
aesthetic response to it difficult to account for: something unsettled 
and appalled me about this film, though also fascinated me. Perhaps a 
more straightforward reason is that the film is itself, self-consciously, a 
case study on aesthetic offense, pitting Robert Crumb’s cartoons against 
his feminist critics; the critics (to the film’s credit), rather than being 
dismissed or mocked, are offered the opportunity to testify about their 
various levels of distress at Crumb’s pictorial transgressions. For them, 
Crumb’s unrestrained id is an antagonist: they’re offended by his bla-
tant sexually aggressive imagery, which they see as propaganda for 
aggression toward women. Writer Deidre English (interviewed in the 
film) goes further, charging Crumb with being in a state of “arrested 
juvenile development” and recommending that he “channel himself 
into doing better work.” 
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 That those most offended by Crumb’s cartoons are female obvi-
ously raises larger questions about the relation between gender and aes-
thetic offense and why the experience is typically more distressing for 
women than for men (though certainly not for all women). As we see, 
the feminist position is explicitly aligned with the enterprise of sublima-
tion and thus, presumably, with whatever forms of authority—psychical 
or social—mobilize its operations and its censorships. There are many 
reasons to object to this. But for me, the salience of these objections, 
and English’s comments in particular, is the imperative to “Grow up.” In 
other words, childhood is the origin of adult vulgarity. Rather than the 
usual clichéd island of innocence, for English, and also for filmmaker 
Zwigoff as we’ll see, it’s childhood that corrupts adulthood rather than 
the other way around. This is not exactly the conventional line at the 
moment, and therefore it’s worth some attention.
 Terry Zwigoff’s Crumb isn’t the story of Robert Crumb alone; it’s 
also the story of Crumb’s two brothers, Charles and Maxim, all three 
of whom are portrayed in extensive interviews. Zwigoff, who’d known 
the family for two decades, achieves something remarkably intimate 
in these scenes. Cartooning was, we learn, something of a childhood 
mania for all the brothers, who were abnormally close. Additionally 
all three shared and continue to share similar preoccupations with sex 
and aggression, although Charles, the eldest, has never actually had sex 
because he’s too depressed to leave the house. Of the three brothers, 
Robert is the only one who can actually function in the world. Charles, 
who has never worked, has lived at home with his deeply strange 
mother since getting out of high school; he’s heavily medicated and has 
attempted suicide numerous times, including once by drinking furni-
ture polish. Maxim lives in a Single Room Occupancy and continues to 
paint (some of his work is stylistically not unlike Robert’s) while practic-
ing various of the more grisly Eastern-inflected bodily disciplines: medi-
tating while sitting on a board of nails and swallowing lengths of cord 
that make their way through his intestinal tract. Apparently he makes 
a living by begging; he’s also been arrested for, and readily admits to, 
molesting women on the street. Robert himself is inclined toward infan-
tilism and various other fetishes; he’s described by various women in a 
position to know as not “normal” in sexual relations, preferring pornog-
raphy more than sex with another person and most of all masturbat-
ing to his own drawings. Nevertheless, he’s now married with a young 
daughter, a late concession to conventional heterosexuality.
 Still, in the world of the film, Robert might well pass for one of his 
strange hypersexual cartoon characters. At the same time, if it weren’t 
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for the cartoons, Robert might well have turned into one of his unfor-
tunate mentally ill brothers: the film opens with him saying that when 
he doesn’t draw he starts getting crazy and suicidal. Which is to say 
that the brothers, the cartoons, and Robert share some sort of essential 
nature: all seem to spring from the same origin; as the film unfolds, 
all the brothers start seeming like incarnations of Robert’s demented 
cartoons. They themselves more or less say so: all are alarmingly articu-
late and mordantly funny about their various disorders. Nothing here is 
exactly repressed or unknown: the main difference between Robert and 
the other two is that for Charles and Maxim, the preoccupations with 
sex and aggression have been disabling in ultimately catastrophic ways; 
only Robert has been able to escape the brothers’ fates by channeling 
these preoccupations into the content of the art. Not so for Charles, 
unfortunately: an epilogue informs us that he finally succeeded in com-
mitting suicide shortly after production was completed, and the film is 
dedicated to him.
 The first thing to note about the structure of this film is that it stages 
the examination of Crumb’s work in the context of a familiar genre, 
the artist biography; the second thing to note is that the current incar-
nation of the artist biography is the family story. The contradiction in 
this case is that Crumb’s standing as an “artist” per se is, or should be, 
liminal—after all, he’s a cartoonist, a genre with an uncertain footing 
in relation to the fine arts, traditionally speaking, though of course its 
stock has risen considerably in recent times, particularly in the years 
since Crumb was released. There’s greater cultural respect for the car-
toon form now than there’s ever been, no doubt due to the emergence 
of culturally ambitious cartoonists such as Art Spiegelman, author of 
the Pulitzer Prize–winning Maus, taking on politically and culturally 
weighty matters in graphic form, a newly elevated standing to which 
this compelling portrait of a tormented cartoonist no doubt contrib-
uted. Crumb’s own cultural status has shifted in the interim too, from 
a counterculture to a mainstream figure: he’s now featured regularly in 
the New Yorker and other respectable venues.
 There are many things to say about the shifting cultural fortunes 
of cartooning within the social hierarchy of cultural forms, and I can 
say only a few of them here. But if the rise and fall of different genres 
and styles is, as literary theorists like to suggest, part of a larger story 
about shifting modes and requirements for social subjectivities—the 
eighteenth-century invention of the novel was accompanied by a new 
focus on interior life and self-examination; modernist fragmentation 
mirrored conditions of increasing social anomie, and so on—then the 
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question we’d obviously want to ask is what the heightened cultural 
status of cartooning says about the conditions of subjectivity at pres-
ent. I’d argue that such shifts are what the film Crumb both evidences 
and in turn reproduces, precisely by treating Robert Crumb’s work as 
the byproduct of an artistic subjectivity, rather than that of a sub-artis-
tic hack or an industrial enterprise. Even now not all genres qualify 
for entry into the conventions of “auteurdom”: you wouldn’t expect to 
come across a biography of Danielle Steele, for example, though one of 
the things that the postmodern breakdown of distinctions between high 
and low cultural forms means is that fewer and fewer genres and figures 
don’t qualify.
 The artist biography is a genre that doesn’t receive much critical 
attention, certainly not from film theorists; in fact even art historical 
treatments are rare. The first such treatment, published in 1934, is still 
one of the only historical surveys of print biographies; though brief, it 
spans ancient to modern times. The author was Ernst Kris, an art his-
torian–psychoanalyst and follower of Freud, though Kris broke from 
Freud in taking the figure of the artist as a social construct, a cultural 
image produced precisely through the sorts of biographical texts that 
comprised his survey. Kris was something of a proto-structuralist: his 
approach was to break these biographies down into constitutive nar-
rative units, or “primitive cells,” and the basic narrative unit to be 
analyzed was what he called “the artist anecdote.”2 Through these anec-
dotes, which he collected and typologized, he believed it was possible to 
understand how the figure of the artist was being socially constructed in 
any given period. But it’s also tempting to read Kris in reverse, to read 
these artist biographies for the descriptions they provide of the specific 
social requirements of the artist-hero figure at different points in history. 
Though Kris himself doesn’t make the point, it’s clear that artist biogra-
phies are written—and rewritten—to suit the requirements and norms 
of an age: Picasso used to be iconically life affirming and lusty; then he 
was a misogynist; no doubt soon he’ll be queer.
 What, then, comprises the current biographical formulae, the cur-
rent required artist traits? In Crumb, although there’s no voice-over per-
forming explanation and exposition, a narrative is written nonetheless 
through the montage, the mise-en-scène, and the direction of the scenes. 
And where Crumb is directed, for much of the film, is back to his child-
hood, directed there literally in pilgrimages to the family domicile as 
well as though journeys of introspection and childhood reminiscence. 
But where else would he go, we contemporaries would doubtless ask. 
So habituated are we to this biographical formula that it seems entirely 
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inevitable, though it’s worth remembering that in other periods the bio-
graphical cells would have been entirely different. The classical con-
ception of the role of the artist emphasized the continuities between 
generations, and so did the classical biographical cells; modernist for-
mulae emphasized the breaking of ranks and oedipal conflicts. In our 
time, some form of familial or childhood trauma necessarily occupies 
the normative biographic cell; something is being “worked out” in the 
art, according to the typical artist anecdote.
 At least the Crumb biopic leads us to this inference, given how many 
scenes portray the subject not just as a misanthropic social and sexual 
misfit, but as an artist whose work is an extension of the family scene. By 
juxtaposing “biographical units” of the tragic misfit brothers and their 
collective childhood cartoons with Crumb’s adult cartoons—the visual 
similarities are unmistakable—any disjunction between family pathology 
and Crumb’s subsequent career all but vanishes. Montage sequences 
and audio bridges tie the brothers’ sexual preoccupations to Robert’s 
oeuvre, focused largely on bizarre forms of sex and aggression carried 
out by a depressed band of perverse, lascivious, and highly physically 
endowed cartoon characters. The fact that Maxim has been convicted 
of real sex offenses—he likes to waylay women on the street and yank 
down their shorts, a compulsion he describes in alarming detail—retro-
actively transforms Robert’s Mr. Natural into a fourth Crumb brother.
 The film has an engaging lightness of tone even when telling this 
tragic tale. I’m not quarreling with the depiction—it’s hard to dispute 
that something very bad happened to these three brothers along the 
way, possibly at the hands of a tyrannical authoritarian father—“the old 
man,” the brothers call him—along with their pill-head, enema-wield-
ing mother; some kind of horrific collective trauma that shaped and 
ordered Crumb’s subsequent artwork. It also seems indisputable, on the 
evidence of the film, that the artist’s childhood and the subsequent art 
are in continuity, though of course we’re offered no competing ways 
of understanding Crumb’s trajectory. To be sure, positing continuities 
between art and self aren’t the preoccupation of our age alone: the mad-
ness of the artist and the suffering artist are familiar Romantic tropes. 
What seems recent is the way that biography has become so transparent, 
virtually identical with the artwork itself. Transformation, sublimation, 
what used to be called aufhebung—all eliminated. What remains is the 
landscape of trauma.
  If, as Kris speculated, each era selects a new set of heroic charac-
teristics for its artists to embody, if certain types of personalities rise in 
prominence due to the specificities and requirements of the moment, 
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it’s clear that the residues of childhood trauma have particular cul-
tural resonance in our particular moment. You have only to track the 
meteoric rise of the abuse memoir in literary culture, its ubiquity as a 
talk-show topic and a cinematic theme: society has declared a state of 
emergency on the issue. The figure of the traumatized child has some 
sort of emotional hook for us, one that past generations were far less 
hooked by. The concept of abuse colors our perception of the world 
and now hovers uncomfortably over all adult–child relations.
 This makes it particularly interesting that the criticism leveled by 
one of Crumb’s most cogent (and offended) feminist critics is that “he’s 
in a state of arrested juvenile development.” Far from disagreeing with 
her, the filmmakers embrace this view of Crumb’s work themselves; in 
fact, it’s what confirms Crumb’s status as an artist. The backdrop of 
trauma is what gives the work its authenticity: the fact that the work 
offends is a sign of its artistic merit. In another sequence juxtaposed 
with denunciations by feminist critics, noted art critic Robert Hughes 
compares Crumb to great artists of the past, like Goya, who employ dis-
turbingly violent imagery. Thus certified by Hughes, there can be no 
doubt that Crumb is a qualified subject for the artist biography treat-
ment we’re watching—a treatment that in turn authenticates his stand-
ing as a real artist.
 For Freud too, as for Crumb’s feminist critics, the real artist was 
something of a schooled primitive: “a man who turns away from reality 
because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual 
satisfaction . . . and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play 
in the life of fantasy . . . but who because of his special gifts [is able 
to] mold his fantasies into truths of a new kind.”3 Yet for Freud, direct 
encounters with “the full play of fantasy,” or the unmediated primitive, 
are impossible desires for the modern socialized subject, an impossibil-
ity that accounts for why the theme of the primitive resonates through-
out his own work as well. No doubt the postmodern theorist will want 
to insert a proviso into the discussion reminding us that the category of 
the primitive is itself an invention of modernity and its obsession with 
development, which was exactly why it became such a source of fascina-
tion for so many adjacent turn-of-the-twentieth-century inventions, from 
psychoanalysis, to modernist aesthetics, to anthropology, all of which 
compulsively circle around this fateful dialectic. Despite all the sophis-
ticated indictments of the colonial mentality in subsequent years, they 
haven’t managed to eliminate developmental metaphors, which are 
deeply embedded in how we see and perceive the world. It may just be 
impossible to think without them.
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 The effects of these impossible-to-eliminate categories on visual per-
ception is a theme that anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss ponders 
quite eloquently in his travelogue-memoir Triste Tropique (from which I 
crib my own essay’s title), complaining: “I am subject to a double infir-
mity: all that I perceive offends me, and I constantly reproach myself for 
not seeing as much as I should.”4 The context is the aesthetic offense 
Lévi-Strauss suffers when witnessing spectacles of uneven development 
during his anthropological forays, that is, the conglomeration of the 
vanishing primitive and the encroaching modern in the same place. 
He doesn’t mind spanking new suburbs or bricked-over cities: he’s not 
simply or romantically anti-development. But he wants it to be all or 
nothing, savage or suburb; the conjunctions of the two stymies him, 
inducing a refusal—or, as he fears, a failure—to see what’s actually there, 
even as it’s disappearing under development’s wrecking ball. But there’s 
nothing to do about it: to be a modern means that the simultaneous 
presence of different levels of development simply offends, and this is, 
according to Lévi-Strauss, the foundation of modern perception.
 If the primitive is a category invented by moderns, so too is regres-
sion a category invented by adults. This problem of uneven develop-
ment is also, as we know, the founding problem of psychoanalysis, 
though not one so easily cured either. Freud’s entire account of the 
perceptual system, which he begins outlining in Interpretation of Dreams, 
rests on the premise of uneven development: not only is regular nightly 
regression in the form of dreams a firmly entrenched aspect of normal 
subjectivity, but normal waking perception itself is founded on a regres-
sive foundation, because attention is always put into motion by some-
thing prior, something from the past. In other words, attention is a state 
that revives something for the perceiving subject; it revisits something 
already there. There are no new perceptions in this account—there 
can’t be: all we have are the shadows and traces of long-lost objects 
and desires. An experience of humiliation, to take a random example 
(except that by this logic there are no random examples), is a form of 
attention in which a pathway to an old source of emotion is traversed, 
and “as soon as the memory of it is touched, it springs into life once 
again and shows itself cathected with excitation.”5 Paying attention isn’t 
a choice—nor is being offended—they’re dictated to us by the past. Thus 
the most intense forms of attention—anger, love, aesthetic offense—
are constructed like memorials, and for that reason they have higher 
degrees of psychical intensity, often described with metaphors of dis-
tance and proximity: they seem “closer.” For Freud, as for Lévi-Strauss, 
the dialectic between progression and regression, the simultaneous 
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presence of relics and the new, and the various journeys this entails—
dreams, anthropological voyages, or those undertaken on the psycho-
analyst’s couch—are the fundaments of modern perception.
 We return now from these side trips and peregrinations to our 
current case study. Crumb offers some interesting updates on the old 
motifs. To begin with, it draws heavily on the currently popular theme 
of childhood trauma as an absent cause. In these case, it’s positioned 
as causal in the formation of the creative drive—not just an origin, but 
also a reparation. The question we might want to ask in this context is 
whether the motif of childhood trauma, so insistently present in our 
culture at the moment—in culture, in the humanities and social sci-
ences—is the reappearance of the primitive in a new guise, our genera-
tion’s update on the theme? Functionally speaking, childhood trauma 
and an older notion of the primitive play similar roles, preserving and 
retaining uneven levels of development within the same temporality—
or in our case, within the same subjectivity. Trauma becomes an arti-
fact to be preserved and memorialized, and this is especially so to the 
degree it provides the unconscious wellsprings for artistic production, 
just as geographic versions of primitivism did for early-twentieth-cen-
tury modernists. If the primitive locales were once located in colonial 
outposts, exterior rather than subjective and interiorized, let’s recall 
that the interior–exterior distinction was never entirely so rock solid 
either: the so-called heart of darkness was always one of modernism’s 
big themes.
 Needless to say, trauma narratives aren’t new when it comes to cul-
tural production; human suffering has a long history. What seems differ-
ent at the moment is the attenuation of the old literary and visual codes 
through which those themes were deployed, the decline of transfor-
mation and sublimation as necessary steps in cultural production. For 
Freud, sublimation was the cultural and aesthetic solution to traumas of 
the past, though sublimation is a concept with a somewhat tangled sta-
tus in psychoanalytic thought. The basic theory, as is well known, posits 
that socially and psychically unacceptable goals—sexual or aggressive, 
primitive wishing and desiring—are transformed into acceptable goals 
or “higher purposes.” But sublimation supposedly also involves a second 
process, the neutralization of the contents of those goals or injuries, to 
the point that they become unrecognizable, losing their reference to 
the original material. In the old model, aesthetic experience is a sort 
of encoding-decoding operation, occasioned by the meeting of two dis-
tinct subjectivities—author and reader, artist and viewer—with the aes-
thetic forming a sort of bridge from one unconscious to another. The 
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disguised, sublimated material brought to bear by the artist or writer 
resonates unconsciously with the disguised, sublimated instincts of the 
reader or viewer, producing frisson and pleasure. This is what comprises 
“aesthetic experience”—a re-encounter with split-off, dangerously prim-
itive materials and wishes. What we’re encountering are our own deep-
est renounced selves.
 Interestingly, in Freud’s account of sublimation, to be overly 
absorbed with sexual themes, in the manner of the Crumb brothers, is a 
symptom of “compulsive brooding, in a distorted and unfree form.”6 In 
contrast, the creativity of sublimation is the escape route, from both sex-
ual repression and a neurotic compulsive thinking about sexual themes. 
Whether this is merely Freud’s Victorianism speaking or a prescription 
for our own current sexual malaise is something we sexually enlight-
ened postmoderns can certainly argue about. Another question to ask 
is whether it’s facile (or overly optimistic) to conflate sexual explicitness 
with increased freedom, as sexual progressives would have it. As Crumb 
powerfully demonstrates, there’s far less freedom in Crumb’s work than 
strict adherence to old familial rules, which allow for these three beset 
brothers nothing but sexual brooding. It’s clear to anyone with eyes to 
see that freedom is not exactly what’s on display here.
 Voicing this observation gives me no pleasure; I fear it pushes me 
toward the fuddy-duddy camp. To compound the problem, like Crumb’s 
feminist critics, I admit to finding the Crumb family sensibility offensive, 
though I’m not sure it’s precisely feminist offense I’m experiencing. To 
be honest, what I found myself most offended by while viewing the film, 
oddly enough, wasn’t Robert Crumb’s cartoons, but his laugh, which is 
disturbing and often wildly inappropriate. Robert giggles while Charles 
is talking about his suicide attempt, chortles while Max is talking about 
molesting women, and sniggers at just about every point in which the 
emotional content is pain and tragedy. The camerawork in the film is 
brilliant, always panning quickly to Crumb at such moments, which is 
to say the camera itself provides the “biographical anecdotes” in these 
instances, so attentive to the cartoonist’s distorted affect that Crumb 
soon begins to seem like a continuation of his lewd cartoon characters, 
and they of him. He begins to seem like a caricature of himself.
 The regulation of behavior is the fundamental project of develop-
ment, no doubt true whether we mean the development from primitive 
to modern, or from child to adult. According to psychologists, chil-
dren progress from using the whole body as an apparatus for expres-
sion into the refinements of language, thought and speech, which are 
the modern subject’s tools for mastering the world and making contact 
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with the environment. Laughter is a more primitive form of expression, 
a residue left over from infancy and childhood when the entire body 
was used to signal pleasure and displeasure. In other words, you might 
call laughter a sanctioned form of regression, and very much a shared 
regression, a shared pleasure. Laughter is a profoundly social act; it 
solicits identification—people often start to laugh at another person’s 
laughter without even knowing what they’re laughing at.
 And on other occasions they stop laughing. Solicitations to laugh-
ter can also invoke self-rebuke, the punishment of the ego. After all, 
social development is secured by a variety of brutal enforcement tech-
niques—spankings, shame, and humiliation, to name just a few—which 
become internalized in the socialization process. With successful social-
ization, defying social proprieties and restrictions provokes painful 
self-reproach: we no longer need parents and society to punish our 
transgressions, since we do it ourselves. Such are the consequences of 
development.
 I was interested to observe in myself that Crumb’s laugh provoked 
profound discomfort, so much so that I can only imagine it somehow 
activated this self-reproachful trigger. Like his feminist critics, the sup-
posed humor of his antics failed to convince me; something aggressive 
and disturbing registered instead, something for which the laugh seems 
to be a bribe, a subterfuge. The inappropriate laugh is like a behavioral 
condensation of Crumb’s visual aesthetic, both founded on the reversal 
of affect. And Crumb’s “adult” cartoons do quite brilliantly condense 
these uneven developments: they’re a perfect formal device, child-
ish impulses and adult sexuality co-existing within every frame. Still, I 
too, like Crumb’s critics, wish he would “grow up” and leave regression 
behind, would stop memorializing those painful relics, whose traces 
in this thwarted and unevenly developed grown-up are so unsettling—
exactly because they’re so recognizable to anyone who was once a child. 
What refuge is there from this recognition? Aesthetic offense at least 
removes one from the distressing scene of identification and protects 
against the self-reproaches such identifications might incite.
 But it wasn’t only Crumb’s laugh that unsettled me, frankly, it was his 
very physiognomy; in fact the physiognomy of the whole family is unset-
tling. In the early childhood photos the family looks fairly conventional 
in appearance, but as they get older, the three sons get uglier and uglier, 
with distorted features and odd, inappropriate affect. It’s as though 
they’ve all become self-caricatures, as if their bodies had provided a pli-
ant medium upon which to record some particularly grotesque story, a 
story that language alone was insufficiently plastic to express.
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 Caricature is a peculiar genre. Historically it’s been a form in which 
artists employ techniques of distortion to show the true essence of a 
person behind the thin pretense of social convention. As Ernst Kris 
observes, it made a surprisingly late appearance on the aesthetic scene, 
only fully surfacing in the sixteenth century, despite the fact that all of 
the technical skills required were certainly available far earlier. Some 
new degree of social permissibility must have been the preconditions 
for its emergence, he speculates, the lifting of some previous form of 
self-censorship in psychical and social aggression. Kris views caricature 
as a mixture of regression and aggression: it’s a deliberate distortion of 
the features of a person for the purposes of mockery, thus as much of 
a psychological mechanism as a mode of art. As he puts it, “The carica-
turist seeks for the perfect deformity, he shows how the soul of the man 
would express itself in his body if only matter were sufficiently pliable 
to nature’s intentions.”7
 When it comes to the Crumb brothers, it appears that their bodies 
were indeed sufficiently pliable to advertise the damage to their souls, 
at least according to the aesthetic evidence on display. The Crumb 
oeuvre too, clearly encumbered by the same familial phantasmatic (a 
term that psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche uses to describe the core struc-
turing action, the mise-en-scène, that shapes and orders any individual 
psychical life), also deploys caricature as its medium of mockery, solic-
iting our laughter. But how funny are these encumbrances—is this a 
joke we want to be in on? One of the reasons I find it so difficult to 
take an unambivalent position on obscenity—to champion it as a form 
of free expression and take pleasure in its license (which at some intel-
lectual level I do also applaud)—is the suspicion that, as in the case of 
the Crumb aesthetic, there’s always more to the story, some subterfuge 
about origins. Obscenity isn’t just a matter of the obscene content, after 
all; it’s also a particular sort of form: a repetition, the compulsive return 
to a scene. Something’s being revisited, memorialized, though most of 
the time we don’t know what. This seems to be the lesson of Crumb: the 
pleasures of the obscene are also a kind of misdirection, an inducement 
not to look at what can’t be named.
 If “freedom of expression” is the progressive’s slogan in debates 
about obscenity, it would be an excessively optimistic slogan to employ 
here: there’s nothing particularly “free” about Crumb’s work, not if we 
mean freedom in the largest sense of the word, in the social and psychi-
cal senses. And shouldn’t that be what we’re striving for? If those of us 
who study obscenity are so busy championing it that we forget to notice 
what’s offensive about it, we’re missing the point, I think.
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One of us (Mikita) comes from England, and we begin this essay with a 
recollection from her childhood:
When I was about eight years old, I went to a sleepover at the home 
of my playmate, the vicar’s daughter. I didn’t know it at the time, but 
her family was rich. When we were in bed at night, just before going to 
sleep, my friend’s mother came to the door and asked if either of us 
would like to “spend a penny” before going to sleep. I got out of bed, 
took some coins from my jeans pocket, and followed the vicar’s wife 
down the hall. I don’t know what I expected, but I was surprised to dis-
cover that she was merely leading me to the toilet. This was possibly my 
first introduction to the strong cultural connection between money and 
bodily excretion.
 In its negative form, this cultural association is often attributed to 
Vespasian, the first-century emperor who gave Rome its first public pay 
toilets. When his son Titus criticized the idea, Vespasian replied that 
the “urine tax” would redound to the good of the city, and that even 
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Pecunia Olet
affluence, effluence, and Obscenity
miKiTa BroTTman and david sTerriTT
One tends to see only the thousand tricks of power which are enacted 
above ground; but these are the least part of it. Underneath, day in, 
day out, is digestion and again digestion.
—Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power
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though it may originate in the toilet, money doesn’t stink: “Pecunia non 
olet.” American readers may know this phrase from Robert Penn War-
ren’s novel All the King’s Men, where narrator Jack Burden quotes it.1 
But we’ll be making the case that only in Utopia (Thomas More’s Uto-
pia, that is) are the chamber pots made of gold. Money does stink—
“pecunia olet”—and some kinds of money stink more than others.
Spending a penny
Everybody is familiar with terms like “filthy lucre” and “cash” that needs 
“laundering,” and many of us know somebody who is “rolling in it” or 
is “stinking rich.” According to Sigmund Freud, it’s natural to associate 
money with dirt, because that’s what money is: shit. Or at least that’s 
what it’s like. “In reality,” wrote Freud in 1908, “wherever archaic modes 
of thought have predominated or still persist—in the ancient civiliza-
tions, in myths, fairy tales and superstitions, in unconscious thinking, 
in dreams and in neuroses—money is brought into the most intimate 
relationship with dirt,” adding that “the gold which the devil gives his 
paramours turns into excrement after his departure” and that “every-
one is familiar with the ‘shitter of ducats.’”2 In a 1911 essay, Freud and 
Ernst Oppenheim quote a scholar’s observation that “gold, according 
to ancient oriental mythology, is the excrement of hell.3 In a 1914 case 
history, Freud stressed that an interest in accumulating money is libidi-
nal rather than rational in character, relating this to the child’s ability 
to hold back shit or to produce it as his or her first symbolic offering.4 
And the flip side of accumulation, expenditure, has the same inherent 
set of meanings, as philosopher Georges Bataille averred when he said 
that ceremonial gift-giving “symbolizes excretion, which itself is linked 
to death.”5
 These ideas were vividly elaborated by Freud’s colleague Sandor 
Ferenczi, who wrote in 1914 that feces held back “are really the first 
‘savings’ of the growing being, and as such remain in a constant, uncon-
scious inter-relationship with every bodily activity or mental striving that 
has anything to do with collecting, hoarding, and saving.”6 Ferenczi 
expands on Freud’s observation that as children become acculturated 
they start finding shit unpleasant and begin collecting other things—
first pieces of bodily detritus such as hair and toenails, then external 
items such as stones, marbles, and buttons. When even these objects 
start offending the child’s sense of hygiene and something still purer is 
demanded, the commonly found answer is—shining pieces of money.
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 Money itself can be further purified, moreover, since the greater the 
sum of money collected, the more abstract it becomes. Shining coins 
that you can run through your hands, pile up, and jingle in your pocket 
become bank notes. Bank notes are objects too, and it feels good to see 
them bulging out of your pay packet, to press them into a wad in your 
wallet, to lick your fingers and pull one out. In the next stage, however, 
the bank notes become checks, credit cards, and finally pure symbol-
ism, nothing more than figures on a printout from a bank or financial 
institution—so much in, so much out—or impulses in an electronic led-
ger, intangible units of information on a screen.
 Still, money qua money retains its age-old connection with the 
unclean. For a vivid expression of this in popular culture, one need 
look no further than the films of Alfred Hitchcock, who repeatedly 
invokes the link between money and shit. At the beginning of Shadow 
of a Doubt, made in 1943, Hitchcock signals that the seemingly benign 
Uncle Charlie is actually a psychopath by showing fistfuls of cash spilled 
over his bedside table and onto the floor. In the 1972 thriller Frenzy, a 
serial rapist and murderer must retrieve a piece of jewelry from a corpse 
stowed on a potato truck, which deposits its load onto the street like a 
lumbering beast with diarrhea. The most striking example appears in 
the 1960 masterpiece Psycho, where a large amount of money, stolen 
by Janet Leigh’s character, is equated with shit in startling and explicit 
ways. After the theft she imagines her victims discussing the loot in 
scatological double entendres: “She sat there while I dumped it out,” 
says the businessman who pulled the money from his pocket and then 
flaunted it in front of her like a naughty boy proud of the excrement 
he’s “made.” Later she enters a lavatory to handle the cash, and later 
still she takes a piece of paper and calculates how much of the money 
she has spent, and then flushes the paper down a toilet, prompting Hol-
lywood’s first-ever close-up of a flushing toilet. The money eventually 
winds up in the trunk of her car, which the film’s eponymous psycho 
(played by Anthony Perkins) sinks in a nearby swamp, metaphorically 
pictured by Hitchcock as a toilet writ large, especially when the car 
momentarily refuses to sink politely out of sight—every toilet flusher’s 
nightmare! Other examples, in works by Hitchcock and other filmmak-
ers, are easy to come by.
 Freud himself couldn’t ask for better instances of sublimated shit in 
the popular imagination. What these visual tropes have in common is 
their adherence to the classic definition of dirt as matter out of place—
here it’s money and other valuables that have been wrenched from their 
proper locations—and to Mary Douglas’s observation that dirt “offends 
against order,” since here metaphorical dirt is used to signify the pres-
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ence of deeply disordered minds.7 Also relevant to this imagery is Jean-
Paul Sartre’s concept of the obscene as that which “appears when the 
body adopts postures which entirely strip it of its acts and which reveal 
the inertia of its flesh. . . . [I]t is de trop. . . . [It] “releases to me the inert 
expanding of flesh . . . when I am not in a state of desire for this flesh 
. . . .”8 A standard dictionary definition of obscene is “so excessive as to 
be offensive,” and if we apply Sartre’s evocation of “inert expanding” to 
money, it provides a useful illustration of how “pecunia olet” may pertain 
to the very rich. We of the less-privileged classes would certainly desire 
what the super-rich have if there weren’t more of what they have than 
we can readily get our minds around. Through its enormity—in both 
senses of the word—the wealthy person’s money loses shape, becoming 
an amorphous monster, a metastasized doppelgänger of the reasonable 
degree of wealth that we could easily conceptualize and covet. Piles of 
money are a benison. Mountains of money are scary.
 Psychoanalysts often place attitudes to money along a spectrum. At 
one pole is the compulsive spender, who gets rid of everything he earns 
and more. In the spirit of Bataille, we call this the excremental person-
ality. At the other pole is the hoarder, who lives far beneath her income 
and refuses to part with a penny. This is the anal personality, and the 
adjective fits all too well. Ferenczi observed many cases in which “peo-
ple are economical [i.e., stingy] as regards the changing of under-linen 
[i.e., underpants] in a way quite out of proportion to their standard of 
living in other respects.”9
 The first is the excremental personality; the second is the anal-
retentive type. Having begun our discussion with the English practice 
of “spending a penny,” we’ll mention at this point our curiosity as to 
whether the anal personality’s extreme economies might also pertain 
to the British desire to cling to the pound at all costs, refusing to give 
it up and switch over to the Euro, as has happened in other countries. 
Should we see this as an attempt to keep the island clean, uncontami-
nated by Continental effluvia? Does it have any relation to the fact that, 
according to telegraph.co.uk, each person in England uses thirty-nine 
pounds of toilet paper per annum, which comes to 110 rolls per capita, 
some two-and-a-half times the European average?
All money is dirty; some money is obscene
It appears to us that the adjective “obscene” has been used with increas-
ing frequency in recent years to describe extremely large amounts of 
money. There are many examples, but one well-known usage in popu-
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lar culture is heard in the 1990 film Pretty Woman, where the corpo-
rate raider played by Richard Gere tells a fawning boutique assistant 
that he’d better prepare to grovel cravenly before his prostitute girl-
friend, played by Julia Roberts, because they plan to spend “an obscene 
amount of money” in the store.
 In phrases like “dirty money” and “filthy lucre,” the cash is what’s 
unclean, not the possessor of it; and, even then, it doesn’t literally crawl 
with vermin or stink of excretions. Describing an amount of money as 
“obscene” is a more literal use of language, because the word “obscene” 
carries a weight of moral disapproval that goes beyond a lack of clean-
liness, and is necessarily aimed at whoever has accumulated the undue 
quantity. The stain of obscenity is more difficult to remove than the 
stain of dirt, since it seems to bleed over to the person who receives the 
money, the deal, or the offer, and who then becomes contaminated by 
this contact.
 The pace of change triggered by recent technological advances, 
such as dot-com and digital technologies, has radically transformed how 
people acquire wealth. Traditionally, great wealth was something you 
were born into or inherited from your family. It’s long been possible for 
people who aren’t born rich to make their own fortunes, of course—
the nouveaux riches are virtually as old as the anciens riches—but histori-
cally this has usually been a long, hard process. There is little precedent 
for the speed at which people today, including very young people, can 
get incredibly wealthy. This quickness of acquisition often makes those 
who become suddenly rich more aware of their wealth than might have 
been the case if they’d been eased into their new socioeconomic status, 
which offers marked contrasts with their former standards of living, and 
also with the poverty of others. The newly rich may therefore have an 
impression that their large quantities of money are out of place in the 
sense of being unevenly or improperly distributed, and excessive in the 
sense of being more than the formerly middle- or working-class indi-
vidual readily understands how to use in ways that will be effective and 
gratifying in the long run. And, as we’ve noted, being out of place and 
excessive are the twin essences of obscenity.
 We typed the phrase “obscene amount of money” into Google on 3 
December 2007 and, excluding some personal and business blogs, the 
first ten results were:
 (1)  The listing for Washington on $10 Million a Day: How Lobbyists Plun-
der the Nation, a book by Ken Silverstein, on Amazon.com.
 (2)  A news article from the New York Times discussing the $25 million 
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that Barack Obama’s campaign took in during the first fund-rais-
ing season of the 2008 presidential race.
 (3)  Another article from the New York Times declaring that a Virginia 
governor had raised millions of dollars for a possible presidential 
bid.
 (4)  A news item from bbc.co.uk reporting that a £500,000 donation 
from a wealthy businessman enabled a Scottish political party to 
exceed its fundraising target of £1 million.
 (5)  A post on Drug WarRant.com about a United States plan to help 
Mexico fight drug trafficking at a projected cost of up to $1.2 bil-
lion over three years.
 (6)  A post on Yahoo! Answers asking if soccer star David Beckham will 
be worth the “obscene amount of money” he’s receiving.
 (7)  A post on Limos.com reporting that an electronics company had 
announced a loss of $59 billion over a three-month period, and 
wondering how one enterprise could lose such an “obscene” 
amount.
 (8)  An item in Domain’s Magazine stating that the investment of 
obscene sums by zealous venture capitalists was the “most astound-
ing thing” about the dot-com boom of the late 1990s and early 
2000s.
 (9)  A blog post about Beckham, reporting that in 2007 he would sign 
with the Los Angeles Galaxy for £128 million, or $250 million, over 
five years, giving him a weekly salary of almost $1 million.
(10)  An item in The Australian saying that the nation’s two largest adver-
tisers, both of which spent “an obscene amount of money” on mes-
sages to the public, “are a company now in much financial trouble 
and the federal government, which spent almost $600,000 a day 
on a single campaign, not counting the cost of producing the ads.”
These examples have a number of common elements:
 (1)  The sums are enormous, ranging up to many billions of dollars.
 (2)  Political money and government spending are dominant subjects.
 (3)  Attention largely centers on enormous sums going to one person 
(e.g., a candidate for public office) or to one industry (e.g., dot-
com companies) even though the money could be more effectively 
used with more efficient distribution patterns.
 (4)  The sums are often spent or collected in ways that don’t produce 
anything tangible, only ephemeral things like the buzz of an elec-
tion campaign or the services of a fashionable athlete.
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 (5)  Most of these references relate not to long-established pillars of 
the financial and political worlds but to individuals and organi-
zations connected with new money, i.e., money that’s given or 
accrued with much greater speed and in vastly larger amounts 
than would have happened in similar cases in earlier times.
 Old money may also be unfairly distributed, to be sure, but since 
the inequities of dynastic wealth have been around long enough for 
denizens of a capitalist society to grow accustomed to them, they attract 
less interest and less contentiousness. What feels obscene is the percep-
tion that “our” money—as citizens, customers, investors, or residents 
of places more fortunate than New Orleans—is going to someone who 
doesn’t seem to deserve it and certainly doesn’t need it. Given the lev-
els of poverty and need in the U.S. and elsewhere, it seems obscene 
that any one person should receive hugely disproportionate amounts 
of money, especially a person who is already rich. The same goes for 
institutions that don’t make manifestly strong contributions to the pub-
lic good. Think of the belated attention being given by some Ameri-
can commentators and legislators, after years of delay, to the waste of 
prodigious sums in Iraq, much of it showered on the likes of Hallibur-
ton and unaccountable private contractors via noncompetitive contracts 
and unaudited dispersals.
 While it’s interesting to see which particular instances of vast and 
underserved wealth strike average people as exceptionally offensive, it’s 
still difficult to explain why these over-the-top expenditures so readily 
exude the distinctive odor of obscenity. After all, the money that’s paid 
to people like Beckham or Washington lobbyists isn’t taken away from 
the rest of us, at least not directly. On the contrary, given how much tax 
people with huge salaries are required to pay, they may create as much 
wealth as they keep for themselves—if they actually pay the taxes, that 
is, or if their tax dodges are worthy charities of the kind to which, say, 
Bill and Melinda Gates contribute. So where does the popular disgust 
come from? If it’s not our money, and it isn’t illegally earned, why do we 
consider it obscene?
 One answer comes from folklore scholar Alan Dundes, who explains 
this phenomenon in relation to the superstition—common in both 
ancient and modern societies—that there is a limited amount of good 
in the world, and therefore gain for one person can come only at the 
expense of another.10 According to this belief, enormous profits in one 
place will be offset by enormous loss elsewhere. We’re each allocated 
our fair share of the world’s good, so if you get lucky, it means some-
body else, somewhere, is getting cheated or short-changed.
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 Dundes argues that the notion of “limited good” also explains the 
common practice of “downplaying” one’s possessions in public: the 
removal of price tags from gifts; customs that forbid eating in front of 
others without inviting them to join in, especially in countries where 
many people are chronically hungry; and all the other social taboos 
against flaunting one’s wealth the way, for example, the Psycho business-
man does. Consider the social injunctions in modern societies against 
asking someone how much he paid for something, or how much she 
earns; alluding to such matters outside a strictly business context 
is socially risky except between the closest friends, and naming spe-
cific figures is considered downright gauche. We’ve all seen movies 
where, even when there’s nobody else around, a person doing business 
doesn’t name a figure but instead jots the number on a piece of paper 
and hands it to the second party, like a magic word that can’t be spo-
ken aloud without breaking the spell. The matters shrouded by such 
strangely secretive customs—the questions that shouldn’t be asked, 
the subjects that shouldn’t be raised, the words that shouldn’t be spo-
ken—reveal, by the very fact of their enshrouding, close connections to 
the bodily functions they represent and intertwine with in the uncon-
scious. Issues related to the toilet and the wallet, we discover early on, 
share two qualities that are conjoined so thoroughly and persistently 
in few other areas of life: They are ubiquitous, integral to every indi-
vidual’s everyday experience, and they are hypersensitive, demanding 
to be approached with scrupulous tact and discretion if they must be 
approached at all. The presence of excrement as an ingredient in many 
love potions, writes philosopher of art Allen S. Weiss, points to a “scato-
logical eroticism, a remnant of primal symbolizations where the poten-
tially dangerous excreta is transformed into a magical good object” 
linked to “powers of potency and omnipotence.”11 As a similarly robust 
aphrodisiac, money partakes of similar magic. No wonder we require 
both of these dynamic forces to hide their prodigious powers behind 
veils of dissimulation and denial.
 A comparable insight comes from Elias Canetti, who provides litera-
ture’s most unyielding description of the intimacy with which money, 
power, and shit are bound together. In the relationship it demands with 
the person who produces it, Canetti writes, “excrement belongs to the 
sphere of power. . . . The constant pressure which, during the whole 
of its long progress through the body, is applied to the prey which has 
become food . . . may very well be seen as the central, if most hidden, 
process of power,” closely linked to the practice of dominating others by 
sucking away their substance with an all-consuming greed for treasure 
and dominance, and then disposing of them “as he does of his excre-
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ment, simply seeing to it that they do not poison the air of his house.”12 
To those whose moral sensibilities or psychic inhibitions constrict the 
exercise and dampen the exhilaration of such power, or withhold free 
access to their allotted share, the forces of this excremental power must 
certainly seem dark, dangerous, obscene.
 It is clear that the superstitions attaching to money and shit, the 
agents of possession and dispossession, retain great implicit power in 
our allegedly enlightened time. And the superstitions most likely to 
have such staying power are those that contain some degree of com-
monly accepted truth. The belief that one person’s comfort comes at 
the hidden expense of others’ suffering is one of these. Any unrecon-
structed Marxist will tell you this, and so will the many conservatives 
who buy into the limited-good hypothesis on selected occasions—not 
when excessive wealth is in question, but when hard-to-measure ide-
ological values such as “freedom” and “liberty” are at stake. Defend-
ing his right-wing view of limited government at his failed confirmation 
hearing for a Supreme Court appointment, for instance, Robert Bork 
asserted that any law providing a freedom for one person or group nec-
essarily subtracts a freedom from some other person or group—a posi-
tion that infuriated less constipated thinkers, who responded with the 
reverse argument that a liberty for one is a liberty for all.
 These are oversimplifications, to be sure; exceptions and hard cases 
abound, since in the diffuse arena of worldly satisfaction magnitudes 
and comparisons must be subjectively felt rather than impartially com-
puted. Yet the limited-good perspective has proven to be an enduring 
aspect of the popular unconscious, partly because it satisfies two bed-
rock psychological traits of the modern and pre-modern subject: the 
(narcissistic) desire to see other people’s excessively or inappropriately 
accrued wealth as an unjust subtraction from the equivalent affluence 
to which we ourselves are rightly entitled, and the (sadomasochistic) 
need to perceive our own limited means as worthy of similar abhor-
rence by those even more deprived than we are. There is a powerful 
and eternal tie between the urge to acquire treasure and the urge to 
keep others away from it, and in this tie we find another echo of Freud’s 
insight that for the developing subject in the sadistic-anal stage of devel-
opment, obediently producing shit “for the sake of . . . someone else” 
is simultaneously a gratifying venture into the social order, grounded in 
the emerging sense of intersubjective exchange, and a bodily sacrifice 
felt as “a prototype of castration,” grounded in the terrors of loss and 
lack.13 It is no wonder that we love money with so much passion and 
fear its effects with so much anxiety.
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 And anxiety over worldly satisfaction does indeed run high, as Anton 
Chekhov eloquently recognizes at the end of “Gooseberries,” a short 
story of 1898: “There ought to be behind the door of every happy, con-
tented man someone standing with a hammer continually reminding 
him with a tap that there are unhappy people; that however happy he 
may be, life will show him her laws sooner or later, trouble will come for 
him—disease, poverty, losses, and no one will see or hear, just as now he 
neither sees nor hears others.”14
The obscenely rich: A demoralized minority
Discomfort with money is deeply rooted. If your parents were shifty or 
ill at ease about money matters, you’ve probably picked up their anxi-
eties, although you may not be consciously aware of it. Even for people 
who don’t normally give money much thought, it’s hard to escape the 
struggle to pick up the check after dinner in a restaurant, or the dif-
ficulties involved in buying gifts, or the discomfort that arises when a 
homeless person gets on your subway car and starts asking for money. 
Hardly anyone is immune, and the very rich are perhaps less immune 
than others.
 Yes, as surprising as it may seem, we must pity the poor zillionaire. 
According to psychiatrist Peter A. Olsson, M.D., in an article called 
“Complexities in the Psychology and Psychotherapy of the Phenome-
nally Wealthy,” those who are rolling in it suffer from the same levels 
of misery, angst, and depression as everyone else, and, in addition, they 
may find themselves beset by special problems of the filthy rich. Olsson 
explains how money, which easily translates into recognition, power, 
and entitlement, can often cause sensations of loneliness, entrapment, 
and isolation, as well as various neuroses—sociopathy, extreme narcis-
sism, impaired identity formation, inner isolation, and others—plus 
weakened family structure and feelings of severe inadequacy.15 Those 
who have made large fortunes through their own efforts may become 
addicted to a cycle of intense work, huge paychecks, high social status, 
and compulsive spending, with the downside of self-destructive behav-
ior, immoderate vanity, and problems maintaining relationships. As for 
those who acquired extreme wealth by being born into it, psychologist 
Stephen Goldbart—cofounder of the Money, Meaning & Choices Insti-
tute—has found that they often need therapeutic help in coping with 
“the emotional complexities of having money” and negotiating the diffi-
cult transition “from emotional bankruptcy to emotional richness.” Sim-
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ilar observations were made by John Sedgwick, who wrote in his 1985 
book Rich Kids: America’s Young Heirs and Heiresses, How They Love and 
Hate Their Money, that those who inherit great wealth may have feelings 
of guilt “more severe, and more permanent” than those of many actual 
criminals, who at least 
have something to confess. They can receive forgiveness, they can 
reform, they can put the sins behind them. But rich kids start to feel 
they are the sin themselves, and every crime that was ever committed 
now hangs on their heads. They see the inequity that lies about them, 
or read about it . . . and they think they are responsible for it. Because 
they are on top, they must be squashing those on the bottom. This is the 
true embarrassment of riches.16
Not every filthy-rich person is afflicted by psychological pains, to be 
sure, but the wealth-management industry has built a profitable side-
line dedicated to helping the unlucky ones whose advantages are disad-
vantages, producing powerful guilt feelings and a consequent need to 
do penance, to suffer, and to hide their wealth from others, even from 
themselves.
 For a high-profile instance of too much money inducing a sense 
of self-disgust, consider the case of Tom Monaghan, who built Domi-
no’s Pizza into a source of astonishing personal wealth. Monaghan is 
very religious, spending (or squandering) large quantities of money on 
ambitious projects related to the conservative Roman Catholicism in 
which he believes. In the early 1990s he radically reordered his pri-
orities, according to New Yorker writer Peter J. Boyer, after a sudden, 
blinding realization that by accumulating great riches he had been 
indulging the sin of pride.17 The very next day he began selling his 
earthly treasures—the house, the helicopter, the jet, the private island, 
the Detroit Tigers—many of them at a staggering loss. He subsequently 
sold Domino’s for a cool $1 billion and consecrated all of his resources 
to church-related philanthropy, declaring, “I want to die broke.” What 
interests us is neither the proximate cause nor the eventual outcome 
of Monaghan’s life-changing decision, but rather the abruptness of its 
advent—he received his flash of insight, swore what he called a “mil-
lionaire’s vow of poverty” in bed that very night, and began parting 
with his worldly goods the next morning—and the thoroughness with 
which he followed through on it; no loss was too immense to tolerate 
as long as the sale took place immediately and irrevocably. We diagnose 
this as a drastic case of Pecunia Olet, the filthy lucre disease, wherein 
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the stench of obscene wealth grows so intensely nauseating to its owner 
that the impulse to purge it, regurgitate it, shit and piss it out becomes 
irresistible.
 All of this said, Monaghan greatly enjoyed his years of wheeling and 
dealing, and he maintains a hands-on approach to his philanthropic 
endeavors. For him, as for most modern citizens, the accumulation and 
disposal of money—the first phase already accomplished in Monaghan’s 
case, the second in progress for the foreseeable future—has become the 
standard way to measure a successful life, outstripping such traditional 
achievements as enjoying leisure, pursuing wisdom, and engaging in 
creative work outside the business world. As a result, financial success 
has become so confused with personal and psychological well-being that 
it’s almost impossible to have wealth without feeling emotional conflict. 
(We grant, however, that Monaghan’s wealth-generated anxieties may 
be tempered by his expectation of the ultimate golden parachute, a fast 
track to heaven after he shuffles off his gilded mortal coil.)
 Those of us who lack excessive wealth may claim indifference toward 
those who have it, but most of us are envious as well as resentful; we 
indulge in unapologetic bias against the super-rich as a matter of princi-
ple, just as we sentimentalize those who claim to spurn money—starving 
artists, selfless humanitarians, and the like—and are jolted when they 
prove to be as vulnerable to money-related misery as the rest of us. Ols-
son presents research to demonstrate that the “phenomenally wealthy” 
are a dispirited minority, suffering the same problems as any other 
downtrodden group; yet it’s hard not to find this claim ridiculous—a 
myth propagated by the rich, perhaps, to cheer up the rest of us and 
get us off their case. Merely to discuss the problems of the rich seems 
trivial, even ridiculous, compared to facing the problems of those dis-
criminated against because of, say, race or poverty or sexuality. There’s 
not much you can do about the color of your skin or the burden of your 
caste, but nobody ever had trouble getting rid of cash. After all, you 
can’t take it with you.
 Or can you?
Taking it with you
Money works because we all tacitly consent that it should; outside the 
boundaries of a given social system, that system’s financial structures 
seem curious if not nonsensical. Yet money is everywhere, in one form 
or another, and systems that don’t use “real” money develop their own 
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currencies—think of communes, prisons, casinos, the board game 
Monopoly, the Internet game Second Life—that can in some cases be 
exchanged for “real” money. Money is so taken for granted that we eas-
ily forget it’s only a signifier, a substitute, a representation. Money is 
the ultimate symbol, both everything and nothing, and this semiotically 
unstable entity, which doesn’t even have to take a tangible form, can be 
the difference between life and death.
 In his book Escape from Evil, cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker 
argues that, although we rarely acknowledge the fact, money has come 
to serve the ritual function of religion. Money is the most natural of 
gods; our belief in it, our conformity to its standards, simply goes with-
out saying. If you don’t conform to its laws, you will be severely pun-
ished, perhaps even executed; but if you accept its power, you can 
achieve eternal life, or a reasonable facsimile thereof. The capacity to 
transcend death, in fact, is the ultimate power that money shares with 
other gods. Monaghan the pizza king may be on to something after all.
 Throughout history, Becker declares, humans have used and dis-
carded “immortality symbols,” representations of cosmic power and 
divinity.18 Coins are physical mementos of these imagoes, or idealized 
mental images; the circular coin, for instance, represents the crown, 
the halo, and the orbs of sun and moon; banknotes bear the images of 
kings, presidents, and other heroes.19 This indicates the profound role 
played by money rituals in our attempts to shore up defenses against 
the fear, helplessness, and dependency that terrify us in facing the 
inevitability of death. As philosopher Norman O. Brown wrote, “accu-
mulations of stone and gold make possible the discovery of the immor-
tal soul. . . . Death is overcome on condition that the real actuality of 
life pass into these immortal and dead things; money is the man; the 
immortality of an estate or a corporation resides in the dead things 
which alone endure.”20
 Today’s immortality symbols take a more abstract form than gold 
under the floorboards or moneybags in the safe; now they take the 
form of wills, estates, memorials, and legacies. The psychoanalyst Otto 
Rank argued that religions, morals, customs, and laws represent limits 
we set on ourselves so we can transcend our human condition—deny-
ing life in order to get more life, to make ourselves immortal.21 In this 
context, money represents sacrifice. The source of the English word 
“gold” is the Old German word “geld,” which means “sacrifice” and is 
related, along with words like “gild” and “gilt,” to the word “guilt.” Until 
recently, banks were built to resemble sacrificial temples. Now, also like 
churches, they can take any form as long as they appear serious, safe, 
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and generic; yet their unconscious links to the masochistic pleasure of 
sacrifice and the existential dread of castration remain in place. Accord-
ingly, the presence of all that money requires a respectful hush; you 
don’t sit and chat in a bank, you wait silently in a quiet, orderly line for 
your brief moment face to face with the keeper of the cash. The higher 
you go up the chain of money, the more formal its emissaries appear, 
from the humble teller to the notary, accountant, stockbroker, financial 
planner, estate lawyer, and so on to the investment bankers dubbed by 
Tom Wolfe, in The Bonfire of the Vanities, the “Masters of the Universe.”22
 Weiss argues that the sign of excrement is threatening to cultural 
formations in two ways: because it “signifies a pure, wasteful expendi-
ture, circumventing societal modes and organizations of production,” 
and because it is “a sign of self-production, an autonomous, sovereign 
productivity” that springs from the individual body rather than the 
communal law.23 Banks and their votaries are society’s psychic defenses, 
shrines to the denial of the body and to the cultural order threatened 
by its lawless and autonomous bowels. They enforce what philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek calls “the mad-obscene law” that “derails the psychic equi-
librium” by ordering a painful, impossible enjoyment beyond the plea-
sure principle.24 Their most intimidating emblem is the mad-obscene 
quantity of treasure that they jealously guard in all our names, at once 
symbolizing and staving off the excremental anarchy that feeds the rev-
eries and nightmares of our hidden, unacknowledged selves.
The potlatch of modernity
A capitalist economy is sustained by a limitless consumption of goods, 
services, materials, and machines that often have little or no clear rela-
tionship to utility or need. A daunting proportion of such economies’ 
resources is dedicated to the production and marketing of commodi-
ties that are, in the wry phraseology of Percival and Paul Goodman, not, 
perhaps, absolutely necessary. Transactions involving obscene quantities 
of money are vital to these economies because of the wealth they put 
into circulation. When markets are flourishing, no one questions these 
excesses—they seem a natural part of things, a kind of private flatu-
lence that doesn’t smell bad to the one who produces it. But as mar-
ket economics reach their peak effectiveness, the flood of gargantuan 
transactions can start to seem obscene, disgusting, as if the flatulence 
is suddenly coming from someone else. Consumption for the sake of 
consumption, and market strategies aimed exclusively at fueling that 
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consumption, take on a sinful and polluted air, at least for those not 
directly profiting from the excessiveness. Furors are kicked up over 
CEO salaries, golden parachutes, and termination packages that exceed 
the gross domestic product of many small nations. Prices may even fall. 
But in economies driven by such intemperance, the invariable result is 
another fresh start to the same old cycle. Money and its magic continue 
to reign, and the stench of obscenity still wafts over the land, assaulting 
our bodies, minds, and spirits even as we spasmodically pretend the shit 
doesn’t stink. Canetti again:
Excrement . . . is loaded with our whole blood guilt. By it we know 
what we have murdered. It is the compressed sum of all the evidence 
against us. It is our daily and continuing sin and, as such, it stinks and 
cries to heaven. It is remarkable how we isolate ourselves with it; in spe-
cial rooms, set aside for the purpose, we get rid of it; our most private 
moment is when we withdraw there; we are alone only with our excre-
ment. It is clear that we are ashamed of it. It is the age-old seal of that 
power-process of digestion, which is enacted in darkness and which, 
without this, would remain hidden forever.25
We conclude that excessive consumption is the potlatch of modernity. 
It is our ritual destruction of goods, and the super-rich are our cultural 
scapegoats; we mock their misery and refuse to believe in their pain. 
Yet we feel deep down that they’re suffering for our sake, consecrating 
their lives to the production, distribution, and marketing of things we 
don’t really need but cannot live without. More precisely, we can live 
without them–without soft drinks, say, or flat-screen TVs, or gas-guz-
zling cars—but we’re afraid to try, partly from habit (the marketer’s best 
friend) and partly from a fear that the end of consumer culture would be 
the end of culture itself, at least in the forms we know and love.
 So we keep consuming what we want rather than what we need; we 
keep enriching tycoons, moguls, and CEOs who are already richer than 
we could dream of being; we keep worshiping the dead presidents in 
our wallets. And all the while we detect the growing stench of lucre 
that’s filthy, rich who are stinking, wealth that’s ineffably but unmistak-
ably obscene. When money becomes de trop, in Sartre’s existential sense, 
its all-powerful excess can no longer be flushed, purged, vomited, or 
wiped away. It is the transhistorical human stain. Vespasian was wrong. 
Pecunia olet.
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I.
In pondering pornography one navigates between the political imper-
ative of free expression and the moral hazard of degradation. The 
default positions in the debate are predictable—if you are an enemy of 
censorship you are expected to tolerate pornography, and if you are an 
enemy of pornography you are expected to tolerate censorship, but nei-
ther one does full justice to the options. There is a position that would 
favor both censorship and pornography: this might be something like 
Orwell’s 1984, where the pornography is mostly violent, or the ideology 
of the proto-Nazi soldiers of the 1920s Freikorps analyzed so terrifyingly 
in Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies, where the pornography is both sex-
ual and violent.1 Censorship and pornography can both serve as means 
of repressive mobilization—the first by denial and the second by intoxi-
cation—in militarized or fascist regimes. One could also oppose both 
censorship and pornography. This is the position I will explore. We are 
too hasty to judge, the state is too clumsy, the fact of human plurality is 
too deep, and the insult to democratic equality is too noxious to have 
censors. On the other hand, sex is too important, the imagination is too 
fertile a soil, the wonders of embodiment are too great, and loyalty and 
love are gifts too rare to let our eyes and hearts go wandering off after 
pictures (and other media) of disembedded eros.2
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II.
Pornography is not the same as obscenity. Obscenity is built into the 
human condition. “All humans are mortal” is a statement so basic that 
it has always served as the first premise of a valid syllogism. As so often 
in philosophy, the statement marries two modes that otherwise resist 
each other’s company: the logical and the existential. Since when were 
we reasonable about mortality? Why is something so basic to our exis-
tence so baffling? Contrary to popular opinion, the more elementary a 
concept is the harder it is to grasp. It is probably easier for a mathema-
tician to define a “p-adic group” than a number. Biologists can tell you 
all about the Krebs cycle, but “life” itself, the center of their discipline, 
remains forever imprecise. Poets can tell a trochee from a spondee, but 
not what poetry is. Precision prevails in advanced studies, not basic ones. 
The fact that we are mortal animals may be our most difficult study.
 The intellectual climate around this fact seems perpetually foggy. 
For philosophical edification, we need to remember that we are mor-
tal; for everyday functioning, we need to be able to forget it. Human-
kind cannot bear very much reality. We are irreparably touchy about 
birth, copulation, and death. Our bodies are gorgeous and icky, sacred 
and profane at the same time. Nudity, sex, and excretion are utterly 
ordinary but can seem perfectly scandalous. Obscenity, the transgres-
sive interruption of the flesh into our midst, is always at least potentially 
a salutary call to conscience. Whatever else it is, obscenity is offensive, 
and sometimes offenses must come. Pornography, on the other hand, 
is the coordinated production and dissemination of sexually explicit 
media, especially word or picture, for the sake of arousal and profit. All 
cultures have obscenity, but not all have pornography. Obscenity comes 
from bodily givens; pornography from media choices.
 Friends of free expression sometimes imagine an offense-free realm 
in which nobody would any longer be offended by obscenity and four-
letter words could pal around with their respectable synonyms. They 
exhort people to grow up and face facts, as if the capacity for shocked 
perplexity about generation and corruption could once and for all be 
overcome. This is the utopia of liberal free-speech theory, and it would 
be fit only for angels. “To the pure all things are pure” is a Pauline dic-
tum that defenders of free sexual expression are wont to quote, but 
humans do not manage purity very well—the part of Paul’s teaching 
that liberals are wont to ignore. (They also typically ignore his idea 
that voluntary modulation of our liberty can be a way of loving one’s 
neighbor.) No mortal is beyond offense. Everyone will find something 
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obscene—depictions of bodies, images of torture and abuse, a burn-
ing cross, the faces of malicious men or the size of military budgets. 
Offense is built into the human estate. To be alive and embodied is to 
be offendable. It is not something we will ever grow out of. We would 
lose something dear if offense were no longer a capacity. Our mortal 
embodiment means that obscenity will be a perennial nettle to grasp.
III.
Liberalism provides indispensable arguments for freedom, but it tends 
to stack the rhetorical deck against a thoughtful analysis of the bounds 
of carnal representation. Its anti-censorship discourse and the more 
general sense that limiting pornography is the same as putting women 
back on the pedestal and gays and lesbians back in the closet give pause. 
Pornography for some theorists stands in, part for whole, for emancipa-
tion.3 Questioning porn can feel like questioning freedom.
 Some of the rhetorical complexities can be seen in two contrasting 
books on obscenity in the United States. Marjorie Heins’s Not in Front 
of the Children (2001) tells a story of unfolding openness and honesty 
about sexuality that leaves behind a long train of unfounded alarms 
about interracial marriage, sex education, birth control, etc. She shows 
how elastic the domain of erotic panic is and how topics now consid-
ered worthy of public discussion were once stigmatized as dangerous 
and indecent. Heins has a deadpan gift for assembling a rogue’s gal-
lery of tremulous quiverers before sexual threats. She makes it hard 
to imagine any other story than her own. The reader sits at the end of 
a long process of clarification and growing yet precarious reasonable-
ness. Doubt her vindication of the pioneers of openness and you risk 
denying several incontestable achievements. Few people today think 
that we should not discuss breast cancer, AIDS, or teenage sexuality, or 
keep Ulysses or Lady Chatterley’s Lover off the shelves. Her point is that 
the wheat of public enlightenment and the tares of explicit expression 
grow together. Pull up the tares, and you risk uprooting the wheat as 
well. Sex has no catastrophic moral, aesthetic, or spiritual meaning for 
Heins: it is a manageable topic of public debate.
 Rochelle Gurstein’s The Repeal of Reticence (1996) covers much of the 
same ground as Heins but from a very different point of view. Rather 
than emancipation we have loss. Her plaint is our growing inability to 
“speak the old poetic languages of love, for now they sound evasive, sen-
timental, platitudinous or naïve.” The cult of frankness makes impos-
sible a common world in which delicate discriminations about matters 
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of public taste would make sense.4 Gurstein has more of an uphill fight 
than Heins (even though children are often the sticking point in cen-
sorship debates). Gurstein knows full well that the direction of modern 
culture works against her, that the genie can’t be put back in the bottle, 
and that calls for reticence risk being mocked as head-in-the-sand pho-
bia. Nonetheless she gamely tries to paint modernity as the tearing away 
of the veil from something sacred, the violation of a mystery. In con-
trast to a liberal politics of clashing opinion and uninhibited debate, 
she roughly follows Hannah Arendt’s politics of agonistic aesthetic per-
formance in which some realms necessarily remain in obscurity—sex, 
life, labor, the household. The Heideggerian principle that truth shines 
forth most truly when it is most concealed has always been a hard sell in 
liberal climes, which tend to view concealment as cover-up.
 Though liberal vindication has easier rhetorical work than conser-
vative hesitation, the confrontation between what both Gurstein and 
Heins call “the party of exposure” and “the party of reticence” is not 
an easy thing to sort out. Which maxim should we follow—“Sunlight 
is the best disinfectant” or “all sunshine makes a desert?” Which do 
we want, Enlightenment or Romance, the wisdom of experience or the 
bloom of innocence? Which is worse, a stifled idea or a world in which 
nothing is sacred? It is a real conflict of values. The problems of con-
servative reticence are obvious—nostalgia, impracticality, and potential 
oppression. But liberal glasnost has problems as well—moral and meta-
physical shallowness. No one seriously denies that representations of 
human things deserve the greatest care, but liberal thought has devel-
oped few resources to guide a policy of caution. Its absolute ban on cen-
sorship can be a political bull in an ethical china shop. We should take 
unrestricted free expression as one competing—and precious—value 
among many others, but not as an absolute. Insisting on one virtue at 
the expense of other virtues is sophomoric. The tragic fact, as the great 
Isaiah Berlin taught, and whose liberalism was unusually full of salutary 
murk and depth, is that many goods and values compete for attention 
and allegiance, and defy any final reconciliation. It is because all val-
ues never fully harmonize that we need free speech. But we should not 
think that free speech is a meta-value above all others; it is battling with 
all the rest.
IV.
What liberalism does understand well is that offense cannot provide the 
basis for a reasonable ethics. In time, offense looks ridiculous and reac-
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tionary. Later generations are puzzled by what all the fuss was about. 
Were Elvis’s hips really so suggestive? (Yes.) Once an idea, text, or work 
of art has become public, no one can stuff it back into the private 
sphere. Les jeux sont faits. It becomes part of the common world, some-
thing we can’t imagine ever having not existed. That offense is not an 
ethically sustainable program arms the liberal historian like Heins with 
a ready-made triumphal narrative.
 A compelling version of the liberal attack against offense has been 
given by Martha Nussbaum. Her criticism of disgust and qualified 
defense of anger provides a vision of the liberal emotional order. Anger, 
she argues, would be impossible without a sense of justice. It is tied 
to our sense of right and wrong. Indignation for her can change the 
world in a way that disgust never can. A world without outrage would 
be deprived of justice (or else would have to be an improbable utopia 
in which we would have no reason ever to be angry). It is a gamble, of 
course, to hitch the liberal wagon to anger, as she well knows. The wrath 
of Achilles made an awful mess out of things. But at least anger has a 
potentially rational core; it could meet the Kantian maxim of generaliz-
ability in the sense that there are some things that you could wish every-
one would be angry about (the abuse of children, for instance). Disgust, 
in contrast, she finds suspicious as an ethical-political guide for several 
reasons: its cognitive content is unreliable, it involves magical thinking, 
and it is a denial of the fluid basis of our common mortality. With dis-
gust we hide from humanity (in the sense of mortal embodiment); with 
anger we potentially fight for it (in the sense of ethical solidarity). More 
importantly, disgust usually involves veiled social distinctions and hier-
archies. Disgusts about food, smell, or bodily fluids are often visceral 
renderings of anxieties about people who are different from us. Used 
as a basis of social and legal policy, disgust risks enshrining forms of 
oppression and abuse. Disgust cannot withstand the Kantian test of uni-
versalizability: we cannot wish that everyone would be disgusted by, say, 
homosexuality or the eating of pork without excluding some portion of 
the human species. Disgust defies an ultimate rational filter.5
 In claiming the moral superiority of outrage Nussbaum lets another 
emotion in through the back door—pride, the Achilles’ heel of liberalism.
 Consider the social psychology of self-justification. “Attribution 
error” is the tendency to interpret our own behavior as motivated by 
reason and circumstance and other people’s behavior as motivated by 
disposition and will. Since we know our own minds better than those 
of others, we tend to cut ourselves a certain explanatory slack. If I cut 
someone off in traffic, it is because I am late to work or upset about a 
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sick child; if someone cuts me off, it is because they are rude or incon-
siderate. I perceive my own behavior as governed by the fluidity of con-
text and that of other people as governed by the rigidity of character. 
We interpret our own conduct situationally and other people’s conduct 
dispositionally. I was late; he is a jerk.6
 This analysis of the way we provide ourselves ethical discounts illu-
minates the dynamics of offense. Offenders rarely think themselves 
offenders. Offense is more often taken than given. It is more generally 
a matter of reception than intention, more often attributed than perpe-
trated. This means that when Peter takes offense from Paul, Peter may 
feel justified in giving it back. Paul, not recognizing that he offended 
Peter, is now in precisely the same position as Peter just was: respond-
ing to an unprovoked assault. An offense is almost always a felt response 
to another’s offense. Since offenders think they are only acting in self-
defense, a vicious cycle of retaliation can start. Violence is usually a 
strike against the violence of the other.7 Few people admit to unmoti-
vated aggression. Motives for self-defense are as psychologically plen-
tiful as huckleberries. As anyone who has ever broken up a squabble 
among children knows, no one ever started a conflict: it was always the 
other. Those who fight violence often do violence themselves.
V.
There is both an ethics and an epistemology here that feeds liberal 
thought richly. The ethics is that recognition of our own fallibility 
should motivate us to respond to offenses by self-critically examining 
our premises and seeking to understand the thought we hate. The epis-
temology is similar: that our cognitive self-surety blinds us to learning 
opportunities. Instead of getting mad at ideas we find infuriating, we 
should undergo the education of learning to think with the enemy. 
Free speech is thus designed to humble the ego’s claim to think itself 
always right.
 Liberalism often fails to extend this analysis to its own analysis. It 
does not imagine that anyone could reasonably entertain a vision of 
the public sphere that is not of agonistic debate or a vision of the self 
that does not take joy in self-criticism. So it ends up creating a zone of 
immunity for itself in which it denies any other worldview. Thus Flem-
ming Rose, the Danish newspaper editor, was offended by what he saw 
as a chilling effect exerted by Islam on public expression, so he com-
missioned and published cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammad 
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in response. He thought he was righting an offense against free speech. 
Though no one could have envisioned the chain of escalating cause 
and effect that led to riots, boycotts, and killings around the world, 
Rose saw himself as standing up to a bully. He did not consider himself 
an aggressor; he was giving as good as he got. Censorship, as every lib-
eral knows, is a form of class privilege (claiming a right for the censor 
that is denied to others, that of access to materials). But denouncing 
censorship is also a form of class privilege. (To advocate free speech 
is often an offensive act.) The chorus celebrating free expression dur-
ing the cartoon controversy by some but not all Europeans and North 
Americans was more than a hymn to liberty: it was a bid for civilizational 
supremacy. Free expression symbolically separated enlightened Europe 
from benighted Islam.8
 There can be a kind of imperial privilege and luxury in advertising 
the fortitude of one’s toleration or the intensity of one’s commitment 
to liberty. Opposing censorship is not a simple virtuous act; it is a sei-
zure of the prime ethical real estate in the public sphere. There is a 
theatrical side to denouncing censorship. Liberals like to think of them-
selves as the neutral arbiters of public debate, but they are adherents 
to a “fighting creed,” as Charles Taylor says.9 Their questioning of all 
monopolies rarely extends to their monopoly right to manage the pub-
lic sphere. Campaigns against censorship can be a kind of moral bully-
ing (crusades might be the correct term in the Danish case).10
 One lesson from the Danish cartoon controversy is that taking 
offense about the other’s offense is a form of engagement, not a neutral 
spectatorial act. Rose’s way of being offended offended others. Offense 
is not the same as disgust, of course, but absolutist free-speech advo-
cates are too quick to see taking offense as something that only the 
others do. Liberals dislike the low-rent offense of disgust and prefer its 
high-rent sibling, indignation. The art of taking offense can be a luxuri-
ous repertoire of moral gestures that is just as available to the liberally 
educated as to the unlettered. In taking offense we can accuse, show 
off our delicacy, and shame the coarse for their brutishness or the luke-
warm for their insufficient zeal. Indignation can be a kind of blackmail: 
sign the petition or be complicit with evil.
 Moreover, few things are quite as delicious as the feeling of being 
offended. Though her tone is more even-handed than some of her col-
leagues in the ACLU, Heins engages in a common rhetorical strategy of 
ticking off outrages against free speech in order to gather righteousness 
for her side. Taking offense is contagious; it is always tempting to jump 
on the bandwagon of indignation. By being scandalized by obscenity 
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I show that I am not a pervert; by being scandalized by people scan-
dalized by obscenity, I show that I am not a prude. Not only does it 
feel good to be offended; it can also look good. Indignation is one of 
the most manipulable of emotions—perhaps because it plays less to our 
appetites than to our sense of ourselves as righteous and reasonable. 
We can cherish our grudges like household pets; the same with our 
indignations. Being wronged suggests we are right. Being a victim can 
supply a purity and innocence. (The moral of the history of American 
military intervention might be: beware of outraged innocents, especially 
if they have big guns.11) The liberal offense at people who are offended 
by obscenity can be a form of class warfare. Both sides consider them-
selves innocent—a failsafe recipe for escalating conflict. What Pascal 
and Rousseau called amour-propre can cause as much mischief as disgust 
or lust.
 Indignation may be a virtue in some contexts, but free-speech advo-
cacy has few checks against the tendency to invidious self-justification. 
Nussbaum’s limited endorsement of anger does nothing to discour-
age the moral tyranny of a righteous cause. Liberal outrage about the 
outrage of the other is its own form of outrage. Liberalism’s claim to 
occupy the high ground can unwittingly undermine its epistemology of 
fallibility and ethic of maximizing learning opportunities.
VI.
Take a lesson from Marx. Who, he asked in one of his moments of black 
humor, is the most productive worker in capitalism? The criminal, of 
course. Not only do criminals exemplify the basic modus operandi of 
the system, that of unlawful acquisition, but they also sustain a web of 
other workers such as professors of criminal law, constables, judges, and 
hangmen; they give rise to art, novels, and plays; and they keep bour-
geois society refreshed from its monotony.12 I am not aware that any 
Marxist scholar has exploited this fruitful insight for the culture indus-
tries in general.13 As a media genre, scandal has been the lifeblood of 
the popular press since the early nineteenth century. The history of 
modern art, cinema, literature, and music is a history of enormously 
productive scandals, from Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring to Damien Hirst’s 
plasticized sheep. Many an artistic career has been made on succès de 
scandale, and liberal defenses of free expression depend on the trans-
gressive vitality of deviant figures to stir things up: “abyss-artists,” as I 
call them.14 But scandal is a highly conservative genre. It does not criti-
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cize social norms: in exposing people for violating them it presupposes 
and thereby reinforces them.15 Marx’s point was that the criminal sustains 
bourgeois order.
 Liberalism loves tropes of illumination, but it tends to see light 
as exposure and not as transformation. Its modus operandi of expos-
ing the hidden is structurally identical with obscenity. Liberalism, as a 
boundary-buster of public and private, is obscene. The public sphere 
has something to do with the pubic sphere, as the typos of my students 
regularly have it. Of course we can be grateful to the journalism of 
outrage for exposing institutional wrongdoing, and more generally 
to the acids of enlightenment for unmasking illusions.16 But it is itself 
obscene—in the sense of an offense against human solidarity—to see 
our carnal ordinariness as scandalous. Failure to distinguish political 
from ethical exposé fuels the pornographic itch. To publicize is to put 
into circulation, and the light of the public gaze changes the nature of 
some things. As Arendt said: “The heart knows . . . that what was straight 
when it was hidden must appear crooked when it is displayed.”17 How-
ever noble your motives might feel inside, once you explain them they 
become self-serving. The simple fact of staging them before others 
corrupts them. The public is the realm of third parties, and everyone 
knows that being watched or overheard can change everything. No soul 
can be entirely “out.” No mind or heart could bear full publication. The 
menu of media scandal consists of ordinary vices magnified by publicity: 
vanity, pettiness, lust, gluttony, or hypocrisy. Many dreams and desires 
are made tawdry by being uttered. Inside, they are fond and silly wishes; 
in public they are porn and crime. Publication can make human ordi-
nariness monstrous. (The promise of the reality TV genre is to make 
ordinary people just as scandalous as celebrities.) The fog of privacy 
keeps us lovable. The attraction and moral deficit of scandal reporting 
is its flattery that we are only spectators and not participants in the fas-
cinating flaws it uncovers.
 Scandal and liberalism share the angelic position: the delusion that 
we could be exempt from the claims of the flesh. There is a conta-
gion of prurience even in the most academic or legalistic discussions 
of free sexual expression. Any word with a potential double entendre 
will quickly embrace it; inadvertent puns sprout like toadstools. There 
is no safe metalanguage for discussing obscenity. Quotation marks, as 
a purification ritual, only displace the fact that you are still choosing 
to use the words. Description is already participation. The upright Ken 
Starr, the U.S. Solicitor General who wrote the report on the Clinton– 
Lewinsky affair, thought himself an investigator, but he also was an 
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inadvertent pornographer.18 He was certainly no liberal politically, but 
he banked on the notion that the analyst could eke out some kind of 
immunity. Lenny Bruce sardonically noted how zealously the judge and 
prosecutor repeated the ten-letter word that they were trying him for 
having uttered in public.19 There is no exemption from human things. 
The censor is exactly the same type of creature as the transgressor, a 
sexual fleshy being prone to obscenity. Mercy is a better response to 
revelation than scandal.
 Scandal involves the revelation of what we always knew anyway. It is 
an ever-renewable fountain. All of us are just one “wardrobe malfunc-
tion” away from indecent exposure. Obscenity is a perpetually available 
human resource. In the temple, things are sacred; outside the very same 
things are profane (from the Latin pro fanum, in front of the temple). 
Obscenity consists in desecrated boundaries; the barrier between purity 
and danger is sometimes a see-through garment. Sexologist Havelock 
Ellis seems to have afflicted us with the ineradicable notion that obscene 
means off-the-scene or off stage, scaena (stage) being his supposed Latin 
root.20 Justice Warren Burger traced obscene to the Latin caenum (filth).21 
The evidence for either etymology is thin. Indeed, the historical attesta-
tion of the word is as obscure as the attestation of the thing. The history 
of the word is vague and messy because evasion might be obscenity’s 
defining mark as much as any particular content. The subtitle to Lud-
wig Marcuse’s fine book on obscenity could well be translated as “the 
history of an exasperation.”
 Obscenity is one of the oldest things around, and yet it always man-
ages to feel fresh. Marcuse quotes a definition of obscenity from 1688 
that in some ways seems just as relevant today: “clearly lewd discourses 
[that] speak impudently of sex organs or paint the acts of debauched 
and impure people in such a way that chaste and tender ears shrink 
from them in fright.”22 The summits of lascivious depiction were surely 
reached millennia ago. And yet obscenity always seems to push the lat-
est envelope of taboo. What, ask the shocked by-standers, will they think 
of next? Like the second law of thermodynamics, modernity seems to 
run in only one direction: ever-increasing degradation. One study of 
trends in risqué TV advertising was headlined, “By 2046 they will all be 
naked.” Of course that omega-point will never be reached, since cover-
ing and its modulation maintain the perennial allure of the body. Both 
culture industries and the avant-garde promote a rhetoric of the next 
step, although both are fashion systems based more on recycling than 
conquering frontiers. Obscenity is evergreen.
 The truly liberal response might be not only never to be shocked by 
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obscenity, but also never to be shocked by the endless ability of obscen-
ity to shock. We all have bodies. They produce splendid ooze. Covering 
them is as important as uncovering them. They will always be unman-
ageably uncanny. Only the gods would know nothing obscene.
VII.
Humans are creatures who live both in the light of day and in the 
shadow of night. Exposure can undeniably be a path to progressive 
social reform, but there is a dialectic of enlightenment to be consid-
ered. I allude, of course, to one of the great and strange books of 
the twentieth century, Dialektik der Aufklärung, a series of philosoph-
ical-historical fragments dictated by the German-Jewish philosophers 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their Santa Monica “exile” 
in 1944. In contrast to liberal thought, they do not take Enlighten-
ment as an unalloyed good thing. We moderns pay for our reason-
ableness with an inner hardening, a routinization of suffering in the 
self that justifies administering it to others, and a diffuse stoicism that 
impedes connection with otherness, intoxication or even faith. Reason 
disenchants the world, saving us from demons and charlatans, but dis-
enchantment has violent side effects, demonizing those others (such 
as women, Jews, and animals) who lack a berth on the S.S. Enlighten-
ment. Odysseus is Horkheimer and Adorno’s—rather preposterous—
image of the bourgeois subject, tied to the mast of the ship listening 
to the sirens sing while the slave rowers grunt below. Odysseus neuters 
the sirens’ song of all that is begotten, born, or dies. His resource-
ful sublimation gives him power over the prehistoric world of sound 
and women, over the slaves, and over himself. Ascetic reason frees the 
bourgeoisie from the bonds of myth but steers it into the doldrums of 
disillusionment. And enlightenment does its most ambiguous work in 
the sexual domain, reducing fond or foolish reverie into physical acts 
and organs. Sade, as they note, is the zenith of sexual enlightenment.23 
Like most high modernists, Horkheimer and Adorno adored sex and 
despised pornography—quite as they adored Beethoven and the bur-
lesque, and hated jazz and Hollywood. Sublimation was great and so 
was desublimation, but the perpetual sugar tease of mass culture was 
sickening.
 They floated the idea of a Bilderverbot, or ban on images.24 This 
notion, which stems from the second of the ten Mosaic commandments 
and finds iconoclastic strains in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, became 
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important later in critical theory as a way to ponder the limits of rep-
resentation in depicting the Shoah or Holocaust. The obscene thing 
would be trying to represent what happened at Auschwitz at all. Obvi-
ously, such cautions are not forms of censorship or suppression, but are 
sensitive to the formal metamorphosis, transfiguration or even redemp-
tion that artistic rendering can impose.25 Publication can change ontol-
ogy. Form matters. The specificities of mediation and communication 
are not mere packing material. A rhetoric of reticence builds a “zone 
of silence” around the mystery of personhood—the same mystery that 
Nazism violated.26 Explicitness can impoverish. Michel Foucault’s Disci-
pline and Punish is an update of Dialectic of Enlightenment in this respect: 
both books anatomize liberal humanism, ask how oppressive the gaze 
can be, and cast doubts on the policy of always leaving the lights on. 
“Visibility is a trap,” in Foucault’s famous but rarely heeded words. A 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind might let us extend the 
courtesy of circumspection to sex as well as violence. Foucault found 
nothing liberating in the modern obsessive chattiness about sex. Mush-
rooms grow in the dark. Voluptuaries have as much to fear from por-
nography as do prudes.27
VIII.
The theory of free expression was born twins with the printing press. 
Literate adults were the assumed audience for the public sphere—Mill 
in On Liberty excluded children and “barbarians” from public debate 
without batting an eye. What is liberalism supposed to do with images, 
sounds, and the Internet? How is the philosophy of free expression to 
respond to the waning of critical literacy as the normative cognitive 
mode for citizens? The question, to be sure, is not completely one of 
media forms per se. A world of digital pictures and sounds is not inher-
ently any wilder than one of gossip, song, and print. Eighteenth-century 
Paris, as we know from Robert Darnton, had a vibrant and often scurri-
lous multi-media system in which rumor and gossip, especially about the 
royal court, circulated by word-of-mouth rumor, song and manuscript, 
pamphlets and books. Indeed, Enlightenment Paris is one birthplace of 
modern pornography, which was at first a genre of aristocratic intrigues 
and political critique.28 The twenty-first century has no monopoly on 
communication out of control.
 And yet an analysis of the materialities of communication should 
inform any responsible theory of free speech. The mainstreaming of 
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pornography is one of the great stories of our time. Its recent rise to 
centrality in popular culture is a result of both technical transforma-
tions and societal decisions. From the eighteenth century through the 
later twentieth century, modern pornography was largely a literary mat-
ter, though there have always been pictures. Literacy was a chief bar-
rier to access, and channels of distribution were largely underground. 
Today the ecology of communication in general has shifted with signifi-
cant implications for porn. In the U.S. in the 1960s, you were lucky to 
view four channels on your TV screen full of least-common-denomina-
tor programming; today on an appropriately linked computer screen, 
you can watch almost whatever niche fare you want. Inhibitions that 
once ruled both production and consumption have waned. The diffu-
sion of new platforms for content delivery such as mobile phones and 
computers makes media choices more and more a matter of private dis-
cretion. YouTube’s slogan “broadcast yourself” nicely captures the reor-
ganization of the past decades. Broadcasting was once mass, collective, 
and impersonal: today it is a medium of individual self-expression. In 
some sense, pornography is the “truth” of the middle-class communica-
tion situation today: it is privately viewed, digital, networked, virtual in 
sociability, and based as much in image as text. Anthony Giddens calls 
modernity a process of disembedding, and pornography today is partly 
a double disembedding, both of communication (from social monitor-
ing) and of sex (from presence).
 A few keystrokes can conjure sexually explicit content with histor-
ically unprecedented speed and indiscriminateness. Pornography has 
moved out of specialty shops, the mails, and clandestinely circulated 
publications into the home and office. It has jumped from print to pix-
els. It shapes the fashions people wear and the deeds people do, and it 
perhaps has its subtlest effect on the vital but immeasurable realm of 
the collective imagination. To reify something that is as essential and 
as mysterious to our humanity as sexuality into publicly accessible mat-
ter without regard to the context or covenant of its expression seems 
to me a potential form of civilizational suicide. What does it mean to 
fall in love with pictures? Sex is already our medium of existence, but 
pornography distills it into an uninhabitable perfume. Media always 
imply storage and transmission: what does it mean to bottle up sex for 
decontextualized use? The rise of porn as a multi-billion-dollar indus-
try should be a huge challenge to the classic liberal confidence that 
anything goes.29 In radically changed conditions of communication and 
shifting cultural norms, we might have better targets than Victorian 
prudery.
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IX.
The disembodiment of sex by audiovisual media is as potentially signifi-
cant to human history as the disembodiment of mind by writing. Plato’s 
Phaedrus stages the age-old fears that new media both disembody our 
souls and set loose new kinds of sexual predators. (These are intimately 
related.) That the writer can reach out from the text and take posses-
sion of the reader’s voice—which reads aloud—symbolizes the erotic 
capture of the body at a distance.30 In the same way, MySpace and Face-
book are eager to show their propriety in taking measures against sex-
ual predators. Every new medium harbors (fantasies of) such creatures.
 Media—devices that arrange souls and bodies in space and time—
always have erotic implications. Every media extension of the body, 
according to one of Marshall McLuhan’s best ideas, is also an ampu-
tation. Despite his posthumous christening by Wired magazine as the 
prophet of cyberspace, McLuhan was no fan of virtual disembodiment. 
Though he was not very consistent on this count (or any other), he 
often scorned the dream of electronic transcendence as “angelism.” 
Pornography can be understood precisely in his sense as an amputating 
extension. It is the zenith of a trend he noted, the absorption of touch 
and the other senses into the hypertrophy of the eye. It trades haptics 
for optics. Pornography is the most physiological of all media (most of 
which have physiological implications). The user (note the druggie lan-
guage) is exalted into solipsistic grandeur. Porn, like liberalism, holds 
out the dream of free individualistic consumer choice, and even more, 
of not being bound by the finitude of the flesh.
 Porn amps the gap between desire and sex. Said Aldous Huxley: 
“Many people are more agreeably excited by the representation—
whether pictorial or verbal—than by the carnal reality. It is a curious 
psychological fact, for which I can find no complete explanation.”31 The 
imagination can go places the body cannot. Lust, as Augustine said, 
does not drive us into the flesh: it exposes the painful gap between flesh 
and spirit. D. H. Lawrence, who complained that pornography made 
sex mental instead of bodily, might have been surprised to find him-
self scooped by the church father, but they agreed about the dangerous 
ways that lustful imagination side-stepped the blessings of being a mor-
tal creature. Desire, said Thomas Hobbes, is the absence of the object; 
love is its presence. (Here he followed Plato’s Symposium). “In pleasure,” 
said Goethe’s Faust, “I thirst for desire.”32 Desire is already obstreperous 
enough, but porn distends the ratio between desire and sex. We have 
“minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety.”33 Desire is poten-
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tially infinite, but sex, even at its most athletic, is always finite. The joint 
activity of friendly bodies making love need not have a lot to do with the 
pulsating imagination, although fiction does seem part of everything 
humans do.
 Porn’s dishonor of presence has something to do with the photo-
graphic medium and its code of realism. Like all realism it is dishonest 
in its suppression of the mediating artifice. Music—perhaps the great-
est erotic medium—handles desire differently. (As the old saying goes, 
there is an orgasm in Tchaikovsky every seven minutes.34) Music is both 
the most abstract and the most emotive of all arts. Music brings forth 
feeling in sound and time, but it is immune to fetishism in a way that 
pictures never can be. The eroticism of music is generally abstract; that 
of pornography is concrete. Music presents a utopia of generality, a way 
of being in an unspecified body. Music escapes positivity; photography 
captures contingency.
 Pornography is in league with a historical and social process of 
abstracting sexuality from spiritual, social, and emotional anchorage. It 
comes in a line of descent from materialist thought in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europe. The bodies in motion of enlightenment 
philosophy, as Margaret Jacob shows, mirrored the newly atomized 
sociability of urban life and of the new genre of the pornographic 
novel.35 On the question whether sexuality is a zone of free play or is 
embedded in larger narratives and practices, pornography clearly votes 
for differentiation—of sex from other realms and of organs from the 
body.36 Pornography’s treatment of sex as plastic pleasures removed 
from duties and persons fits the modern division of labor. It also fits the 
trend in modern media of transporting distant bodies as sights, sounds, 
and words. Interaction with distant people as symbolic effigies is one of 
the major transformations of modern times.37 Touch is no guarantee of 
ease or quality in linguistic or nonverbal interaction—but it is essential 
in sexual interaction. Porn provides sex without touch or the other. It 
does away with the object. The objectification of the person in the pic-
ture is paired to the subjectification of the viewer. The emancipation of 
sexual desire from the mortal, imperfect beloved is one of porn’s chief 
deficits. Too much perfection makes us sick.
X.
Liberals rarely admit (though they know very well) that pornography 
is not just a consumer choice but a battlefield for spiritual author-
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ity, a contest about what institutions and practices get to preside over 
inner life and its irrigation. ACLU head Nadine Strossen, for instance, 
pairs her defense of pornography with a superficial picture of the sex-
ual person. She marshals much useful evidence to show how legisla-
tive attempts to control porn backfire, but she does not see sexuality as 
open to degradation—or chastity as a positive good. Without even the 
usual invocation of social science research on minimal media effects, 
she can imagine no harm in sex or pornography: it is all happy con-
sensual healthy fun. Though her antagonist Catherine MacKinnon’s 
vision of sexuality is dire and bleak, rape and heterosexual intercourse 
being indistinguishable, MacKinnon at least grasps what one might call 
the Baudelairean side of sex. At one point Strossen dismisses Augus-
tine together with Puritans, Victorians, Christian fundamentalists, and 
anti-pornography feminists in one fell swoop.38 No doubt, some things 
Augustine said left a lasting blot, but his sense for the experience of 
mortal creatures is hauntingly resonant—the proximity of pleasure and 
pain, sex and violence, delight and degradation. What Nietzsche said of 
Paul counts better for Augustine or his legatee Freud: he is a “dysange-
list,” a bringer of bad tidings. We dismiss such insights at the risk of our 
own shallowness.
 In the modern world, pornography was first a political genre, and 
it is partly on political grounds that I oppose it. We need the solidity 
of a public world against Jacobin jouissance, the eros of revolutionary 
violence. Lust means the suspension of social order: its lesson is the 
thought that society no longer exists with its contracts, commitments, 
and relations. Lust can create a very exciting kind of counter-order or 
communitas, but it is not a sustainable program.39 Kin, lover, friend, citi-
zen, and stranger are crucially different kinds of relations. Pornography 
promises to eradicate the saving distance in human contact. Immediacy 
is always a lie. (This is the chief link from ethics to media studies.) Rep-
resentative institutions create complex webs of mediacy between peo-
ple. Porn is to love what revolution is to democracy—a magnification of 
an essential destructive element at the core of each. “The most tender 
place in my heart is for strangers,” sings Neko Case. It can be so much 
easier to fall in love with passing phantoms than to live with people for 
years. What checks do we have against the vertigo of bad infinity?
 One should be able to both favor free expression and consider the 
porn industry a cultural, spiritual, ethical, and political catastrophe. 
Liberalism shares the ecological idea that maximization of diversity 
is the surest path to future viability. In wildness is the preservation of 
the world. But environmental analysis does not renounce judgment: it 
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knows of blights and species that run rampant. Why is this kind of judg-
ment so difficult for the ecologist of speech? (One reason is liberal phi-
losophy’s insufficiently examined equation of market competition and 
the discovery of truth.) If we want maximal diversity, we might well be 
appalled by the proliferation of some species. One can join the civil lib-
ertarians in their defense of free speech and still find pornography a 
plague in the land.
XI.
The critics of obscenity of late are often less formidable intellectually 
than they are politically. This is not true of the granddaddy of them all, 
Moses, the fiercest and deepest thinker there is on obscenity. Plato, who 
comes in a close second, seems to have thought that bodily begetting 
was inferior to intellectual begetting; the anti-sex impulse in western 
thought and culture is in his lineage, not Moses’. Genesis, his first book 
in the traditional but discredited view of biblical authorship, concerns 
the familial adventures of the phallus, its circumcision, covenant, and 
begettings. Exodus, his second, concerns the political struggle for libera-
tion from captivity and the long journey to the Promised Land. (Genesis 
is the book of Freud, Exodus the book of Marx.)40 Sexuality for Moses 
was bound by law. It was to be properly embedded in a covenant rela-
tionship. Ever since, we have been trying to wriggle out of the box of 
sex as justice. Those who think that we can call the whole thing off and 
start over in Edenic innocence, or look forward to the millennial day 
when sex operates under some other sign than law are, in my view, not 
fully informed. The longing for the innocence of the sexual dawn or for 
the lifting of the strictures of the law are well-established impulses in the 
Mosaic legacy. These remain the stories of the post-European world, for 
good and ill, and the infrastructure of its unconscious. When we think 
we can bypass this tradition, we only find it waiting for us at the end of 
the road.
 Whatever, whoever, if ever Moses was, his name stands for a mix of 
currents and gestures: law-giving, people-formation, covenant-making, 
idol-smashing, and sacred writing. The deep structure of our worries 
about obscenity has something deep to do with monotheism. A single 
god is a jealous god, prone to wrath, indignation, and even disgust. The 
main target of biblical wrath is idols—competitor deities, often female 
ones full of fertility and sexuality, ever alluring with their images and 
devotees in their temples. Idolatry is always figured as adultery by the 
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Hebrew prophets, as the people of Israel breaking their marriage cov-
enant with God. The second of the ten Mosaic commandments pro-
claims, as noted, a Bilderverbot or ban on images. A media policy against 
visual representations in favor of the text was a religious matter. God 
was aniconic, appearing by writing or sound, but never by visual image.41 
Monotheism’s first target, we might say, was pornography.
 The friends of liberty are sometimes tempted to dismiss the mono-
theistic heritage as censorious and intolerant, and to see its “fundamen-
talist” descendents as the major threat to free expression today—which 
they might be. (I’d add the market and the state.) But liberalism also 
owes to monotheism its central gesture of an incandescent all-seeing 
reason. World-historically, monotheism has blazing epistemological 
accomplishments. Iconoclasm (the smashing of images), said Hegel, 
is the precondition of analytic thinking. A transcendent god leaves 
worldly zones evacuated of the divine—specifically the idols themselves, 
which are made of mere wood and stone. Monotheism opens up the 
world to a liberty of human action apart from divine control—a reli-
giously neutral space apt for scientific experimentation, interreligious 
toleration, and debates in the public sphere. A notion of secular empty 
matter is not found in more relaxed polytheistic cultures. There the 
gods are everywhere; so often is sexuality. Sexual discipline and intel-
lectual achievement coincide; Freud was not original in noting the epis-
temocarnal doubleness of the biblical term “to know” or the fruits of 
sublimation.42
 Moses’ legacy is a deeply mixed bag and deserves more than this 
teaser (and let us be extremely careful here, for this narrative can be 
hijacked for anti-Semitic purposes). It provides a vocabulary of outrage 
and revulsion that has never been surpassed: “a stench in my nostrils,” 
“an abomination.” (Outrage about idols often meant violence against 
idol-worshippers.) But it also tells the story of family lineage, the Prom-
ised Land, of a peace and justice that would fill the whole earth. It 
founds a patriarchal order that—speaking of obscenity—ritualistically 
cuts the penis as a sign of the promise with God (berit or bris = circumci-
sion and covenant). Moses gave the shelter of legal and lawful covenant 
to something as flammable as sex. Moses was not anti-sex: he was pro-
sex and anti-idol. He wanted the one true god, not the many false ones, 
to preside over sex. Whether his legacy is one major part of the long 
reign of heteronormative patriarchy or the binding of male sexuality to 
fidelity and care is an open question. Odds are we won’t get over our 
troubles about obscenity any time soon, and that might be a very fine 
thing.43
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